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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The nature of government business enterprises (GBEs) as a nexus between 
government control and private sector management gives rise to three research 
questions. They are: (1) Does the way management (including the board) aligns the 
development of GBE organisational capabilities and the formulation of strategies have 
an influence on the financial performance and management’s emphasis for 
discharging accountability requirements of that GBE? (2)  Does the extent of adoption 
of board governance structures have an influence on financial performance and 
accountability-emphasis given by management of a GBE? (3) Does board 
composition moderate the relationship between capabilities-strategy configurations 
and performance of a GBE?  
 
  This study addresses these questions in three stages. First, the study explores 
the concepts of corporate governance, board governance in particular, strategy, 
capabilities and accountability in the context of GBEs. This is done by analysing 
textual data from selected GBEs’ annual reports and interviews with GBEs’ 
executives. Second, the study investigates relationships between GBEs’ governance 
arrangements and performance, on the one hand, and capabilities-strategy match and 
performance on the other hand. The concept of performance used in this study is 
separated into financial performance, measured by  economic rate of return (ERR) (a 
government-developed algorithm for GBEs comprising financial accounting and 
market measures), and accountability-emphasis (ACCBTY) (management’s attention 
to systems and processes used for discharging aspects of accountability). Third, the 
study investigates the moderating effects of GBEs’ board governance arrangements 
on the relationship between capabilities-strategy match and performance. Modelling 
the study this way allows for a more integrated understanding of factors contributing 
to performance of organisations that operate at the interface between government 
control and policy oversight and private sector-type competitive markets and 
management autonomy. Modelling from this particular combination of perspectives, 
distinguishes the current study from prior studies.  
 
xiv 
 The current study contributes to the focal literature as follow. First, the study 
adds to prior research in the separate bodies of literature on  corporate 
governance/performance relationships, and capabilities-strategy match/performance 
relationships, respectively, by providing a rationale and empirical findings on an 
aspect of their integrating in the context of GBEs. Second, the study contributes to the 
methods used to develop a corporate governance index (CGI) by adding some unique 
features to such an index that make it adaptable to GBEs. Third, the study extends 
prior public sector accountability studies by investigating the use of processes to 
discharge accountability and thereby, developing and testing a new measure of 
accountability emphasis that goes beyond prior research into identifying dimensions 
of accountability.  
   
 The empirical analysis is conducted based on two datasets, using both primary 
and secondary data. The first dataset comprises of extracts from annual reports of 141 
GBEs- 97% of GBE population in Australia. This dataset provides secondary data 
used to measure variables concerned with GBEs’ governance arrangements and 
financial performance. The second dataset comprises primary data from senior 
managers’ responses to a questionnaire returned from 91 GBEs- 64% of the 
population. This questionnaire data is supplemented by interviews with selected GBE 
managers. The primary data is used to measure variables relating to capabilities-
strategy match and accountability emphasis. 
 
 The findings of the study are as follow. First, the results of a set of 
multivariate analyses indicate that board governance index (BGI) has a positive and 
significant relationship with ERR, but has no significant relationship with ACCBTY. 
At the individual governance mechanism level, the percentages of non-executive 
directors (NEDs), politically-related directors (PRDs) and financial-literate directors 
(FLDs) are all strongly and positively related to ERR. These findings are supported by 
certain prior studies from different contexts. On the ACCBTY side, these specific 
board governance variables are not found to support a hypothesis that the composition 
of the board will impact on the GBE’s attention to accountability processes.   
 
 Second, the findings indicate that capabilities-strategy match (CSM) has no 
significant influence on ERR but has a strong and positive impact on ACCBTY. The 
xv 
results indicate that only the alignment between defender strategic-type and outside-in 
capabilities has a positive relationship with both ERR and ACCBTY.  Other than the 
defender strategic position, alternative strategy-types will align with capabilities (e.g. 
prospector strategy and inside-out capabilities) to have a significant positive affect on 
ACCBTY, but not on ERR. These findings are corroborated with qualitative evidence 
from open ended questions in the questionnaire and the text of interviews. 
 
 Third, the study finds that GBE’s board governance arrangements (BGI) have 
a positive moderating affect on the relationship between capabilities-strategy match 
and ERR. However, BGI has no moderating impact on capabilities-strategy match and 
ACCBTY relationship.   
 
 These findings are interpreted in the light of the hypotheses generated earlier 
from the literature review and the use of congruence and agency theories. As a  
summary, the findings draw the conclusion that in order to achieve their dual 
objectives of concurrently fulfilling financial performance and accountability-
emphasis, GBEs need to adopt a defender strategic-type, develop strengths in outside-
in capabilities and have their boards of directors comprise of non-executive directors, 
politically-linked directors and financial-literate directors. Given the limitations 
underlying the findings that are mentioned, the conclusion from this study has 
implications for government-owners and managers of GBE.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the current study and has four sections. The first 
section discusses problems inherent in structural and operational arrangements of 
government business enterprises (GBEs). These problems give rise to research 
questions for this study. The second section provides the research questions and 
objectives of the study. The third section discusses the significance of the study. This 
section will thoroughly discuss how the current study contributes to relevant literature 
and how it provides insights for policy makers, boards of directors and the executive 
management of GBEs in Australia. The last section introduces the structure of this 
thesis.   
 
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
 
The corporatisation of commercial arms of government departments, statutory 
authorities and other agencies throughout the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to a group of 
public-private sector entities referred to as government business enterprises (GBEs) in 
Australia.  Corporatisation provided GBEs a considerable amount of managerial 
autonomy enabling their boards of directors to set internal governance mechanisms 
and commercial strategies. Nevertheless, GBEs remained wholly government owned 
and subject to accountability control from the government (Bottomley, 2001; Barret, 
2000; Halligan and Horrigan, 2005; Wettenhall, 1998; Luke, 2008; Thynne, 1998a, 
1998b). GBEs are controlled under statutes and government policy directives that 
place high expectations on their corporate governance quality and high demands on 
their accountability performance. At the same time, GBEs are given managerial 
independence to develop their own organisational capabilities and strategies that can 
enable them to meet commercial performance targets and be competitive. 
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 The modern operational arrangement for GBEs has received considerable   
attention and been subject to much debate. The main focus of public and political 
attention has been on managerial effectiveness in driving commercial performance. 
Thynne (1998b) and Thynne and Wettenhall (2004) express concern that GBEs’ 
operating environment can both enhance and constrain their operations and thus the 
extent to which objectives can be obtained. They contend that government policy 
controls specifically imposed on GBEs will affect not just their actual performance 
but also the means by which performance is formally assessed.  Halligan and 
Horrigan (2005) are also concerned with governance settings and commercial 
competitiveness. Furthermore, Thynne (1998b) contends that there should be a 
balancing system embedded in GBEs’ operational arrangements, which enables them 
to achieve their multi-objectives: 
 
The establishment and operation of a company in government requires 
that some form of balance be achieved between and among a number of 
opposing forces. The most apparent of these involve the demands 
of…economic efficiency leading to wealth maximization (in pursuit of 
clearly defined commercial objectives) and price-capping on the goods 
and services provided (as a means of being socially responsible or 
discharging what are referred to as community service obligations) 
(p.302). 
 
This issue is not new since it dates back to Seidman’s (1954;1968) theory of evolution 
of the public trading enterprise organisation. The move to full autonomy is favoured 
in terms of achieving commercial objectives, however it is not favoured in term of 
accountability.  The issue of meeting multiple accountabilities and at the same time 
striving for financial efficiency is a primary concern of most public sector entities 
according to Barret (2000).  
  
 By nature, GBEs are a nexus between government ownership and control and 
a private sector management philosophy and operating environment. Their private-
public characteristics give rise to some fundamental research problems: 
 
1. Can the development of organisational capabilities and the setting of 
strategies be effectively matched when there are both private and public channels for 
organisational decision-making? 
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2. Do corporate governance arrangements, especially the board composition, 
provide desirable outcomes for the organisation when a proportion of board members 
is politically appointed and, in some cases, a minister has power of veto over GBE 
management? 
3. Can both financial performance (needed to compete and be profitable under 
free market conditions) and attention to accountability requirements (in term of 
effectively and efficiently fulfilling accountability requirements and expectations to 
government and the public) be concurrently achieved? 
4. Can capabilities-strategy alignment and corporate governance arrangements 
be positioned in such a way that a GBE can simultaneously achieve its financial goals 
and accountability requirements? 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
  
The study will address three empirical questions:  
 
(1) In a GBE, to what extent does the way management (including the board) aligns 
the development of the organisation’s broad capabilities and the formulation of 
strategies have an influence on the financial performance and management’s emphasis 
on processes to discharging accountability  of that GBE?  
 
(2)  To what extent does the adoption of board governance structures have an 
influence on financial performance and accountability emphasis given by 
management of a GBE?  
 
(3) To what extent does board composition moderate the relationship between 
capabilities-strategy configurations and performance of a GBE?  
  
 
 
 The objectives of the study are: 
 
(1) To extend the literature in several ways. First, the relationship between strategic-
type and organisational capabilities has been predominately investigated in the 
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context of the private sector, not the public sector. This study extends the 
investigation to government-owned enterprises. Second, the literature on how 
capabilities-strategy alignment and corporate governance, respectively, relate to 
performance has focused on financial performance. This study extends this literature 
to effects on accountability-based performance. 
 
(2) To provide evidence about the comparative impacts of two contemporary control 
devices adapted by management of GBEs, as organisations that operated in a nexus 
between private sector market conditions and public sector ownership and oversight 
conditions. These two control mechanisms are the structures put in place for good 
corporate governance and the types of accountabilities to be rendered by management 
to different stakeholder groups, particularly the government-owner and the public.  
 
(3) To provide evidence about the mix of congruency factors (i.e. capabilities-
strategies alignments) and agency monitoring factors (i.e. board structures) on both 
types of performance, namely, financial performance and accountability outcomes of 
GBEs. This can provide insights of relevance for management practice and 
government policy-makers. 
 
1.4 MOTIVATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
  
 The study is motivated by several factors. First, the modelling of a 
combination of concepts used in private sector and public sector studies can be 
brought together. Although many studies have investigated the direct relationship 
between corporate governance and performance, these studies are mainly conducted 
in the private sector. GBEs are operated in a unique environment where the 
management needs to balance accountability and profitability (Luke, 2008; Thynne, 
1998b; Bottomley, 2001; Thynne, 1998a; Wettenhall, 2001; NSW Treasury, 1991; 
Tasmania Treasury & Finance, 1998; Queensland Treasury, 2005). Previous studies 
have been in the context of privately-owned enterprises where profitability applies or 
public sector agencies where accountability applies, not like GBEs where both are 
important aspects of performance.   This situation is similar for studies of the 
relationship between the capabilities-strategy match and performance, where the 
context has involved privately-owned enterprises (Smith et al., 1986; Conant et al., 
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1990; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980). Thus, there is a motivation to extend the 
investigation to the context of GBEs so that the interaction effects of governance, and 
capabilities-strategy match can be compared on their affect on both types of 
performance.  Modelling in this context provides a richer basis for testing underlying 
agency theory invoked in this study.   
  
 Second, the study is motivated by an endeavour to bridge three separate bodies 
of literature – the literature on corporate governance, accountability and 
organisational competencies/strategy-types. There are separate bodies of prior 
literature that have focused on the direct effect of corporate governance on 
performance and capabilities-strategy match on performance, respectively.  These 
studies, explicitly exclude many other factors that can affect organisational 
performance. Therefore, the prior findings are somewhat incomplete and have not 
drawn together the relationships between corporate governance, capabilities-strategy 
match and performance. This linking of literature in the context of GBEs provides a 
motivation to this study.  
 
 Lastly, the findings from the study can provide new insights for policy makers, 
the board of directors and the management in making decisions effecting GBE’s 
performance. The findings can enable readers to reflect on the scope and impact of the 
reforms in the public sector.  The study should be able to provide boards of directors 
with information to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the alternative 
governance structures and accountability orientations of their GBE. From executive 
management’s perspective, the study will provide new understanding about the ‘big 
picture’ management issue of developing and maintaining the right congruence 
between their organisation’s range of capabilities and chosen strategy-type.    
 
1.5 THESIS ORGANISATION 
 
 
This thesis is divided into 7 chapters. The first chapter provides the 
introduction, research problems, research questions and significance of the study. The 
relevant theories and literature will be thoroughly reviewed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 provide a detailed hypotheses development and methodology.  The 
findings from textual analysis on accountabilities, capabilities and strategies of GBEs 
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from selected annual reports and interviews are provided in chapter 5. The descriptive 
statistics on GBEs sampled in the mail survey, and discussion of the variables used in 
the study will be provided in chapter 6. The seventh chapter provides a 
comprehensive analysis and discussion of the empirical results of the study. It 
involves answering the research questions and hypotheses. The last chapter provides 
concluding remarks concerning the major findings, implications of the findings and 
limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter presents a detailed review of literature that is focal to the current 
study. The literature under review is drawn from research across the disciplines of 
accounting, management and public administration. It centres specifically around the 
themes of corporate governance, organisational capabilities, corporate strategy and 
public sector accountability. The nature and theoretical underpinnings of the major 
concepts within these themes is included in the review. The chapter ends up with a 
section that identifies the gaps in the literature that will be addressed by this study. 
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
This section has four parts. The first part reviews the theoretical underpinnings 
and applied nature of the concept and features of corporate governance and elements 
within it. The second part reviews proposed models that have been developed as 
alternative approaches to measuring the quality of corporate governance in term of 
indexes or ratings. The third part presents the empirical research literature that tests 
relationships between particular characteristics of corporate governance and 
organisational performance. The emerging empirical studies on boards of directors’ 
inter-personal behaviours and how this can affect organisational performance are also 
reviewed. The last part of this section contains an annotated literature review of 
empirical studies on corporate governance. 
 
 
2.2.1 THE NATURE AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE  
 
Corporate governance is a topic that has gained much attention from both 
scholars and authoritative bodies. The phenomenon of corporate governance has 
emerged from organisational and economic structures and events, including the 
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increased in separation of ownership and control, deregulation, globalisation, 
corporate scandals and collapses, the Asian economic crisis and the emergence of 
shareholder activism (Gregory, 2000).  
 
Authoritative definitions of corporate governance have been formulated first 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it applied 
a relationships emphasis with corporate governance defined as “the full set of 
relationships among a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders” (OECD, 2004 p 11). The OECD explains that this definition provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set and the means of 
attaining those objectives are monitored. The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
provides a system view of corporate governance by relating that it is the system by 
which companies are directed and managed, how the objectives of the company are 
set and achieved, how risk is monitored and assessed and how performance is 
optimised (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003).  
 
Various perspectives on the definitions of corporate governance have been 
taken by scholars in different academic disciplines. Gregory (2000) argued that 
corporate governance is concerned with the relationships between corporate managers, 
directors and the providers of equity capital. From a similar owner-manager 
perspective, Fama and Jensen (1983) defined corporate governance as the relationship 
between efficient allocation of residual claims and decision process functions. 
Corporate governance has also been defined among economists and legal scholars as 
the defences of shareholders’ interest (Trole, 1997). Hart (1995) provided a more 
practical problem solving view of corporate governance, as it is the mechanisms to 
solve disagreement within the firm and mechanisms to allow smooth decision-making 
on issues that has not been specified in the initial agency-principal contract.  
 
A commonly accepted view is that corporate governance structures are 
appropriate to control the interest of parties involved in, or affected by, the 
organisations’ operations and allocations of its residual interests. Governance 
structures, however, will be different between corporations and according to 
expectations of the society within their operating environment. In other word the 
actual governance structures will be different among countries as well. 
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Corporate governance provides many benefits to both the organisation and its 
stakeholders. According to a survey by Felton et al., (1996), two-thirds of US 
investors are willing to pay more for a well-governed company- ideally a company 
that is responsive to its investors and has an independent board. The survey was 
repeated by Mckinsey Investor Opinion (Gregory, 2000) for Asia, Europe and Latin 
America, which produced the same result. The results of these surveys suggest that 
effective corporate governance structures help the firm to raise greater capital. More 
specifically, it is claimed that effective governance that safeguards better transparency 
and voluntary disclosure can provide firms with the benefits of lower cost of capital 
i.e., lower interest on debt contract (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). There are arguments 
that stakeholders also reap benefits, if governance structures ensure that the board and 
management are accountable for pursuing corporate objectives and complying with 
relevant laws, regulatory requirements and expectations of the society.   
 
While there has been much research on corporate governance in the last 
decade, it tends to lack explicit theoretical underpinning. A well established theory 
underpinning corporate governance is agency theory (Clarke, 1998). Related theories 
that can be applied to corporate governance are stakeholder theory and to a lesser 
extent stewardship theory. 
 
Agency theory provides a conceptual framework to the corporate governance 
behaviours of bonding the management to the interests of owners (shareholders). The 
underlying features of agency theory are the separation of ownership and control of 
the firm, which give rise to agency relationship between management (agent) and the 
shareholders (principals), the assumption that individuals are profit-maximised and 
agency or contracting costs ((Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hart, 1995; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). These are the characteristics of most modern corporations either 
public or private companies.  
 
An agency relationship is a contract under which one or more persons 
(principal(s)) engage another person (agent) to perform some services on their behalf 
and involves with delegation of decision making authority (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Given this relationship a profit maximised agent would act opportunistically in 
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their self-interest, hence conflict of interests arises. These elements alone however do 
not provide rationales for governance structures, as comprehensive contracting with 
risk-sharing features between the principals and agent can eliminate such problem. It 
is the incomplete contracting, which resulted from high costs to develop a 
comprehensive contract that gives rise to agency problem and warrant governance 
structures (Hart, 1995).  
 
Agency costs are the costs incur to align the interests of management to 
shareholders, which include monitoring costs, borne by the principal, bonding costs, 
borne by the agent and residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Monitoring costs 
are costs of setting up governance mechanisms to monitor and control management’s 
activities, including cost of audits, writing executive compensation contracts and 
ultimately the cost of changing management. Bonding costs, on the other hand arise 
as management recognized that it ultimately bear the monitoring costs, thus setting up 
governance mechanisms to assure that it will acts in the best interest of shareholders.  
This may include providing additional information disclosures to shareholders 
(McColgan, 2001).  
 
Other features of agency issues are information asymmetry and ownership 
structure. In situations where the management knows more about the firms’ 
operations and future prospects than the shareholders; governance structures that 
ensure additional information disclosure and transparency are required. This is to 
deter management from using inside information to advance their self interest. 
Ownership structure has many implications toward the principle-agency relationship 
and agency problems. If ownership is concentrated with a few shareholders 
(blockholders) then they have the power to influence the board of directors and 
indirectly the management to advance their interest at the expense other shareholders 
or minority shareholders. Alternatively, they can increase managerial monitoring and 
thus improve performance. Moreover, when board members and the chief executive 
officer (CEO) share ownership of firm their interests would align to those of 
shareholders’, with the principle aims to increase their share of wealth (Coles et al., 
2001; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
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In addition, it could be argued that the application of Agency Theory to 
examine the behaviour of management with respect to GBE is too narrow and needs 
reconsideration to broaden it with contracting (an expansion of the agency theory). 
The reason is that GBEs are subject less agency cost due to closeness of the owners, 
which is in the case, the government. When such closeness exists, the literature 
suggests an entrenchment problem in which the dominant owners can dictate terms 
and conditions to the detriment of the minority owners. However, the GBEs in the 
study have no minority owner. Therefore, there is a need for efficient governance 
structures to narrow the gap between the interests of the management and 
shareholders and to have a significant impact on corporate performance and firm 
value overall. 
 
An allied theory underpinning corporate governance is stakeholder theory. 
Stakeholder theory stated that management has duties to constituencies other than 
shareholders, which include duties to employees, suppliers, customers, local 
communities and the general public (Hill and Jones, 1992; Boatright, 1994; Brennan 
and Solomon, 2008).  Thus it implies that governance structures need to encompass 
all possible relationships and issues arising as a result of management’s relationships 
to the firm’s stakeholders. This also means that management has corporate objectives 
to pursue beyond the shareholders’ main interest of profit maximisation and increase 
firm’s value. The management is expected to balance the objectives wide stakeholders 
with those of shareholders.   
 
Stakeholder theory of corporate governance is subjected to many criticisms, 
which directed toward the monitoring and effectiveness attributes of corporate 
governance.  Sternberg (1997) argues that stakeholder theory provided a firm has no 
substantive end objective other than to balance stakeholder objectives. Thus, there is 
neither social objective nor firms’ value maximisation. Moreover, balancing 
stakeholder objectives is impossible, as it is difficult to determine the number of 
parties affected and benefited from firms’ operations and quantifies their benefits 
(Sternberg, 1997). Lastly there is no conceptual specification of how to make the 
tradeoffs among stakeholders. This absence destroys corporate performance 
measurements and evaluations system and provides legitimate excuses for 
management to pursuit their interests, as there is no principled way to say that a 
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manager has done good or bad job (Jensen, 2001). Health and Norman (2004) and 
Jensen (2001) suggested that these are the reasons that led to the demise of early 
corporate governance philosophy of state-owned enterprises and the failure of 
socialist and communist experiment in the last century.   
 
The employment of either the shareholder or stakeholder approach to the 
design and evaluation of corporate governance structures is influenced by country 
specific factors. According to Allen and Gale (2002) Anglo-Saxon countries like US 
and UK would employ a shareholder-focus in governance structures and countries 
like Japan, Germany and France would employ a stakeholder approach. 
 
In contrast stewardship theory of corporate governance purports that there is 
no need for financial incentives to bond management’s interest to the shareholders’ 
interests. The management is motivated by personal need to achieve, to gain intrinsic 
satisfaction through successfully performing inherently challenge work, to exercise 
responsibility and authority (McClelland, 1961; Herberg et al., 1959). Moreover, the 
management carries out their functions out of the sense of duty, which is, normatively 
induced compliance. In addition, organisational sociologists argue, against agency 
theory perspective, that management interests are aligned with corporate and 
shareholders interests, by personal perception instead. If a manager feels that their 
future fortunes are bound to their current employers through an expectation of future 
employment or pension rights, then that manager would align their interests with that 
of the corporation and its owners.  
 
 Stewardship theory, thus provided that there is no motivational problem and 
governance structures should be set to facilitate high corporate performance rather 
then bonding management to corporate and shareholders interest (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Evidence suggests that CEO duality (CEO and Chairperson is the same 
individual) improves corporate performance. This is because CEO duality facilitates a 
better working environment for the management, less complex structure and 
monitoring routines (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
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2.2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM AND A CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE INDEX 
 
 Corporate governance mechanisms have common features across firms, 
whether they are employed to align management’s interests to the shareholders’ or to 
facilitate flexible work environment. The mechanisms include board of directors, 
insider share ownership, executive compensation schemes, blockholders, institutional 
shareholders, and the market for corporate control (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Weir 
et al., 2002).  The first three are called internal mechanisms whereas the last three are 
external mechanisms. The structures of the board of directors consist of board 
leadership, board composition and board size. The market for corporate control 
includes managerial and director labour markets and takeover activity. Beside these 
components suggested by scholars, many authoritative bodies around the globe have 
issued principles of good corporate governance and best practice recommendations. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003), OECD (2004) and Business 
Roundtable (2005) principles of good governance can be summarised into three 
common themes, accountability (both internal and external), transparency/openness 
and recognition of stakeholders/shareholder rights (Edwards and Clough, 2005). 
Table 2.1 provides governance elements related to each theme. 
 
TABLE 2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ELEMENTS 
Theme Governance 
characteristics 
Description 
Accountability- 
Internal & External 
Board composition, 
Role of Chairperson, 
Role of CEO 
Board size, 
Risk management framework, 
Board committees, 
Board independence, 
Remuneration, 
Compliance with regulations 
and enforcement authorities, 
Code of ethical conduct 
These characteristics 
achieve internal 
accountability by improving 
company performance, 
efficient operations and 
added value. 
They help external 
accountability by bonding 
firm’s operations with 
external parties’ 
expectations and interests.  
Transparency/Openness Board 
roles/functions/composition 
disclosures, 
Firms’ 
objectives/policies/compliance 
disclosures, 
Financial information: 
application of corporation 
laws and accounting 
These characteristics help 
ensure full disclosures and 
transparencies. 
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standards, 
Timely and balanced 
disclosure 
Recognise Stakeholders and 
Shareholders 
Keep shareholders/legitimate 
stakeholder informed, 
Respect shareholders/ 
legitimate stakeholders rights, 
Communication procedures 
between shareholders and 
board of directors, 
Promote social responsibility, 
Equitable treatment of all 
shareholders 
These characteristics help 
fulfil the requirements that 
the firms’ board and 
management have to their 
constituencies. 
Source: ASX, Corporate Governance Council (2003); OECD (2004); Roundtable 
(2005) 
 
 In the public sector, corporate governance characteristics and guidelines are 
quite different from those of the private sector. However, for public entities that 
conduct their business in a commercial manner, the private sectors’ governance 
characteristics and guidelines are also applicable. This is evident in the Queensland 
Government’s corporate governance guideline for state owned companies  
(Queensland Department Treasury, 2005), Tasmanian Government’s corporate 
governance handbook for government business enterprises (Tasmania Department of 
Treasury and Finance, 1998), the Uhirg (2003) review and recommendation of 
corporate governance practice for statutory authorities and office holders 
(Commonwealth), Public Corporation Act 1993 (SA), NSW Guide to better practice 
for public sector governing and advisory boards (The Audit Office of New South 
Wales, 1998), Victoria’s guiding principles of corporate governance in the public 
sector (Cameron, 2003) and OECD guidelines on corporate governance of state-
owned enterprises (OECD., 2005).  Moreover, a review of territory, state and federal 
government business enterprises (GBEs) indicates that they have similar corporate 
governance structures to their private sector counterparts. 
 
The main differences between the two sectors lie in ownership, direct 
requirements and accountability. The commercial public sector entity is fully owned 
by the government with either the State or a combination between the Portfolio 
Minister and Treasury/Finance Minister is the shareholders. Additionally, it must have 
an Audit Committee and there will be a formal channel for the shareholding Ministers 
to communicate with board and management and impose government policy. These 
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characteristics make the entity accountable to the Ministers, government, parliament 
and the public, which is very much different from its private sector counterparts 
(Bottomley, 2001; Thynne, 1998a, 1998b; Wettenhall, 2001; Thynne and Wettenhall, 
2004).  
 
 A study of Canadian state-owned enterprises indicated that their governance 
structure changes when they operate under corporatisation form and toward 
commercialisation oriented (Bozec et al., 2004). There is a similar finding for New 
Zealand crown companies (McKinlay, 1998). The board structures become 
compatible to those of private sector, with board independence and private- sector like 
Board Committees.  
 
 Corporate governance ratings or indexes (CGI) are developed to answer the 
need for a simple and easily understood tool to judge governance practices and 
determine their quality. CGI allows for easy comparison between firms’ governance 
practices and a useful tool to monitor management’s activities. Moreover, it is 
claimed to represent the phenomenon of real investment risk, as low CGI would lead 
to poor performance (Sherman, 2004).   
 
 CGI is developed by both scholarly researchers and professional service firms. 
Researchers develop indices to assist their studies, which range from a single 
governance provision index to the entire governance structure, whereas professional 
service firms develop indices for ratings purposes at firm level as well as country 
level. Examples of alternative CGIs are provided in the following paragraphs. 
   
  First, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, (2003), in their study of corporate 
governance and equity prices have developed an index that focuses on shareholder 
rights, known as the ‘g’ score.  The ‘g’ score is centred on governance characteristics 
that either increase shareholders rights or increase management power (restricting 
shareholder rights). There are five categories of governance characteristics, including 
Delay, Protection, Voting, Other and State. Each category consists of governance 
provisions and any characteristic considered as restricting shareholders rights will 
have one point added to the firms’ ‘g’ score. The dataset used to conduct the index 
comes from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which has State 
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level data on takeover law and other publicly available information. The ‘g’ score has 
a possible range from 1 to 24 with duplication characteristics within the categories 
considered as one (1 point). The lower the ‘g’ score, the better the firm’s governance 
practices. As governance provisions have equal weighting the methodologies could be 
seen as too simple, because it doesn’t acknowledge that different governance 
characteristics have different levels of important to stakeholders and affect firms’ 
operation and performance differently. 
 
 Secondly, The German Society of Financial Analysts (DVFA) has developed a 
CGI known as Corporate Governance Scorecard (hereafter known as Scorecard) 
(Strenger, 2004). The Scorecard is simple to develop, easy to understand and 
applicable to all firms and countries.  The Scorecard bases on two main categories, the 
‘Corporate governance commitment’ which reflects best practices and accounts for 
75% of the weighting and the other 25% is allocated toward the fulfilment of 
‘additional or suggested” code of practice. In the case of the German Scorecard there 
are seven categories, which included ‘corporate governance commitment’ and six 
additional codes of practices of the “additional or suggested’ category. The firms’ 
governance score is given by the evaluator on the basis of whether governance 
characteristics are presented or not. There are three choices, yes, partially and no with 
a corresponding point of one, half and zero point respectively. Furthermore, to avoid 
the ‘box-ticking’ trap, individual weighting is allowed. The overall governance score 
is the sum of each category’s score. 
 
Third, Canada, Globe and Mail’s business magazine called Report on 
Business has developed a CGI for Canadian trading firms (Klein et al., 2005). The 
index (hereafter known as ROB index) is developed based on best practices culled 
from corporate governance guidelines and recommendations of US and Canadian 
regulators, as well as major institutional investors and association (McFarland, 2002). 
ROB index has a possible range from 0 to 100, obtained from summing up of four 
sub-indices. The sub-indices are Board composition with 40 points, Shareholding and 
Compensation policies with 23 points, Shareholder rights policies with 22 points and 
Disclosure policies with 15 points. The points given are further disseminated within 
each sub-index and bases on their level of important to overall corporate governance 
practices. The greater weighting that places on Board composition is fairly reasonable 
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as board of directors set governance structure and oversight system. However, 
weighting of Disclosure policies could be a concern.  
 
Fourth, Mothanty (2003) in studying the relationship between organisational 
performance and corporate governance in India has developed another distinct CGI. 
Mothanty’s CGI (known as ‘I’ index from here onward) is developed based 
stakeholders governance perspective, where greater weighting places on shareholders. 
There are seven stakeholders, namely Shareholders, Bondholders, Employees, 
Customers, Suppliers, Government and Society. The interactions between the firm 
and the stakeholders are classified into three forms, Positive, Neutral and Negative. 
Each form of association has a different weighting, with positive, zero and negative 
points given respectively. The Shareholders-stakeholder receives more weighting in 
the overall ‘I’ score than other stakeholders. The ‘I’ score is the sum of all 
stakeholders’ score.  The points given to each stakeholder and forms of association 
are quite arbitrated.  Moreover, there could be a problem where a firm has a positive 
‘I’ score as a result of positive interaction with one stakeholder but negative 
interaction with others.  
 
Fifth, apart from India, other emerging capital markets also focus on corporate 
governance practices and CGI. Most of the studies in the emerging capital markets, 
like Greek and Asian markets, focus on the common area of the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance. Xanthakis, Tsipouri and Spanos (2004), 
developed a CGI for the Greek’s capital market (known as Greek’s score) which is 
based on OECD principles of corporate governance. The five OECD principles of 
corporate governance are transformed into 37 governance indicators and 54 
questionnaires. The 37 indicators comprise of 6 indicators related to Shareholder 
rights, 9 indicators for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 for Board, 5 for CEO and 
Executives and 5 for General issues. The scores for each indicator are 0, 1 and 2 
points, which corresponding to inadequate, intermediate and top performance 
respectively. The five categories are weighted differently with Transparency and 
Disclosure receives top weighting followed by Shareholders rights, Board, CEO and 
Executive and General Issues. The Greek’s score is the sum of all governance 
characteristics, hence the higher the score, the better the governance practices. 
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Sixth, another CGI constructed in the emerging capital markets is the Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia CGI of 25 markets from 25 countries (Durnev and Kim, 
2005; Klapper and Love, 2002)   The CGI is compiled by a composite of 57 
qualitative, binary (yes/no) questions which are designed to avoid subjectivity. The 
questions are categorized into 7 governance characteristics, namely Discipline, 
Transparency, Independence, Accountability, Responsibility, Fairness and Social 
awareness. The first 6 characteristics are weighted equally, 15% each, and the last 
characteristic is weighted 10% of the total index score. Every ‘yes’ answer will add 
one point to the firms’ governance score. Klapper and Love (2002) modified the 
above methodologies to include only the first 6 categories in their study of the affect 
of CGI on corporate performance. Other scholarly developed indices are Chen, Kao, 
Tsao and Wu’s (2007) and Feng, Ghosh and Sirman’s (2005) board governance 
indices and an econometric driven-stochastic frontier analysis governance index by 
Khiari, Karaa and Omri (2007).  
 
 In Australia, Horwarth (2002; 2005) developed a corporate governance index, 
which has been used in corporate governance ranking and rating of large listed 
Australian companies. 
 
 Professional service firms like Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Governance Metric 
International (GMI), Deminor rating, Corporate Library, Institutional Shareholder 
Services and recently the joint FTSE and ISS have each developed governance indices 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). These firms use different methodologies and the 
indices are distinct from one another (Brown, 2007). Due to their commercial nature 
detailed discussion of their methodologies is not accessible through publicly available 
information, except for S&P.  
 
 Seventh, S&P’s governance services consist of two parts, the corporate 
governance score (CGS) and country governance review. The CGS is composed from 
four main governance characteristics, which are (1) Ownership structure and External 
influences, Shareholder rights, (2) Stakeholders relations, (3) Transparency, 
Disclosure and Audit, and (4) Board structure and effectiveness. Each characteristic 
has sub-governance criteria, which are the criteria used to determine the CGS.  Each 
criteria has a possible score from 0 to 10, depending on the level of conformance of 
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the assessing firms’ governance criteria to international good corporate governance 
codes conduct (Standard and Poor, 2004). 
 
Table 2.2 provides a summary of other professional firms’ CGI characteristics. 
 
TABLE 2.2 FURTHER EXAMPLES OF CGI 
Firm Scoring system Information source 
GMI 1-10 (1 = low, 10 = high) 
rating relative to other 
companies in 6 categories 
plus an overall score; 600+ 
variables in areas of board 
accountability, financial 
disclosure & internal control, 
shareholder rights, 
remuneration, market for 
control and corporate 
behaviour. 
Publicly available data and 
interview with firm’s 
management and board. 
ISS- Corporate 
Governance Quotient 
0-100 (0 = low, 100 = high) 
rating relative to other 
companies in market cap and 
industry peer group (2 
scores); 61 variables in area 
of board of directors, audit, 
charter, and bylaw provision, 
laws of the state of 
incorporation, executive and 
director compensation, 
qualitative factors, ownership 
and director education. 
Publicly available 
information 
Deminor rating 0 – 10 rating based on four 
categories; Right & Duties of 
shareholders, Commitment to 
shareholder value, Disclosure 
on corporate governance, 
Board structure and 
functioning 
Publicly available 
information and firm’s board 
and management interview. 
Source: (Coffin and Collinson, 2005), CCG Investor Relations, Strategic 
Communications 
  
 
2.2.3 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDIES AND 
ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 The majority of studies on casual relationships between governance structures 
and organisational performance focus on the holistic effect of various governance 
configurations on performance.  The use of CGIs as proxy for quality of corporate 
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governance practices and the study of their relationships with performance are also 
well investigated. This part will review both types of corporate governance study.  
  
 The structures of the board of directors, which include board leadership, board 
composition and board size, receive considerable attention in the literature. This is 
due to the belief that board of directors is the major controlling and monitoring 
mechanism in a modern corporation, where ownership is defused among many 
shareholders and no direct control on management. It is an agency theory driven 
approach. 
 The study of board leadership focuses on CEO duality, where the CEO is the 
Chairperson of the board as well and the separation of duties among Chairperson and 
the CEO. This study tests the underlying assumptions of agency theory and 
stewardship theory. Agency theory contends that to be effective in monitoring 
management, the Chairperson should be independent from the management (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that where the CEO is the 
Chairperson of the board of directors, the impartiality of the board is compromised. 
Consequently, the interests of the owners will be sacrificed to a degree in favour of 
management and incur agency loss.  Alternatively, stewardship theory argues that the 
CEO should also hold the Chair position as because it provides a greater flexible work 
environment and a clear line of leadership (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Similarly, 
Stewart (1991) asserts that duality enhances the decision-making process due to the 
fact that it permits a sharper focus on company objectives and promotes more rapid 
implementation of operational decisions. Nevertheless, majority principles of good 
governance practices require corporate leadership to be divided so that there is 
independence among CEO and Chairperson (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2003; OECD, 2004; Business Roundtable, 2005).  
The empirical findings are somewhat mixed with evidence supporting CEO 
duality and stewardship theory and other evidence supporting the independence 
between CEO and Chairperson. Donaldson and Davis (1991) study of US 
corporations’ board leadership showed a positive relationship between CEO duality 
and performance. Firms with a CEO duality role showed higher return on equity 
(ROE) and shareholder wealth relative to other firms. The study still produces the 
same result after incorporating a moderating factor, long-term compensation scheme 
to align the management interest to shareholders in the study. This result suggests that 
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the positive relationship between CEO duality and performance is not moderated by 
the effects of a compensation scheme. Thus, it strengthens the finding and supports 
the CEO duality and stewardship theory perspective. A study of board leadership in 
Australia’s largest public listed companies shows similar results, where CEO duality 
has a positive relationship with both a market-based firm performance (measured by 
Tobin’s Q) and an accounting-based firm performance (measured by ROA) (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003). These empirical findings are very significant in terms of policy 
implication and board leadership practices in Australia. In contrast to US, the majority 
of Australia firms have an independent CEO and Chairperson.  
The alternate findings come from Rebiez and Salamenh (2006), who study 
governance structure and financial performance in the construction industry. They 
find a positive linear relationship between the independence of CEO and Chairperson 
or non-CEO-Chair and market return. However, it is a weak relationship and only 6% 
of the variation of market return is explained by type of leadership structure. This 
finding is consistent with an earlier finding by Dahya, Lonie and Power (1996) in UK 
listed companies context. They find that CEO duality is negatively related to stock 
market returns and accounting performance. Rechner and Dalton (1989) in their study 
of CEO duality within the context of longitudinal analysis also find a positive 
relationship between separation of CEO and Chairman roles and performance. Lastly, 
there is another stream of empirical findings which noted no effect of board 
leadership configurations on the organisational performance (Berg and Smith, 1978; 
Rechner and Dalton, 1989; Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993; Heracleous, 2001). 
Therefore the empirical findings in the area of board leadership are somewhat 
inconclusive.  
  
Another characteristic of corporate governance is board composition. In 
Australia, UK and US, the practice is for the board of directors to have a unitary board 
model and comprises of executive directors and non-executive directors (NEDs). 
Executive directors are directors who are full-time employees of the firms. NEDs are 
directors who are not current or past employees of the firm and do not have 
substantial business or family ties with management, nor have potential business ties 
with the firm (Cotter et al., 1997; Weir et al., 2002). Basically, NEDs are tied 
normally to the firm based on their directorships only. Another type of director is 
‘grey directors’ and they are either former employees of the firm or affiliated with 
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managers. An independent board is viewed to have at least 50% of NEDs. In Australia, 
NEDs on average accounted for 69% of the board and only six companies out of the 
largest public listed companies have all internal directors and thirty-five companies 
have fully external boards (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The US boards are also 
dominated by NEDs with an average of 76% to 77% outside directors on the board 
(Klein, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 1998). Therefore, the Australian and the US boards 
have a clear majority of NEDs and are considered as independent boards. These 
observations are consistent with suggested practice by authoritative bodies (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2003; Business Roundtable, 2005; OECD, 2004). In 
contrast, Peasnel et al., (1998) report that UK boards have an average of 44% NEDs 
and 31% of boards are defined as independent. This trend is changing with the 
introduction of the Cadbury’s recommendations (Weir et al., 2002). Turing to 
government business enterprises (GBEs), the proportion of NEDs of GBEs in 
Australia is, on average, 92% of the board of directors (Seng and Taylor, 2008b). This 
high proportion of NEDs is similar to those of Canadian SOEs (Bozec, 2005). 
 In general board composition studies focus on board independence and its 
relationship to organisational performance. The underlying assumption is NEDs 
possess two desirable characteristics that enable them to fulfil their monitoring 
function. First, their independence and second their reputation. Fama and Jensen 
(1983), argue that reputation effects can provide NEDs with incentives to monitor 
managers. Moreover, Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and Gilson (1990) provide empirical 
evidences of a positive relationship between reputation capital and the directorship 
market.  
 The empirical findings of whether NEDs impact on organisational 
performance is inconclusive, as there are evidences support and reject the underlying 
assumptions.  Kiel and Nicholson (2003) study of board composition of Australia’s 
largest public listed companies provides mixed results. They find the percentage of 
NEDs on the board correlates with performance on accounting-based measure (3 
years ROA) but does not correlate to performance on a market-based measure 
(Tobin’s Q).  They further find using regression that board independence moderates 
the positive relationship between CEO duality and performance. Bhagat and Black’s 
(2002) study of board independence and long-term performance provides a clear cut 
finding that board independent does not improve performance.  Their finding suggests 
that the more independent the board becomes the worse the firm perform. This 
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negative result was supported by Yermack (1996), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and 
Bozec (2005) as they also find a negative relationship between proportion of NEDs 
and performance. A more recent study, in the context of international commercial 
banks, also supports this finding. Andres and Vallelado (2008) find that NEDs of 
boards of 69 commercial banks have U-shaped relationship with performance. 
Nevertheless, there are empirical findings that support the common wisdom which 
suggests the benefits of NEDs on the board of directors. In their contribution to the 
debate on corporate governance reform in UK, Weir et al., (2002) found that NEDs 
are positively related to performance. This finding is quite significant given that UK 
boards are dominated by executive directors. In addition, Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
found that a significant proportion of NEDs on the boards is proved to be more 
efficient in monitoring and advising functions and add value to the firm. Seng and 
Taylor (2008), in the context of GBEs find that NEDs have a strong and positive 
relationship with economic performance. Board independence is also found to 
increase shareholder wealth in a takeover situation (Cotter et al., 1997). Finally, there 
is evidence that board composition has no effect on performance (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).  
 
Other studies on directors’ characteristics focus on their financial knowledge. 
Directors with a financial and accounting background, as well as being independent 
from the management, are deemed to have a more positive effect on an organisation’s 
achievement of its financial performance. Given the directors’ function on the board 
and the audit committee of shaping financial planning and keeping a check on internal 
financial controls, their accounting and finance knowledge and experience are 
necessary for carrying out this function properly and efficiently (Agrawal and 
Chandha, 2005; Bull and Sharp, 1989; DeZoort, 1997).  
 
Empirical studies on FLDs provide a mixed outcome. Chen et al. (2005) found 
that FLDs on audit committee of boards have no significant relationship with the 
quality of audit in the Australia company context. This finding contradicts an earlier 
study in the US by McMullen and Raghunandan (1996). They found that the financial 
qualifications of directors are negatively related to the likelihood of being subjected to 
SEC enforcement actions and the likelihood of having material misstatements of 
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quarterly earnings. Prior studies measure financial literacy on directors’ formal 
education in accounting and finance disciplines. In term of firm value Chan and Li 
(2008) find that the presence of financially literate directors on an independent audit 
committee contributes to firm value. They indicate that the impact is five times as the 
impact of independent audit committee. They employ a broadly defined FLD variable, 
comprising directors from backgrounds of business school professor, CPA, top-level 
experience in a finance-related firm, chief financial officer, accounting firm partner 
and former Treasury official. In contrast Defond, Hann and Hu (2005b) employ a 
much stricter definition of FLD which divides directors into accounting FLD and non-
accounting FLD. Out of their 509 U.S. firms they found that the proportion of 
accounting FLDs has a positive relationship with cumulative abnormal return. A more 
recent study by Seng and Taylor (2008b) indicated that FLDs on the board is 
positively related economic rate of return. However, they did not find any significant 
relationship between FLDs on audit committee and performance. 
 
 Turning to the study of board size and performance, this is dictated by two 
arguments. The first argument contends that increase in board size leads to increase in 
problems of communication and coordination and thus decreases the board’s ability to 
control the management (Yermack, 1996). The other argument is that larger boards 
lead to less candid discussion of managerial performance and to greater control by the 
CEO (Jensen, 1993). In the US, board size ranges from six to 24 members and only 
few firms having boards fewer then six members. In Australia, the average board size 
of largest public listed companies is 6.6 members with a range from 2 to 19 members 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). These board sizes are similar to their GBEs counterpart, 
which have board size ranged from 3 to 12 members and an average of 6.79 (Seng 
and Taylor, 2008a). 
 The empirical findings of board size effects on organisational performance 
are also mixed. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) find a mixed result, showing board size has 
a positive relationship with performance on a market-based measure but uncorrelated 
with accounting-based measure. This result provides an insight that the Australian 
capital market prefers companies that have a large board than small board. Rebiez and 
Salamenh (2006), conclude that board size doesn’t affect performance in the 
construction services industry. A study of board size in the US by Jensen (1993), 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Yermack (1996) provide a clear cut finding in favour of 
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companies with small board size. Yermack’s data (1996) suggest that firms’ value 
reduces when board size ranges between five and ten members. Moreover, a direct 
study of small firms, Finish firms, reveals a negative correlation between board size 
and performance, for various measures of performance (Eisenberg et al., 1998). This 
finding show that a board size effect stills exist even among firms with substantially 
small boards. A recent study in the context Canadian SOEs also reveals that board 
size has a negative relationship with performance, measured by return on sales, sales 
efficiency and ROA (Bozec, 2005). The narrow studies of board size effects need to 
be carefully analysed as there are various reasons to suggest the outcome. Board size 
correlates with board composition variables, thus it could be board composition that 
dictates the results, not board size. Furthermore, board size could be associated with 
past performance, where firms increase the number of directors on their boards after 
poor performance in order to improve performance. Lastly, board size reflects the 
evolving nature of the firm, which suggested when firms mature their boards grow. 
Such growth changes the nature of the board and thus board size effect does not relate 
to performance but stage of economic growth (Eisenberg et al., 1998). This is known 
as endogeneity of board size issue. 
 
 The relationship between ownership structure as governance mechanism and 
corporate performance is also well documented in the literature. The studies of 
ownership structure are directed toward the causal relationship between insider 
ownership (directors and managerial ownership) and organisational performance and 
the affects of blockholder and institutional shareholder on performance.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that as managerial ownership increases, 
firm performance increases. This is because managers are less inclined to divert 
resource away from value maximisation. This early thought suggests that there is  a 
linear relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Domestz (1983) provided that the important key in the 
relationship between the two variables is the level of managerial ownership. Demetz 
(1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that at low level of ownership capital 
market controls will keep managers in check and adhere to value maximisation. 
Morck et al. (1988) further provided that high level of managerial ownership could 
lead to entrenchment. At this stage external shareholders and the capital market 
26 
cannot control the actions of the managers. Therefore, at certain level of ownership, 
managers can consume perquisites and reduces firm’s value without fear of discipline 
from other ownership interests. This would lead to a decline in firms’ value and 
implies that there is a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
corporate performance. Empirical finding in the US by Morck et al., (1988) provided 
that there is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and performance at 
ownership level between 0% to 5% range and above 25%. They noted a negative 
relationship in the range of 5% to 25% level of ownership. In the UK, Short and 
Keasey (1999) found firm performance, as measured by accounting-based measure, 
has a positive relationship with managerial ownership in the 0 – 15% range, 
negatively related in the range of 15% to 41.84%, and positively related again when 
ownership exceeds 41.84%. These findings suggest that managerial ownership and 
performance is a cubic functions rather than linear relationship. A further study, by 
Davies et al., (2005) found that managerial ownership and corporate performance is a 
quantic function rather then cubic function. They further found that the relationship 
between managerial ownership and performance is a two-ways relationship that 
managerial ownership affects performance and vice versa. In contrast, Weir et al., 
(2002) and Cole et al., (2001) find no significant relationship between managerial 
ownership and organisational performance. They found no significant relationship 
between director ownerships and performance as well. These results are consistent 
with findings by Farrer and Ramsay (1998) in Australia listed company context.  
   
 Blockholders and institutional shareholders have incentive to monitor 
management activity when their ownerships increase. This is because the potential 
agency costs increase when performance is poor (Weir et al., 2002). Weir et al, (2002) 
in their study of UK public companies find no significant relationship between 
blockholders and institutional shareholders and organisational performance. This is 
contrast to earlier studies by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) in the US and Leech and 
Leahy (1991) in the UK, as they found positive relationship between external 
shareholdings and performance. 
 
The mixed and inconclusive empirical findings of the structures of the board 
of directors as governance control and performance provide incentive for the 
researcher to find alternative methods to investigate the relationship phenomena 
27 
between corporate governance and organisational performance. It is also a search to 
find empirical evidence that backing the various theories underpinning the concept of 
corporate governance. A composite corporate governance index (CGI) is the first 
alternative way to study the phenomena. It is also the first attempt to capture 
interactions among various governance characteristics. Hence, using a governance 
index to explain performance seeks to capture the impact of overall firm’s governance 
controls on performance.  The alternative method and second attempt is to study the 
board of directors directly i.e. the behavioural factors of the board. This method 
captures board decision making behaviours that included effective board leadership, 
board processes and basically any of board behaviours (Halligan and Horrigan, 2005; 
Leblanc, 2001; Leblanc and Shwartz, 2007). The study of board behaviours will be 
discussed in the following section. 
 
 Empirical studies on governance indexes to date fall within two main fields, 
the study of the governance index effects on firm’s performance and the study of 
governance index effects on variation in share price. The later aims to transform 
governance index into an investment decision-making tool- an indicator to trigger 
decisions to buy or sell share on stock markets.  Klein, et al., (2005) in their study of 
corporate governance and corporate performance of Canadian firms employed a 
governance index as the determinant variable. They employed the ROB index 
(discussed above) as their CGI index. The result is statistically insignificant when 
total CGI alone is used as the independent variable. However, when sub-indices are 
included into the regression models, the results show positive and significant 
relationships between corporate governance and firm performance. The only sub-
index that shows a negative relationship is Board Composition.   These results 
suggested that the overall relationship between CGI and firm performance could be 
influenced the sub-indexes and especially when the sub-index accounts for a large 
percentage of the total index.   
 Feng et al., (2005) also study the relationship between corporate governance 
and performance. Their study was confined to real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
and used a board index instead of a wider perspective of CGI. The board index is 
constructed as a simple combination between board size, board composition and 
board leadership. The best board index score is 3 with the characteristics of small 
board size (less then 8 members), high percentage of outside directors and non-chair-
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CEO.  Their finding revealed that firms with board index of 3 out perform other firms 
in the group. The ROA measure of firm performance is relatively greater then other 
firms. This positive relationship between board governance index and performance is 
also observed in Chen et al., (2007) study as well. They find that their board 
governance index, which comprises of CEO duality, board size and management and 
directors share ownerships, is a good proxy for governance quality and positively 
related to stock performance.  
 
 Another study that uses CGI to study the association between corporate 
governance and corporate performance was conducted in a context of Russian firms, 
with an attempt to understand the role of corporate governance in a developing and 
emerging capital market (Black, 2001). The CGI employed in the study is a 
governance risk index. The lower the index is the lower the risk and the better the 
quality of corporate governance practices. The results support the hypothesis that 
lower risk (therefore, indicating better the corporate governance) has a positive and 
very high statistically significant relationship to firm performance. The result shows a 
standard deviation, approximately 13 points in improvement in governance ranking 
predicts an increase in firm value by a factor of 7.03 point. The association is much 
stronger when incorporating an industry-specific factor into the model. However, in a 
breakdown analysis only self-dealing risk, which comprises of dilution through share 
issuance, asset stripping and transfer pricing, merger or restructuring and bankruptcy, 
is statistically significant. The other sub-indices aren’t significant but still show an 
expected negative coefficient. Once again the overall result is influenced by the sub-
index performance.  
 
 Klapper and Love (2002), with a similar rationale as Black (2001), carry out a 
study of the effects of corporate governance and corporate performance in 14 
emerging capital markets in 14 countries. The study covers 374 firms, from South-
East Asian countries to the Middle East and South America countries. Firm 
performance is measured by market-based Tobin’s Q and accounting-based ROA. 
They employed the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia CGI (discussed above) as their 
CGI with the exclusion of a Social Awareness category. The empirical finding is in 
favour of their hypothesis which indicates that CGI has a significant positive 
relationship with firm performance. Moreover, the significant relationship becomes 
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stronger (5% to 1% significant) when a country-specific factor included in the 
regression model. The magnitude of this effect is large, as one standard deviation 
change in governance results affects 23% change (increase) in firm Tobin’s Q value. 
The conclusion is that corporate governance is country specific and has a different 
strength of influence on firm performance. Therefore, caution is needed in drawing 
inferences about corporate governance study across country.  
   
 Mothanty (2003) uses CGI to study the relationship between institutional 
investors and corporate governance in India. His study also finds a significant positive 
relationship between CGI and both Tobin’s Q and excess return, as measures of firm 
performance. Therefore, corporate governance plays a significant role in determining 
firm performance in developing countries. 
  
 Studies that relate corporate governance to share price movement take the 
viewpoint of a signalling effect. Investors perceive firms that adopt principles of good 
corporate governance as a signal that they will perform better relative to other firms. 
Thus, changes in corporate governance quality, as proxy by CGI will lead to changes 
in firm performance and share price. Drobetz, Schillholfer and Zimmermann’s (2003) 
study of corporate governance and expected stock return analyse the effect of 
corporate governance on firm performance as well as expected stock returns. Their 
findings indicated that firms with high corporate rating have higher book value of 
assets. The regression coefficient for CGI is significant and economically meaningful, 
with increases in CGI by 3 points resulting in increase in market capitalisation by 2.8 
percent. This association is inline with other empirical results discussed above. 
Turning to CGI and expected stock returns, Drobetzet et al. (2003) provide a positive 
relationship between CGI and stock returns in the secondary market.  This result 
suggests that investors are surprised by the relatively high performance of high CGI 
firms and vice versa. The result needs to be cautiously interpreted as using past stock 
return to measure expected stock return could bias the result. The finding could be 
explained by unexpected agency cost, where differences in firm-specific corporate 
governance systems cause differences in agency costs and these differences are not 
properly incorporated into market prices. The alternate explanation is a certain 
corporate governance malfunction has led to a stock’s valuation below its fair value or 
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peer group valuation. Further support is given by Gompers et al., (2003) to the 
positive effect of corporate governance on equity prices in US market context. 
  
 Overall, empirical studies on the relationship between CGI and performance 
provide a more consistent finding. The explanatory power improves when CGI is used 
instead of individual governance mechanism. This reinforces the notion that 
integration of corporate governance mechanisms provides a better means of affecting 
corporate accounting and market-based performance.  
 
2.2.4 NORMATIVE DISCUSSIONS AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON 
BEHAVIOUR OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
The second alternate study of corporate governance focuses directly on the 
conducts of the board of directors i.e. board behaviours instead of the configurations 
of the board of directors. While the study does not examine board behaviour, it is an 
interesting aspect of board governance. According to Brennan and Solomon (2008), 
this is one of the dimensions of governance studies pushing the frontier of governance 
research. This stream of studies investigates the behavioural factors that directly 
address the issue of board effectiveness (Halligan and Horrigan, 2005; Brundin and 
Nordqvist, 2008; Leblanc and Shwartz, 2007; Leblanc, 2001; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; 
Wan and Ong, 2005).  Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) argue that actual board 
effectiveness in monitoring the performance of the management and thus add value to 
the organisation is in the behavioural dynamics of the board not the board structures, 
which is only the condition rather then determinant of effectiveness. Moreover, 
Orlifkoff (2005) contents that the required quality of governance structures can be 
prescribed or legislated but the effectiveness of the board is a matter of how the board 
as a whole carries out their entrusted tasks. In similar perspective, Minichilli, 
Gabrielsson and Huse (2007) argue that “having capable board members is 
consequently not enough to secure effective task performance” (p. 617). 
Directing empirical study towards directors’ behaviours provides insight into a 
board’s decision-making, involving cohesiveness, commitment and creativity. At the 
individual level, it provides insight into how each individual director interacts, 
discusses of board issues, and engage in monitoring performance. This provides an 
understanding of the “Black Box” of board processes (Leblanc, 2001).   
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Prior empirical studies and discussions on board behaviours provide various 
board behaviours items. Conforth (2001) provided board behaviours items include 
board’s ability to handle conflict constructively, relationships between the board and 
the management and board meeting practices. Board meeting practices was suggested 
by Orlikoff (2005) as well. Wan and Ong (2005) and Zona and Zoattoni (2007) in 
their studies of the relationships between board processes and board task performance 
identify board behaviours to include effort norms of the board of directors, cognitive 
conflict and knowledge and skills, of which there are several sub-items. Halligan and 
Horrigan (2005) in their investigation of board effectiveness in the public sector 
content that effective board behaviours comprise of effective and efficient board 
decision making, board information,  board relationship, board personalities, board 
culture, board integration and board roles. Brundin and Nordqvist (2008) look at 
board room’s behaviours in term of directors’ emotions. In addition to emotions, 
Samra-Frederick (2000) also include feelings and routine selection of lexemes in his 
study of board behaviour. Lastly, Barker (2004) provides a framework to evaluate 
board effectiveness that applies to both private and public sectors. The framework 
provides eight essential components of effective board performance and is intended to 
help independent boards in executive non-departmental public bodies to enhance their 
board effectiveness. Three behavioural factors are included in the 8 essential 
components and included effective board leadership, effective decision making and 
board’s relationship.   
 
Leblanc (2001), Halligan and Horrigan (2005) and Barker (2004) have 
developed board effective concepts. They combine board structures and behaviours 
items together to develop their board effective concepts.  This development provides a 
complete package, which goes beyond the recently reforms of corporate governance 
in the private sector domestically and internationally. It provides a better picture of 
board effectiveness and how a board of directors contributes to corporate performance.   
 
Empirical studies into the relationship between board behaviours and 
organisational performance is still at early stage, where studies are focused on the 
relationship between board behaviours items separately on board performance (Zona 
and Zattoni, 2007; Wan and Ong, 2005). This is because there are problems in 
accessing to the board and thus collecting board behaviours data (Leblanc and 
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Shwartz, 2007).  Nevertheless, few studies on board behaviours have successfully 
employed survey questionnaire as method to measures and collect board behaviours 
data.  The studies of the affects of board behaviours on board task performance 
indicate that they are positively associated. Wan and Ong (2005) and Zona and 
Zattoni (2007) provided that board behaviours of efforts norms, cognitive conflicts 
and use of knowledge and skills are positively related with board performance of its 
services role, monitoring role and networking role. Services role includes matters of 
board contributions to the development of organisational strategy, accountable to 
stakeholders and provide assistance to top managers. Monitoring role includes 
monitoring of organisational control procedures, planning and budgets, review 
performance and strategic plan and engage succession for the CEO. The networking 
role includes contributions to the legitimization of the company, board comprises of 
outside directors that have skills relevant to the company and serve as a link to 
government entities. Brundin and Nordqvist (2008) and Samra-Fredericks (2000) also 
found board behaviour characteristics of emotions, feelings and choice of lexemes 
have positive impact on board performance. Given the board roles listed, the positive 
relationship between board behaviours and board task performance can implicate that 
board behaviours could also have positive impact on organisational performance.      
  
 In summary the research on corporate governance and organisational 
performance is at a crossroad, where researcher starts to develop new and innovate 
ways to model the relationships between governance and firm performance. 
According to Leblanc (2001) and Halligan and Horrigan (2005) Brennan and 
Solomon (2008) board effectiveness is the emerging concept that captures that the full 
affect of corporate governance and a good determinant factor in the governance and 
organisational performance relationship. 
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TABLE 2.3 SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNANCE INDEX AND PERFORMANCE 
Author(s) and year  Context of study Focus of the 
study 
Key findings 
Board structure and Performance 
Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) 
US companies Relationship 
between CEO 
duality and 
performance. 
Firms with CEO 
duality role 
show higher 
return on equity 
(ROE) and 
shareholder 
wealth. 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) US listed companies The relationship 
between CEO 
duality and 
performance. 
CEO has a 
negative 
relationship with 
performance. 
Daily and Dalton (1993) US listed companies The relationship 
between CEO 
duality and 
performance 
CEO has a 
negative 
relationship with 
performance. 
Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) 
500 largest US firms 
(Sales/Assets/Market 
value) 
The relationship 
between board 
independence and 
performance. 
Both OLS and 
simultaneous 
equation models 
show board 
independence 
has a negative 
relationship with 
Tobin’s Q. 
Yermack (1996) US listed companies The relationships 
between board 
independence, 
board size and 
performance. 
Board 
independence 
has a negative 
relationship with 
performance, 
Board size also 
has a negative 
relationship with 
performance, 
firms’ value 
reduce with both 
size fall between 
5 to 10 
members. 
Cotter et al. (1997) US firms in Wall 
Street Journal and in 
takeover situation 
The effect of 
independence 
outside directors 
on target firms’ 
share value in the 
takeover 
situation. 
Independence 
directors have a 
positive effect 
on shareholder 
gain of the 
target firms. 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) Small Finish firms, 
bankrupt and healthy 
firms 
Look at board 
size effects on 
performance in 
small firms. 
Board size has 
negative 
relationship with 
performance.  
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Coles et al. (2001) US companies, Fortune 
500 
Look at the effect 
of CEO duality, 
board 
independence, 
director share 
ownership, tenure 
of CEO on 
performance. 
CEO duality has 
a positive effect 
on MVA, 
Board 
independence 
has a negative 
effect on MVA, 
CEO tenure and 
Director share 
ownership has 
no significant 
relationship with 
MVA. 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) Australian top 500 
companies on ASX 
The relationships 
between CEO 
duality, %NED, 
Interlocking, and 
performance. 
CEO duality is 
correlated with 
ROA and 
Tobin’s Q, 
%NED has 
negative 
relationship with 
Tobin’s Q and 
correlated with 
ROA, 
Interlocking 
directorship 
does not 
correlate with 
firm 
performance on 
both ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. 
Bhagat and Black (2002) Large US public 
companies 
The relationships 
between board 
independence, 
board size and 
firm performance. 
Both OLS and 
simultaneous 
equation models 
suggest that 
board 
independence 
has negative 
relationship with 
performance, 
Board size 
shows mixed 
relationships, as 
it has negative 
relationship with 
Return of Sales 
to Asset and 
positive 
relationship with 
Tobin’s Q.   
Peng, Buck and Filatotchev 
(2003) 
Privatised Russian 
SOE 
The relationship 
between board 
independence and 
performance. 
NEDs has no 
significant 
relationship with 
performance. 
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Weir, Laing and McKnight 
(2002) 
All quoted non-
financial UK firms 
The relationships 
between board 
independence, 
CEO duality, 
director 
shareholding, 
external 
shareholding and 
performance. 
Board 
independence 
has a positive 
relationship with 
performance, 
CEO duality, 
director and 
external 
shareholding 
have no 
significant 
relationships 
with 
performance. 
Rebiez and Salamenh 
(2006) 
US construction 
services industry 
The relationships 
between CEO 
duality, %NED, 
board size, 
independent 
committee and 
yearly meeting 
with performance.
CEO duality has 
a negative 
relationship with 
share return, 
%NED has a 
positive 
relationship with 
monthly return 
on share price, 
maximum 
number of 
NEDs on the 
board should be 
around 80%, 
Board size has a 
weak 
relationship with 
monthly share 
return, 
Independence 
committee has 
no significant 
relationship with 
performance, 
Yearly meeting 
also has no 
significant 
relationship with 
performance. 
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Ownership Structure and Performance 
Morck et al., (1983) US listed companies The relationships 
between 
managerial 
ownership and 
performance. 
Managerial 
ownership has a 
non-linear 
relationship with 
performance, 
positive in the 
range of 0% to 
5% and above 
25% ownership 
level, negative 
in the rage of 
5% to 25% 
ownership level. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) US Fortune 500 firms The relationship 
between large 
shareholders 
(Blockholders) 
and performance. 
Blockholders 
has a positive 
effect on 
performance. 
Leech and Leahy (1991) UK companies The relationship 
between large 
shareholders 
(Blockholders) 
and performance. 
Blockholders 
has a positive 
effect on 
performance. 
Short and Keasy (1999) UK companies The relationships 
between 
managerial 
ownership and 
performance. 
Managerial 
ownership has a 
positive 
correlation with 
performance in 
the range of 0% 
to 15% and 
above 41% 
ownership level 
and negative 
correlation in 
the range of 
15% to 41% 
ownership level. 
Davies et al. (2005) UK companies The relationship 
between 
managerial 
ownership and 
performance. 
Managerial 
ownership has a 
quantic function 
with Tobin’s Q.  
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Studies on corporate governance indices and performance 
Author(s) 
and year 
Governance 
mechanisms 
Scoring system Context of 
study/ Key 
focus 
Key Findings 
Black  
(2001) 
Centred on 
governance 
risk index, 
comprises of 
eight 
categories of 
governance 
mechanisms 
and state 
rules. 
Score is allocated to 
each category 
differently, the lower 
the score the better 
the quality of 
corporate governance.
Russian firms; 
looks at the role 
of corporate 
governance in 
developing and 
emerging capital 
market 
Low risk firms, 
which have 
better 
governance 
index have a 
high statistically 
significant 
positive 
relationship with 
performance. 
Industry type 
increases the 
significance and 
coefficient of 
the model, 
Break down 
analysis shows 
some sub-
indices aren’t 
significant. 
Gompers, 
Ishii and 
Metric, 
(2003) 
Centred on 
governance 
provisions that 
either increase 
shareholder 
rights or 
increase 
management 
power. 
1 point is added to 
firm’s governance 
score for any 
governance 
provisions that 
retracting shareholder 
rights. 
US firms;  
looks at the effect 
of governance 
index on share 
prices; 
attempt to uses a 
governance index 
as the predictor of 
variation in share 
price among firms
Firms with low 
governance 
index, which 
support 
shareholders’ 
rights, have a 
positive 
relationship with 
share price. 
Mothanty, 
(2003) 
Centred on 
stakeholder 
governance, 
including 
shareholders, 
bondholders, 
employees, 
customers, 
suppliers, 
government 
and society. 
Score is allocated 
based on firm 
interactions toward 
each stakeholder. 
Three forms of 
interaction, positive, 
neutral and negative 
with score allocated 
respectively. 
Indian companies; 
looks at the 
relationship 
between 
governance index 
and performance 
Governance 
index has a 
positive 
relationship with 
Tobin’s Q and 
excess return. 
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Xanthaski, 
Tsipouri 
and 
Spanos, 
(2004 
Centred on 
OECD 
principle of 
corporate 
governance 
0, 1, 2 points are 
allocated to the index, 
corresponding to 
adequate, inadequate 
and top performance 
Greek listed 
companies. The 
study only 
develop index to 
measure 
governance 
practices. 
The finding 
indicates that 
Greek’s 
companies have 
improved their 
governance 
practices and 
governance 
disclosure. 
Feng et al. 
(2005) 
Centred on 
board 
structure, 
board 
leadership, 
board size and 
board 
composition 
1 point is added when 
board size < 8, 
percentage of non-
executive directors > 
60%, separation of 
CEO-Chair positions. 
US real estate 
investment trusts 
(REITs); looks 
the relationship 
between overall 
governance index 
and performance. 
Firms with high 
index 
outperform 
other firms, 
The ROA is 
significantly 
greater then 
other firms. 
ROB index,  
Klein et al, 
(2005) 
Centred on 
board 
composition, 
shareholding 
and 
compensation 
policy, 
shareholder 
rights policy, 
disclosure 
policy 
Score is allocated to 
each governance 
components 
differently, with 
board composition 
has the highest 
weighting 
Dual listed 
Canadian firms, 
NY Stock 
exchange and 
Canadian Stock 
exchange.  
The study looks 
the relationships 
between the 
developed index 
and sub-indices 
and performance. 
The governance 
index has no 
significant 
relationship with 
performance, 
All sub-indices 
except board 
composition 
have positive 
relationships 
with 
performance, 
The overall 
index 
relationship with 
performance can 
be influenced by 
sub-index. 
Chen et al. 
(2007) 
Centred on 
board 
composition 
and 
management 
and director 
shareholdings 
Maximum score of 4 
and is the sum of all 
components 
Taiwan listed 
companies; The 
study investigates 
the impact of 
board governance 
index on 
performance. 
The index is 
positively 
related with 
stock 
performance 
Studies on behaviours of boards of directors and board performance 
Wan and 
Ong (2005) 
Singapore 
listed 
companies 
Effort norms, 
cognitive conflict and 
knowledge and skills 
Board 
performance 
Positive 
relationships 
between board’s 
behavioural 
characteristics 
and board 
performance 
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Zona and 
Zattoni 
(2007) 
Italian 
companies 
Effort norms, 
cognitive conflict and 
knowledge and skills 
Board 
performance 
Positive 
relationships 
between board’s 
behavioural 
characteristics 
and board 
performance 
Samra-
Fredericks 
(2000) 
UK 
manufacturing 
companies 
Feelings, emotions 
and choice of lexemes
Board 
performance 
Positive 
relationships 
between board’s 
behavioural 
characteristics 
and board 
performance 
Brundi and 
Nordqvist  
(2008) 
Swedish 
companies 
Emotions Board 
performance 
Positive 
relationships 
between board’s 
behavioural 
characteristics 
and board 
performance 
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2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW ON ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND 
STRATEGY 
 
 This section has three parts. The first part reviews the concept of 
organisational capabilities and competitive advantage. The second part reviews the 
concept of strategy, strategic typology and congruence theory. And the last part 
reviews empirical studies on the congruent or fit relationship between organisational 
capabilities and strategic type and their effect on organisational performance. In 
addition an annotated review of the empirical studies is provided. 
 
2.3.1 ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES 
 
 Organisational capabilities (hereafter known as capabilities) are defined in 
marketing and strategic management literature as “complex bundles of skills and 
accumulated knowledge, exercised through organisational processes, that enable firms 
to coordinate activities and make use of their assets” (Day, 1994, p. 38). This 
definition is consistent with Oliver (1997) and Collis (1994) as they define 
capabilities as capacities and complex routines to deploy resources to perform tasks 
and produce output. The concept of capabilities is not new and dates back to Selznick 
(1957) and Penrose (1959). It also features in the strength and weaknesses 
components of the business policy framework of Learned et al. (1969).  Capabilities 
are firm specific and internal to the firm (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). The concept of 
capabilities is used interchangeably with the concepts of distinctive competencies 
(Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980), competitive devices (Davig, 1986) and sources of 
advantages (Day and Wensley, 1988).  
 
  Capabilities can be divided into several categories. Smith et al. (1986) provide 
a category of organisation general capabilities, which includes general management, 
marketing, R&D engineering and production, and accounting and finance. Snow and 
Hrebiniak’s (1980) distinctive competences are similar to Smith et al. (1986) with the 
addition of distribution, legal affairs and personnel. These capabilities are of a general 
category and apply to all types of organisations. Hitt and Ireland (1985) identifies 55 
different distinctive competence activities within functional area. O’Regan and 
Ghobadian (2004) through interviews with six managing directors and two employer 
41 
representatives provide a list of generic capabilities of small manufacturing firms. 
Their capabilities range from advertising and promotion to offering consistent quality. 
Adler and Shenbar (1990), Christensen (1995) and Guan and Ma (2003) provide   
innovation capability, which characterises as (1) the capacity to developing new 
products satisfying market needs, (2) the capacity to apply appropriate process 
technologies to produce new products, (3) the capacity to develop and adopt new 
product and processing technologies to satisfy future needs and (4) the capacity to 
respond to accidental technology activities and unexpected opportunities created by 
competitors.  
 In addition to the above capabilities, Day (1994) provides two sets of 
strategically-related capabilities, namely inside-out capabilities and outside-in 
capabilities. The inside-out capabilities are important and must have capabilities for 
organisations that compete on the basis of low cost. Alternatively, the outside-in 
capabilities are used by market-oriented or product differentiation types of 
organisations. The capabilities listed under the inside-out category are consistent with 
Smith et al. (1986) and Snow and Hrebiniak (1980). By comparison, the outside-in 
capabilities are market-sensing in nature (understand the target market(s) and 
competitors’ capabilities). They consist of customer-linking capability (creating and 
managing durable customer relationship) and channel-bonding capability (creating 
durable relationships with channel members such as suppliers and customers). These 
capabilities are also known as distinctive marketing competencies (Conant et al., 1990) 
and marketing capabilities (Vorhies et al., 1999; Vorhies and Harker, 2000). Another 
set of strategically focused capabilities is IT capabilities, which comprise of 
administrative and externally-focused information system technologies (Song et al., 
2007; Di Benedetto and Song, 2003; Desarbo et al., 2005).  These different types of 
capabilities have employed in empirical studies across a range of industries, from 
hospitality industry (Garrigos-Simon et al., 2005) to American Health Maintenance 
Organisation industry (HMO) (Conant et al., 1990) and to Export oriented 
Manufacturing firms in Australia and Chinese state-owned enterprises  (SOE) 
(Shoham et al., 2002; Di Benedetto and Song, 2003). The main distinction found 
among the industries and or firms is the strength of the capabilities. 
 
 Capabilities and competitive advantage are not directly linked (Reed and 
DeFillipi, 1990). In other word, having capabilities does not always bring about 
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competitive advantage over competitors. Both the complexity and specificity of a 
firm’s capabilities need to be analysed in order to consider how to put the firm into a 
position of competitive advantage (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). Capabilities and the 
desired strategic position need to support each other. This is known as causal 
ambiguity or congruence between a firm’s capabilities and strategy (Day and Wensley, 
1988; Bahaee, 1992; Jauch and Osborn, 1981).. 
 
 Complexity is referred to as the clever coordination or interrelationship 
between capabilities and other organisational resources. For example, pre-planned 
maintenance programs for production equipment can be combined with quality 
inspection capabilities.  Specificity is the commitment of capabilities and resources to 
suit the requirements of individual customers, and thus generating advantage. To 
achieve sustainable competitive advantage capabilities must be  (1) scarce (2) relative 
immobility and (3) difficult to understand and imitate by competitors (Reed and 
DeFillippi, 1990). These requirements are also suggested by Day and Wensley (1988), 
Barney (1991), Hunt and Morgan (1995) and Lawson and Samson (2001).  
 
 Therefore, capabilities must have the right attributes and be supported by 
organisational structure and operational arrangement in order to have significant 
positive impact on firm performance.   
 
2.3.2 STRATEGY, STRATEGIC TYPOLOGY AND CONGRUENCE THEORY 
 
 The study of strategy in the literature has evolved over recent decades (Kald et 
al., 2000; Chaffee, 1985). The concept of strategy can be classified into three main 
models or categories, namely the linear, the adaptive and the interpretive models 
(Chaffee, 1985). The emergence and development of the adaptive and interpretative 
models arose when management and researchers recognised the fact that strategy is a 
multifaceted concept and that a successful strategy required consideration of the 
nature of an organisation and its ever changing environment (Kald et al., 2000). The 
linear model defines strategy as “the determination of the basic long-term goals of an 
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation resources 
necessary for carrying out these goals” (Chandler, 1962, p. 13). This model suggests 
that the management is the main player in setting strategy and the environment is, 
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implicitly, a necessary nuisance that is composed mainly of competitors (Kald et al., 
2000).  Mintzberg, (1978) denotes this early thought on strategy as (a) explicit, (b) 
developed consciously and purposefully, and (c) made in advance of the specific 
decisions to which it applies. Therefore, the linear model of strategy explicitly 
assumes that decisions made today take into consideration all future unforseen events.  
The interest in this approach to strategy has declined in the mid-1970s, where 
management and researchers have become aware of the organisational environment 
and its effect on the success of strategy implementation.  
 
 According to Hofer (1973, p.3) adaptive strategy is “concerned with the 
development of a viable match between the opportunities and risks present in the 
external environment and the organisation’s capabilities and resources for exploiting 
these opportunities.” This definition is consistent with Kald et al., (2000) and Miles et 
al., (1987). This approach thus requires organisations to continually assess their 
external and internal conditions and adjust appropriately towards their environment. 
Such an approach results in eliminating the time and forward looking assumption that 
is present in the linear model. The coordination between organisational resources and 
their environments to achieve predetermined objectives is consistent with the theory 
of congruence or fit discussed above.  
 
 There are several strategic typologies developed in pursuit of this adaptive 
strategy model, namely Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology, Porter’s (1980) 
strategic positions and Gupta and Govindarajan’s (1984) strategic missions. These 
typologies will be discussed in detail below.  
 
 The interpretive strategy model is based on the notion of a social contract, 
where it views the organisation as a collection of cooperative agreements entered into 
by individual with free will. The interpretive strategy model, thus, has similar 
characteristics to legitimacy theory (Lindblom, 1994), where the management needs 
to take a lead role in coordinating strategy to concerned stakeholders. The facts that 
differentiate this model from previous models are that it considers the environment as 
opposed to the linear model and the organisation’s leaders shape the attitudes of 
participants or potential participants toward their organisation and its outputs, unlike 
the adaptive model (Chaffee, 1985). Pettigrew (1977) defines this interpretive strategy 
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model as the emerging product of the partial resolution of environmental and intra-
organisational dilemmas. The parameters of this model are still unclear, which has 
resulted in little attention in empirical studies (Kald et al., 2000; Chaffee, 1985).  
 
 Strategic typologies describe an organisation’s strategy in term of overall 
interaction of internal and external factors affecting the organisation. In other words a 
single strategic type is the result of many interdependent factors that are both internal 
to the organisation and external in its environment. Table 2.4 below provides three 
major strategic typologies employed in empirical studies.  
 
 
TABLE 2.4 COMPARISON OF MILES AND SNOW, PORTER AND GUPTA 
AND GOVINDARAJAN STRATEGIC TYPOLOGIES 
Study Strategic variables Archetypes Features 
Miles and 
Snow (1978) 
Strategic pattern Defender Stable domain, limited product 
range, compete through low cost or 
high quality, efficiency paramount, 
centralised structure. 
Strategic pattern Prospector Turbulent domain, always seeking 
new product and market 
opportunities, uncertain 
environment, flexible structure. 
Strategic pattern Analyser Hybrid, core of traditional products, 
enters new market after viability 
established, matrix structure. 
Strategy lacking Reactor Lacks coherent strategy, structure 
inappropriate to purpose, misses 
opportunities, unsuccessful. 
Porter (1980) Strategic position Differentiation Product uniqueness leads to higher 
prices, emphasis on marketing and 
research. 
Strategic position Cost 
leadership 
Low price, focus on high market 
share, standardized products, 
economies of scale. 
Choice within a 
strategy 
Focus Focus on defined buyer group, 
product line or geographic market. 
Gupta and 
Govindarajan 
(1984) 
Strategic mission Build Mission is to increase market share, 
capacity investment, low relative 
market share, high growth industry. 
Strategic mission Hold Mission is to keep existing market 
share, quality improvements and 
marketing campaigns crucial for 
success, high relative market share, 
mature industries. 
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Strategic mission Harvest Mission is to maximise short-term 
earnings, investments will decrease 
rapidly, high relative market share, 
declining industries. 
Source: Kald et al. (2000) 
 
 Consistent with the adaptive model of strategy discussed above, each strategic 
type shown in Table 2.4 takes into consideration the nature of the organisation and its 
environments. Porter (1980) provides two strategic positions and a choice within a 
strategy (Focus). Organisations that embark on any strategy need to consider the 
industry development or product-life-cycle and its capabilities (Porter, 1980). For 
example, in the early stage of the product development phase, an organisation based 
on its capabilities, can choose the differentiation strategic position. This position 
requires the organisation to differentiate its product from competitors, gain product 
uniqueness, and charge a higher price to obtain a high return. Capabilities such as 
marketing and R&D are important to be the leader in the market for this strategy. 
However, when the product development reaches a mature stage, the organisation 
needs to alter its strategy. Usually, the organisation needs to compete in term of cost 
leadership instead of differentiation when the product development is at the mature 
stage. This is because it can no longer differentiate its product from the competitors 
and sustain itself in charging high price. This example illustrates the adaptive nature 
of Porter’s (1980) strategic position. Alternatively, an organisation can compete on 
one strategic position. For example, it can compete on a product differentiation 
strategy and when product development changes, the organisation can change its 
strategy to accommodate industry changes with new product development.  
 
 Gupta and Govindarajan’s (1984) strategic typology is based on strategic 
missions, dictating what the organisation should do under conflicting objectives of 
market-share growth and short-run profit maximisation (Kald et al., 2000). Their 
strategic missions are build, hold and harvest. An organisation embarking on the build 
strategic mission requires competence at monitoring and analysis of external industry 
characteristics such as consumer needs and competitors’ strategy. The organisation 
needs to know the product-life-cycle as well. This capability allows the organisation 
to differentiate its product from its competitors and provide superior value to 
customer, which leads to more sales and the capture of more market share.  In contrast, 
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a harvest strategy requires skills at boosting internal efficiency of operations rather 
than concentrating on external analysis. The change in product life-cycle will dictate 
the change in strategic missions, thus illustrating the organisation’s adaptive nature. In 
summary, both Porter’s (1980) and Gupta and Govindarajan’s (1984) strategic 
typologies are concerned with competition of a similar nature, product differentiation 
and cost leadership. They employ capabilities that have features similar to Day’s 
(1994) inside-out and outside-in capabilities discussed in section 3.1. 
 
 Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology portrays firm strategy in term of 
overall interaction among entrepreneurial problem(s), engineering problem(s) and 
administrative problem(s). When the management chooses the entrepreneurial 
position to enter into, it creates an entrepreneurial problem(s) to be solved. This the 
departure point of analysis of Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology (Kald et al., 
2000).  The engineering problem(s) and administrative problem(s) are to be 
recognised when selecting the entrepreneurial position. This is the adaptive nature of 
Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology, where the engineering and 
administrative problems and solutions are adaptive to the selected entrepreneurial 
position.  According to Miles and Snow, there are four identifiable strategic positions 
that exist within an industry, namely the prospectors, analysers, defenders and 
reactors. The main difference among these strategic types is the rate of change in the 
entrepreneurial position or organisation’s domain (Zahra and Pearce, 1990; Miles et 
al., 1978).  The other different is, if properly implemented; the prospector, analyser 
and defender strategies perform equally well and outperform the reactor strategy. 
Table 2.5 below provides detail of each strategic position. 
 
TABLE 2.5 SUMMARY OF MILES AND SNOW’S STRATEGIC POSITION 
Adaptive cycle 
components 
Dimensions Strategic types 
  Prospectors Analysers Defenders Reactors 
Entrepreneurial 
problems and 
solutions 
Product-
market 
domain 
Board and 
continuously 
expanding  
Segmented and 
carefully 
adjusted  
Narrow and 
carefully 
focused 
Uneven and 
transient 
Success 
posture 
Active initiation Calculated 
followers of 
change 
Prominence in 
“their” product 
market(s) 
Opportunistic 
thrusts and 
coping 
postures 
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Surveillance  Market and 
environmentally 
oriented/ 
aggressive 
research 
Competitive 
oriented and 
thorough 
Domain 
dominated and 
cautious/ 
strong 
organisational 
monitoring 
Sporadic and 
issues 
dominated 
Growth  Enacting 
product market 
development 
and 
diversification 
Assertive 
penetration and 
careful product 
market 
development 
Cautious 
penetration and 
advances in 
productivity 
Hasty change 
Engineering 
problems and 
solutions 
Technological 
goal 
Flexibility and 
innovation 
Technological 
synergism 
Cost-
efficiencies 
Project 
development 
and 
completion 
Technological 
breadth 
Multiple 
technologies/ 
pushing the 
edge  
Interrelated 
technologies/ 
at the edge 
Focal, core 
technology/ 
basic expertise 
Shifting 
technological 
applications/ 
fluidity 
Technological 
buffers 
Technical 
personnel 
skills/diversity 
Incrementalism 
and synergism 
Standardisation 
maintenance 
programs 
Ability to 
experiment 
and ‘rig 
solutions’ 
Administrative 
problems and 
solutions 
Dominant 
coalition 
Marketing and 
R&D  
Planning staffs Finance and 
production 
Trouble 
shooters 
Planning Problem and 
opportunity 
finding/ 
campaign 
(program) 
perspective 
Comprehensive 
with 
incremental 
changes 
Inside/out 
control 
dominated 
Crisis 
oriented and 
disjointed 
Structure Product and or 
market centred 
Staff 
dominated/ 
matrix oriented 
Functional/ 
line authority 
Tight formal 
authority/ 
loose 
operating 
design 
Control Market 
performance/ 
sales volumes 
Multiple 
methods/ 
careful risk 
calculations 
Centralised 
and formal/ 
financially 
anchored 
Avoid 
problems/ 
handle 
problems 
remain 
solvent 
Source: Contant et al. (1990) 
 
 The prospector and defender organisations are considered to be on the 
opposite ends of a product domain continuum. The entrepreneurial problems and 
solutions of prospector organisations indicate that they are the first mover in product 
development in the market.  This suggests that prospector organisations can compete 
on the basis of product differentiation. The engineering problems and solutions 
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support this position by suggesting prospector organisations have flexibility and 
innovation, multiple technologies and pushing edge-capabilities.   
 
 At the opposite end, defender organisations have a narrow and carefully 
focused product domain. The engineering problems and solutions suggest that these 
organisations should focus on cost efficiency. Thus, defender organisations are less 
active in product research or responsive to market change. They compete on a low-
cost basis (Slater and Narver, 1993). The analyser organisations are located in 
between the prospectors and defenders and thus share both of prospectors’ and 
defenders’ characteristics. The reactor organisations have an unsystematic strategic 
pattern and thus are considered to have as a residual strategy. It is difficult to 
determine the competitive basis of this strategic type.  
 
 Therefore, Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology can be analysed in 
term of Porter’s (1980) competitive basis. Both illustrate the need for capabilities 
similar to those of Day’s (1994) inside-out and outside-in capabilities. This provides a 
conceptual foundation to conduct empirical studies that look at the congruence or fit 
between organisational capabilities and each of Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic 
type.  
 Strategic typologies face several criticisms in term of their nature as a theory. 
They are portrayed by many theorists as a mere organisational classification (Doty 
and Glick, 1994; Rich, 1992). Rich (1992, p. 758) contends that strategic typologies 
are “a means of ordering and comparing organisations and clustering them into 
categorical types”. Other criticisms include the arguments that typologies are 
essentialism (a theory of classification) and typologies are limited to addressing 
primary questions asked by descriptive researchers (Rich, 1992; Bacharach, 1989; 
McKelvey, 1975; Doty and Glick, 1994).  
These criticisms are only valid for some typologies and cannot be generalised to all 
typologies.  
 
 Doty and Glick (1994) argue that typologies are theory and distinct from 
classification systems. They further suggest that typologies meet at least three 
important criteria of theory, namely having identifiable constructs, having 
relationships between constructs and permitting these relationships to be falsified. In 
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addition, typological theories can be viewed at different levels. Typologies can have a 
grand theory that generalises to all organisations, as well as a middle range theory that 
is restricted to individual industry type. The grand theory of Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
strategic typology purports that at least three of their strategic positions perform 
equally well and outperform the reactors strategic position. The middle range theory 
purports that each strategic type contains sets of engineering and administrative 
solutions. This middle range view point also suggests that each strategic type should 
have a set of distinct capabilities.   
 
 A further theoretical perspective is that each of the above strategic typologies 
when viewed as a set of desirable or practical combinations of factors, can be 
considered as representing a theory in their own right. This referred to as congruence 
theory (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984).  Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) 
through their conceptualisation of types of congruence argue, that the three typologies 
above are “content-fit” types of congruence. In addition, the Porter’s (1980) typology 
is characterised as an external strategy fit, which means it matches an organisation’s 
strategy with the industry environment in which it competes. The Gupta and 
Govindarajan’s (1984) typology is on the other hand characterised as internal fit, 
which is the match between organisational internal structure and its strategy. Lastly, 
Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology is an integrated fit. This type of congruence is 
considered to be the most effective of the three. White and Hamermesh (1981) 
contend that this integrated type of fit ‘connects, in a single framework, the concepts 
of industry environment and business position, organisation structure, and strategy’ (p. 
218). Moreover, most definitions of fit or congruence describe this integrative fit type. 
For example Nadler and Tushman (1980) contend that congruence is the ‘degree to 
which the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and/or structure of one component are 
consistent with the needs, demands, goals, objectives and/or structure of another 
component’(p.40). Similar to typologies, the congruence theory is also subjected to 
many criticisms. Venkatraman and Camillus (1984), using Dubin’s (1978) theory 
building model, have confirmed congruence as theory.   
The study will adapt the Miles and Snow (1978)’s construct for strategy as it provides 
better generalisation to the GBE context than the alternatives that apply directly to 
private context. Moreover, this construct was used in Snow and Hrebiniak (1980)’s 
study that incorporate some public sector organisations.   
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 Congruence theory posits that when an organisation’s business structure, input 
resources/capabilities, environment, strategies and other factors fit well together then 
the organisation would function effectively and achieve superior performance (Fry 
and Smith, 1987; Bahaee, 1992; Myers, 2004). White and Hamermesh (1981) provide 
structured propositions for congruence theory as shown in Figure 2.1. Note that 
proposition P3 is consistent with Miles and Snow’s (1978) middle range theory. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1 CONGRUENCE THEORY PROPOSITIONS 
 
Source: White and Hamermesh (1981) 
 
 Congruence theory has been empirically tested in many fields, including 
strategic management, marketing and organisational structure. The contexts of these 
studies include the fit between relational norms in governance strategies and global 
supply chains (Griffith and Mayers, 2005), the fit between market orientation and 
business strategy (Griffith et al., 2006), the fit between pricing strategy and venture 
strategy fit (Myers, 2004), the fit between compensation policy and competitive 
strategy (Montemayor, 1996) and lastly the fit between organisational capabilities and 
strategic typology (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Song et al., 2007; Di Benedetto and 
Song, 2003; Miles et al., 1978).  
 
Strategy Performance 
Organisational structure Strategy 
Strategy + Business structure + 
internal consistency 
Performance 
P1
P2
P3
P1: Organisation strategy affects performance 
P2: Strategy influences on the design of organisational structure and vice versa 
P3: Strategy fits with structure and internal consistency leads to achieving superior 
performance 
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The studies on the alignments between capabilities and strategic positions are 
predominately focused on aligning Day’s (1994) inside-out and outside-in capabilities, 
marketing capabilities (Conant et al., 1990) and IT capabilities (Song et al., 2007) 
with Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic- type. Apart from Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
basis for research on the alignment of capabilities (Table 2.5), another body of 
literature on the alignment of capabilities is driven by the theoretical perspective of 
Resource Base View (RBV) (Song et al., 2007).  
 
The RBV contends that, in term of Day’s (1994) inside-out and outside-in 
capabilities and Song et al.’s (2007) technology and market-linking capabilities, an 
organisation that adopts a defender strategic position needs to have strong market-
linking and outside-in capabilities in order to maintain a secure niche in a stable 
product or service area and anticipate changes in the market and their customers’ 
needs. Thus, developing greater strength in these capabilities is required rather than 
other types of capabilities. In terms of technology and inside-out capabilities, the 
RBV contends that these capabilities should be matched with prospector strategic 
position. A prospector organisation, thus, needs to develop a stronger degree of these 
capabilities than other types. Therefore, on a relative basis, the defenders should have 
stronger strength in outside-in and market-linking capabilities than the prospectors, 
whereas and the prospectors should have stronger strength in inside-out and 
technology capabilities than the defenders.   
 
2.3.3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE CONGRUENCE OR FIT RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CAPABILITIES AND MILES AND SNOW’S STRATEGIC 
TYPOLOGY 
 
  
 Empirical studies on the congruence between capabilities and each of Miles 
and Snow’s strategic types focus on the relationship between capabilities and their 
selected entrepreneurial position. In other words, the studies look at what capabilities 
each strategic type should possess to enable it to achieve its selected products or 
services’ market domain. In addition, the studies look at the relative performance 
among each strategic type. Basically, empirical studies test the grand and middle 
range theory of Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology. According to Zahra and 
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Pearce (1990), Miles and Snow (1978) and Miles et al., (1978) the strategic typology 
has the testable propositions listed in Table 2.6. 
 
TABLE 2.6 SUMMARY OF TESTABLE PROPOSITIONS OF MILES AND 
SNOW’S STRATEGIC TYPOLOGY 
Dimensions Typology’s proposition 
(1) Existence of distinct strategic type Four type exist in a particular industry 
(2) Environment-strategic link Strategic groups exist in different 
environments 
(3) Entrepreneurial problem Strategic types differ in the way they define 
their domain 
(4) Engineering problem Strategic types differ in the way they choose 
production technology 
(5) Administrative problem  
 (a) environmental analysis The groups differ in the intensity of their 
environmental scanning effort  
 (b) functional important Strategic groups differ concerning their 
relative emphasis on the various functions 
within the firm 
 (c) TMT composition Strategic groups differ in their recruitment 
practices relating to the TMT, concerning, 
functional background, source (internal and 
external) and age median 
 (d) internal organisation Firms of different strategic types will utilize 
different organisational structure and central 
mechanisms 
 (e) managerial philosophies Managers will emphasise different human 
resource philosophies depending on the 
strategic type of the organisation 
(6) Competitive devices Strategic groups will differ in the devices 
types used 
(7) Performance Prospectors, Analysers and Defenders 
perform equally effective and outperform 
Reactors 
Source: Zahra and Pearce (1990) 
  
 Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) look at the relationships between a set of 
distinctive competences and each of Miles and Snow’s strategic type in the context of 
high uncertainty industries. The industries selected for their study include plastic, 
semiconductor, automotive and air transportation industries. These types of industries 
allow for a comprehensive test of dimensions (1) and (2) in Table 2.5. Furthermore, 
they look at the performance of each strategic type, hence testing dimension (7). Their 
findings support Miles and Snow’s (1978) original findings, which suggest that there 
are four strategic types existing in a particular industry and overall performance 
suggests the prospectors, analysers and defenders are performed equally well and 
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outperform the reactors. The congruence between capabilities and strategic type 
(dimensions (4), (5) (a) and (b)) suggests that prospectors possess market research, 
product research and development, and basic engineering. In contrast, the defenders 
have production, engineering and financial management capabilities. This is 
consistent with the original findings. Nevertheless, Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) did 
not find any distinct pattern of capabilities in the analysers, as they cannot be 
distinguish from the prospectors and defenders. This supports notion that analysers 
have both prospectors’ and defenders’ characteristics. The reactors do not show any 
distinctive pattern of capabilities.   
 
 Others studies look at similar relationships and test similar propositions. The 
main differences among them are context of study and type of capabilities. Davig 
(1986) looks at small manufacturing firms and employs capabilities of competitive 
prices, on-time delivery, product quality, unique product and customer services. His 
findings contradict Miles and Snow (1978) and Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) as he 
found that only the prospectors and defenders do well, whereas analysers and reactors 
perform rather poorly. Nevertheless, he also found that prospectors concentrate on 
price competitiveness and product uniqueness, while defenders focus on on-time 
delivery and product quality. This finding is similar to Miles and Snow (1978), as 
product uniqueness requires flexible and innovative technology and product quality 
requires a focus of focal core technology and product expertise. It also requires 
similar capabilities as described by Snow and Hrebiniak (1980). The analysers 
concentrate on product quality and the Reactors concentrate on customer focus.   
  
 Another study, by Smith et al. (1986) focuses on electronic manufacturing 
firms and broad capabilities that resemble Miles and Snow’s (1978) entrepreneurial 
and engineering solutions with accommodation of management’s backgrounds, 
similarly to Snow and Hrebiniak (1980). This study thus tests dimensions 3 and 4 in 
Table 3. Smith et al’s (1986) findings show that prospectors, analysers and defenders 
perform equally well and outperform the reactors. Their cluster analysis shows each 
strategic type has the characteristics that are portrayed by Miles and Snow (1978).  
 
 Conant et al. (1990) look at American Health Maintenance Organisation 
(HMO) industry and focus the congruence relationship for distinctive marketing 
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competencies.  Their findings provide empirical support for dimensions (1), (2), (4), 
(5) (a) and (b) and (7) in Table 3. They find that prospectors have the highest level of 
marketing related capabilities on the Prospectors, Analysers, Defenders and Reactors 
continuum. This is supported by Snow and Hrebiniak’s (1980) and Davig’s (1986) 
findings.  Once again dimension (7) is supported by an ANOVA indicating no 
significant different in performance among the first three strategic types on the 
continuum and the reactors perform worse than the others. Two other studies that look 
at similar relationships are in the context of Spanish hospitality firms (Garrigos-
Simon et al., 2005) and Australian exporting manufacturing firms (Shoham et al., 
2002).  These two studies provide consistent results to the prior studies, thus further 
strengthening the grand and middle range theories of Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
strategic typology. In addition, these studies extend the validity of Miles and Snow’s 
(1978) strategic typology to various contexts. 
 
In contrast to Conant et al. (1990) that look at a set of strategically focused 
capabilities, Di Beneditto and Song (2003) employ four sets of capabilities i.e. Day’s 
(1994) inside-out, outside-in capabilities, information technologies and marketing 
capabilities. Their findings suggest that prospectors have information technology and 
inside-out capabilities, and the defenders have marketing and outside-in capabilities. 
The analysers possess both the prospectors’ and defenders’ characteristics. These 
result are consistent with more recent studies by Song et al. (2007) and Desarbo et al. 
(2005). Song et al. (2007) employ technology, IT, Market-linking and Marketing 
capabilities and found that prospectors have greater technology, and IT capabilities 
than defenders and defenders have greater market-linking and marketing capabilities 
then prospectors.  These findings are somewhat contradicting to Contant et al. (1990), 
however they are consistent with RBV. In addition, these findings are, to some extent, 
consistent with Snow and Hrebiniak (1980).  
 
On top of the above findings, Song et al. (2007), through regressing 
capabilities and strategies alignments variables instead of ANOVA, found that a good 
fit between strategic position and capabilities lead to superior performance. They 
found that, at good fit between prospector strategic type and technology/IT 
capabilities has positive relationship with performance. On the other end, a defender 
has a positive relationship with performance when it possesses market-linking and 
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marketing capabilities. These findings are consistent with the RBV and original 
findings by M-S.  
 
Two other studies that look at similar relationships are in the context of 
Spanish hospitality firms (Garrigos-Simon et al., 2005) and Australian exporting 
manufacturing firms (Shoham et al., 2002).  These two studies provide consistent 
results to the prior studies, thus further strengthening the grand and middle range 
theories of Miles and Snow’s strategic typology. In addition, these studies extend the 
validity of Miles and Snow’s strategic typology to various contexts. 
 
 Table 2.7 provides a summary of empirical studies using Miles and Snow’s 
strategic typology.  
 
TABLE 2.7 APPLICATION OF MILES AND SNOW STRATEGIC TYPOLOGY 
Empirical studies on M&S strategic typology and capabilities match and performance 
Author(s), 
year 
Context Strategic 
type 
examine 
Capabilities Dependent 
variable- 
performance 
Measureme
nt of M&S 
strategy 
Findings 
Snow and 
Hrebiniak 
(1980) 
Plastic, Semi-
conductor, 
automotive, air 
transportation 
Prospector, 
Analyser, 
Defender, 
Reactor 
General firm’s 
competencies 
ROA Self-typing: 
Paragraph 
approach 
Prospectors, 
Analysers, and 
Defenders show 
positive 
performance. 
Reactors show 
negative 
performance 
Davig 
(1986) 
Small 
manufacturing 
firms 
Prospector, 
Analyser, 
Defender, 
Reactor 
Low price, 
Quality of 
product, 
Customer 
services  
Change in 
Revenue and 
Profits, for 
three years 
Self-typing: 
Snow and 
Hrebiniak, 
1980, 
paragraph 
approach 
Prospectors and 
Defenders 
outperform 
Analysers and 
Reactors. 
Analysers 
outperformed 
Reactors 
Smith et al. 
(1986) 
Electronic 
manufacturing 
firms 
Prospector, 
Analyser, 
Defender, 
Reactor 
General 
management, 
marketing, R&D 
engineering and 
production, 
accounting and 
finance 
Self- report, 
Sales growth, 
Profits, ROA, 
and overall 
performance 
Self-typing: 
11 
questionnaire 
approach 
Prospectors, 
Analysers and 
Defenders are 
perform equally 
well and out 
perform Reactors 
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Conant et 
al. (1990) 
American Health 
Maintenance 
Organisation 
industry (HMO) 
Prospector, 
Analyser, 
Defender, 
Reactor 
Distinctive 
marketing 
competencies 
Self- report, 
Relativity of 
general 
profitability, 
ROI  
Self-typing: 
11 multi-
item scale 
questionnaire; 
Majority 
rule in 
selecting 
strategic 
type 
Prospectors, 
Analysers and 
Defenders 
perform equally 
well, and 
outperformed 
Reactors 
Shoham et 
al. (2002) 
Export oriented 
Manufacturing 
firms in Australia  
Prospector, 
Analyser, 
Defender  
Snow and 
Hrebiniak’s 
(1980) 
distinctive 
competences 
with addition of 
marketing 
management, 
market research 
5 point scale 
measure of 
perceived 
success in 
export 
activities, ratio 
of export to 
total sale 
Self-typing: 
Paragraph 
approach 
Prospectors, 
Analysers, 
Defenders 
perform equally 
well 
Garrigo-
Simon et al. 
(2005) 
Spanish 
Hospitality firms 
Prospector, 
Analyser, 
Defender, 
Reactor 
Direct causal 
link with 
performance 
Questionnaire 
survey on: 
Profitability, 
Growth, 
Stakeholder 
satisfaction, 
Competitive 
position, 
Total 
performance 
Self-typing: 
Snow and 
Hrebiniak, 
1980, 
Paragraph 
approach 
Prospectors, 
Analysers, 
Defenders 
perform equally 
well and 
outperform 
Reactors on total 
performance 
Other 
performance 
indicators show a 
mix result. 
Di 
Bennedetto 
and Song 
(2003) 
Chinese State 
Owned 
Enterprises 
(SOEs) 
Prospector, 
Analyser, 
Defender, 
Reactor 
 
Day (1994) 
inside-out and 
outside-in 
capabilities, 
And Information 
technology and 
Marketing 
capabilities 
No study on 
relationship 
with 
performance 
Self-typing: 
Conant et 
al., 1990  
11 multi-
item scale 
questionnaire 
with 
majority rule 
in selecting 
strategic 
type 
Prospectors have 
a relatively 
higher of inside-
out and 
information 
technology 
capabilities and 
the defenders 
have a relatively 
higher of 
outside-in and 
marketing 
capabilities 
along the 
prospector-
analyser-
defender 
continuum 
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Desarbo, 
Di- 
Benedetto, 
Song, and 
Sinha 
(2005) 
709 firms from 
Japan, China and 
US.  
Electronics, 
pharmaceuticals, 
drugs, 
telecommunicatio
n industries and 
more. 
Prospector, 
Analyser, 
Defender, 
Reactor 
Marketing, 
Technology, 
Market-linking, 
IT and 
management 
capabilities 
No study on 
relationship 
with 
performance 
Self-typing: 
Conant et 
al., 1990  
11 multi-
item scale 
questionnaire 
with 
majority rule 
in selecting 
strategic 
type 
Prospector and 
Analyser 
strategic 
positions aligned 
with marketing, 
management, 
technology, and 
IT. 
Defender and 
Reactor strategic 
position aligned 
with market 
linking and 
management 
Song, Di- 
Benedetto 
and Nason 
(2007) 
308 US firms 
from electronics, 
pharmaceuticals, 
drugs, 
telecommunicatio
n industries and 
more. 
Prospector, 
Analyser, 
Defender, 
Reactor 
Marketing, 
Technology, 
Market-linking 
and IT  
capabilities 
Capabilities 
and strategies 
alignments 
perform well 
Self-typing: 
Conant et 
al., 1990  
11 multi-
item scale 
questionnaire 
with 
majority rule 
in selecting 
strategic 
type 
Technology and 
IT capabilities 
are well matched 
with prospector 
strategic position 
and market-
linking and 
marketing 
capabilities are 
well match with 
defender 
strategic position 
Other studies on M&S strategic typology 
Author(s), 
year 
Context Strategic 
type  
Congruence 
Variables 
Dependent 
variable 
Measuremen
t of M&S 
strategy 
Findings 
Bahaee 
(1992) 
Regional Airline 
Industry 
Prospectors, 
Defenders, 
Reactors 
Comprehensive 
strategic 
decision making 
Performance: 
Percentage of 
seat occupied 
per aircraft, 
profit margin 
Self-typing: 
Snow and 
Hrebiniak, 
1980, 
Paragraph 
approach and  
Conant et al., 
1990  
11 multi-item 
scale 
questionnaire 
Majority rule 
in selecting 
strategic type 
High 
congruent 
(defenders 
use a 
comprehensi
-veness 
strategic 
decision 
making 
(SDM), 
prospectors 
uses non 
comprehend
-siveness of 
SMD) 
outperform 
low 
congruent 
(defenders 
uses non 
comprehensi
-veness 
SDM) 
58 
Abernethy 
and Guthrie 
(1994) 
Strategic Business 
Unit Level,  
Variety of industries 
Prospectors, 
Defenders 
Management 
information 
system design 
Performance: 
7 point Likert-
scale 
performance-
related 
questionnaire 
Self-typing: 
Paragraph 
approach  
 
Prospectors 
are 
correlated 
with broad 
scope 
information 
and 
outperform 
defenders 
Other empirical studies on capabilities and strategic type
Vorhies and 
Harker (2000) 
Strategic Business 
Unit Level, 
Australian 
manufacturing and 
service firms 
Market- 
driven and 
Non-market 
driven 
Marketing 
capabilities 
Performance: 
7 point Likert 
scale survey on 
Profitability, 
Growth, 
Adaptability, 
Customer 
satisfaction 
Survey 
questionnaire 
7 point 
Likert scale 
Market 
driven firms 
outperform 
Non-market 
driven firms 
O’Regan and 
Ghobadian 
(2004) 
Small and medium 
size manufacturing 
firms, Electronic 
and Engineering 
sectors 
Not look 
congruence 
with 
strategy 
Generic 
capabilities: 
14 capabilities 
obtained from 
interviews with 
six managers 
and two 
employer 
representatives 
Performance: 
Survey 
questionnaire, 
focus on 
Financial 
performance, 
Customer 
satisfaction, 
Organisational 
effectiveness, 
Innovation 
 Capabilities 
influence 
organisation
-al 
performance 
 
High 
performing 
firms place 
stronger 
emphasis on 
capabilities 
compared to 
low 
performing 
firms 
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2. 4 LITERATURE REVIEW ON PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
  
This section is divided into three parts. The first part of the section provides 
definition and theoretical underpinnings the concept and features of accountability. 
The second part reviews the literature on dimensions of accountability. Lastly, an 
annotated literature of the dimension of public sector accountability is provided.   
  
2.4.1 NATURE AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 Accountability is a concept used in business, political and social contexts, and 
is viewed as an important concept for social and organisation systems (Othman and 
Taylor, 2006). The issue of accountability receives greater attention in the public 
sector than in the private sector. This is because there are more control mechanisms in 
the private sector than in the public sector (Steering Committee, 1996). The capital 
markets, which only exist in the private sector, act as the ultimate control over the 
management. The investors can easily change their investment decision and vehicle to 
suit their requirement. This is of course not the case in the public sector, as there 
aren’t many public sector entities to choose from, and the government could be 
changed only via the ballot box (Kluvers, 2001). Additionally, the public sector 
entity’s management faces greater scrutiny than its private sector counterpart as its 
actions and decisions are prone to political and public reviews. The political 
environment focuses on a system of checks and balances, and value systems that 
dictate the issues of ethics and codes of conduct, thus further concern with 
accountability (Barret, 2000).  
   
Accountability is a multi-faceted concept with a definition varying depending 
on the context of study (Sinclair, 1995). The basic concept of accountability is that 
one is obliged to answer for one’s actions and decisions which arise when authority to 
act on behalf of an individual or body is transferred to another (Funnell and Cooper, 
1998).  This is consistent with Stewart (1984), as he defines accountability as the 
involvement of two parties, the accountor and the accountee and the process of 
account and the holding to account. Moreover, accountability is an assurance that the 
responsible party will perform their duties as expected and answerable for desirable 
and undesirable outcomes (Othman, 2005). Lastly, the meaning of accountability is 
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discipline-specific with auditors discussing accountability in term of financial and 
numerical matters, political scientists view accountability as a political imperative, 
legal scholars as a constitutional arrangement, and  philosophers treat accountability 
as a subset of ethics (Sinclair, 1995). Nevertheless, the concept of accountability 
remains unclear as ‘the more definitive we attempt to render the concept, the more 
murky it becomes’ Sinclair (1995, p.221).  
 
The theories underpinning accountability concept are the same as those of 
corporate governance, namely agency theory, stakeholder and stewardship theories.   
These theories have been reviewed in the governance section and thus will not be 
repeated here. 
 
2.4.2 DIMENSIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
  
  The underlying features of a public sector entity that give rise to multi-
dimension of accountability include the nature of the Westminster system of 
government, the new public sector management (NPM) approach and the multiple 
stakeholders. The Westminster system of government provides a chain of political 
accountability, where the manager of public sector entity is accountable to the 
minister for implementing the set of policies and the minister is accountable to the 
Parliament for the outcomes and ultimately the Parliament is accountable to the 
electorates (Funnell and Cooper, 1998). Moreover, the manager is required to answer 
to government oversight bodies as well, including the Auditor-General and the 
ombudsman. Under the Howard governments, political accountability becomes more 
important than ever. This is because the Howard governments strengthened their 
control over government authorities and agencies and weakening the power of 
administrative review tribunals and set up formal ministerial directions for GBEs 
(Wettenhall, 2007). These features also give rise to fiduciaries accountability, where 
there is concern for the probity and legality of expenditures. The agency is 
accountable for using the funds entrusted to it accordance with the processes set down 
for use and the purpose for which funds were prescribed (Mayston, 1993).    
 
 NPM is a marketised approach to the provision of government services 
embracing a philosophy of government being a facilitator of public services, rather 
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than the direct and sole provider  (Glynn and Perkins, 1997; Parker and Gould, 1999). 
It adopts private sector management practices, including the pursuit of efficiency and 
effectiveness of service delivery, through employment of quasi-markets in which the 
government pays for services but does not necessarily provide them and through 
contracting out services (Parker and Gould, 1999). This resulted in public sector 
organisations being transformed into commercial and services forms and the public 
and client are redefined as customers (Parker and Gould, 1999; Parker and Guthrie, 
1993). This development therefore leads to an accountability requirement other than 
the traditional political and fiduciary accountabilities. It leads to the requirement of 
managerial accountability. This also led to the use of performance indicators and 
performance reporting to discharge accountability (Kluvers, 2001, 2003; Cunningham 
and Harris, 2005). Mucciarone and Taylor (2002) suggest that there are two types of 
performance indicators disclosed by public sector entities, namely financial and non-
financial. The financial indicators include cost reduction, profitability and unit cost 
types. The non-financial indicators include procedural efficiency and quality of output 
types. Sinclair (1995) explains that managerial accountability is the focus on 
monitoring both input and outputs or outcomes as a measure of management’s 
effectiveness in setting and achieving output targets as well as managing resources 
effectively. Therefore, managerial accountability involves in achieving economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. Managerial accountability would be seen as complement 
the short-comings of fiduciary accountable.   Public sector entities, including GBEs 
provide a wide range of community services to the public, which include 
transportation, utilities and finance.  Thus, public accountability is also required.  
Public accountability are perceived to be an informal type of accountability and exists 
where public servant are accountable to the public via the media or survey (Sinclair, 
1995). 
 
 The above features provide background assumptions toward the study of 
public sector accountability. Empirical studies in the field of public sector 
accountability to date are conducted through case studies and surveys and concerning 
accountability in local government, departments and authorities in Australia (Kloot 
and Martin, 2001; Sinclair, 1995; Taylor and Rosair, 2000) and local government 
authorities in Malaysia (Othman and Taylor, 2006). Sinclair (1995) in studying of 
accountability of heads of government departments and statutory authorities identifies 
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five accountability dimensions, namely the political, public, managerial, professional 
and personal accountability. The study employs qualitative method that involves 
interviewing the CEOs of the departments and statutory authorities and content and 
discourse analysis of the transcripts. The dimensions of accountability identified are 
the self-identification accountability. The CEOs are said to face with a complex 
chameleon-like accountability and answerable to many competing constituencies, 
from government ministers to professional society. Kloot and Martin (2001) in their 
thirst to investigate the distinctions of accountability faced by local government 
managers across Australian states and between urban and non-urban areas have 
conducted a quantitative accountability study. The study was carried through survey 
questionnaires where the managers were asked to rate their degree of accountability to 
various stakeholders. The study found that there were only minor differences in the 
perception of accountability within different States and between urban and non-urban 
areas and the mangers indicated they have high responsibility to discharge their 
accountability to ratepayers, councillors, wider community and state government. The 
managers indicated that these accountabilities are of high and very high importance. 
Thus, Kloot and Martin (2001) provide further evidence of Sinclair’s (1995) public 
and political accountabilities. Othman and Taylor (2006) also study accountability of 
local government’s managers, but in a context of Malaysian local government 
authorities. The study conducted through survey questionnaires, which directed to 
Heads and Senior Officers. The questionnaire was constructed base prior normative 
discussions and empirical findings on dimensions of accountability. Stewart (1984), 
Sinclair (1995) and Taylor and Pincus (1999) were among them. The findings of the 
study refined the prior empirical findings from Sinclair (1995) and Kloot and Martin 
(2001) with the evidence of three exclusive dimensions of accountabilities. The study 
provides three distinct accountabilities, namely managerial/public accountability, 
fiduciary/compliance accountability and political accountability.  
 The consistency in these studies is empirically confirmed the multi-
dimensions of public sector accountability and provide a very useful tool to both the 
government and oversight bodies and public sector’s entity in relation to assessing 
and discharging accountability. 
 
Turning to government business enterprises (GBEs), the central feature that 
draws GBEs into the web of public sector accountability is their ‘publicness’, as they 
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are owned by the government and ultimately the public. This ownership requires that 
they be controlled and called to account in ways that enable them to meet their 
responsibilities to the government, parliament and the public (Thynne, 1998a; Thynne 
and Wettenhall, 2001; Aharoni, 1981). More specifically, GBEs are subject to 
political, managerial, public and to fiduciary accountability. Political accountability 
arises as the management of the GBEs is accountable to the relevant ministers and the 
relevant ministers are accountable to the parliament regarding GBEs’ activities and 
performance (Bottomley, 2001; Department of Treasury and Finance, 1998). GBEs 
are also accountable to their political master for any imposed community service 
obligations (CSO) as well (Uhrig, 2003). This requirement is specifically stated in 
their respective enabling Act. In addition, GBEs need to comply with reporting 
requirements. They need to report to the Department of Treasury and their responsible 
minister(s) in a form of a statement of corporate intent, which include their corporate 
plan and half yearly and annual report (Tasmania Treasury and Finance Department, 
1995; Queensland Department Treasury, 2006; NSW Treasury, 2005). Their annual 
report will be tabled in parliament. Fiduciary accountability is of least concern in 
terms of normal day-to-day operating activities. This is because GBEs are not 
dependent on government budget for operating funds.  However, fiduciary 
accountability is of concern when disposing and acquiring new assets or investing in a 
subsidiary. This is because relevant ministers’ approval is required, as required by the 
respective enabling Act. Moreover, fiduciary accountability is important when 
seeking reimbursement from the government on cost of CSOs, as they need to follow 
strict guideline set out by Treasury Departments (Tasmania Treasury and Finance 
Department, 1996; NSW Government, 1994; Queensland Treasury Department, 1999). 
 
The provision of CSOs requires GBEs to be accountable to the public for the 
performance of the CSOs provided. Since GBEs trades like private sector 
organisations in providing services and goods to the public, its public accountability 
has shifted from the traditional role to a more customer focus and customer 
satisfaction. This means that GBEs still need to concern about public accountability 
even if there is no CSO imposed upon them. The move to corporatised form of 
operation is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of GBEs operation.  
According to McDonough (1998) the corporatised form was the prefer form in 
Queensland as to improve economic efficiency of Queensland public sector. In 
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addition, there is a built in strict accountability for performance, evidenced in their 
respective enabling Act in the principles of corporatisation (McDonough, 1998). This 
warrants GBEs to be efficient in the use of resources inputs to produce outputs and 
effectiveness in use of input to deliver the specified outcomes. Thus it subjects GBEs 
to managerial accountability. 
 
While there are reasonable amount of studies on dimensions public sector 
accountability, little attention paid to accountability of GBEs to date.  Luke (2008), 
through combination of in-depth interviews with New Zealand state owned 
enterprises’ (SOE) executives and secondary data, looks at dimensions of 
accountability of New Zealand state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Her finding is 
somewhat consistent to Sinclair (1995) as she found that accountability of GBEs can 
be seen as “similar to a web, encompassing numerous and complex dimensions” (p. 
24). Nevertheless, three of the four traditional dimensions of accountability are clear 
presented in the executives’ discussions. Political accountability, in context of GBEs, 
is seen as an upward reporting responsibility to relevant ministers and to oversight 
bodies. In addition, it involves due approval process, which minister approval is 
required for major developments and investment projects. The executives mentioned 
that they work on a “no surprises policy” (p. 17).  In contrast to findings by Sinclair 
(1995) in the “pure” public sector organisations context, public accountability is a 
relevant factor to GBEs. It involves extending GBEs’ responsibilities beyond it 
mandated areas to social and environmental responsibilities. Lastly, managerial 
accountability was seen by the executives as an emphasis for commercial or financial 
success of investment projects. As cited in Luke (2008) one of the executives 
provided that: 
I think the biggest risk is not being able to recoup your investment…so 
SOE framework is about being able to justify the investment… [and] we 
need a return that above market (p.16). 
 
Given Luke’s (2008) context of study, both SOEs and regulatory environment 
are similar to Australia (Wettenhall, 1998; McKinlay, 1998), her findings can be 
extended to Australia GBE context. In addition, they are consistent with authoritative 
guidelines and normative discussions provided above.  
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Therefore GBEs’ management needs to set up management strategy and 
operation systems that allow it to perform at a level that will effectively discharge 
accountability requirements. The effects of these strategies and systems on the 
discharge of accountability are informed by the underlying theories used by this study. 
The construct for accountability emphasis chosen in this study will be limited in scope 
to the notions of managerial and public accountabilities only. This choice is made 
because these two dimensions of accountability have a more commercial orientation 
than the fiduciary and political accountability dimensions. Managerial and public 
accountabilities are faced by all forms of GBEs and are present across a common 
range of GBE performance situations. On the other hand, the extent and nature of the 
political chain of accountability and compliance requirements will different between 
GBEs of different forms and under different jurisdictions. 
 
 Table 2.8 presents a summary of studies on dimensions of accountability. 
These studies are illustrated chronologically to show the evolution of the notions and 
dimensions of accountability. 
 
TABLE 2.8 SUMMARY OF PRIOR STUDIES ON DIMENSIONS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Authors/year  Dimensions of 
accountability 
Concept/implications/findings  
Normanton, 
1966, 1971 
 
• Public 
accountability 
 
The Author noted that in the public sector, public 
officials are required to provide information 
particularly on financial management to superior as 
well as to persons at the highest level in the states.   
Robinson, 
1971 
• Programme 
accountability 
• Process 
accountability 
• Fiscal 
accountability 
The author noted that Faculty members of a 
university are not answerable to anyone as a result 
of academic freedom.  In order to account for their 
research funds, they are expected to be concerned 
with quality of their work and ensure their set goals 
are achieved.     
 
Johnson, 
1974 
• Legal 
• Political 
• Professional 
• Administrative 
In this conceptual article, Johnson highlighted that 
public accountability requires the performance and 
conduct of persons exercising public authority to be 
evaluated for their actions and inactions.  The 
persons exercising public authority consist of those 
holding elected political office or permanent 
position in the political and administrative structure. 
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Stewart, 
1984 Alternative bases of accountability: 
• Accountability 
for probity 
• Accountability 
for legality 
• Accountability 
for efficiency 
• Accountability 
for good 
administration 
• Performance 
accountability  
• Programme 
accountability 
• Managerial 
accountability 
• Commercial 
accountability 
 
Ladder of 
accountability:  
• Accountability 
for probity and 
legality 
• Process 
accountability 
• Performance 
accountability 
• Programme 
accountability 
• Policy 
accountability 
This is a conceptual review of accountability in 
public sector in which the author noted that: 
• The full concept of accountability entails giving 
an account, holding to account and the capacity 
to legitimately exercise governmental power.  
• The bond of accountability is the relationship 
between those giving the account and those 
held to account and the bond must be clear to 
ensure a clear and enforceable accountability.  
• There are several bases of accountability that 
vary in relation to the activities for which the 
accounts have to be given and the purpose of 
the account.   
• The alternative bases of accountability can be 
set out as a ladder of accountability according 
to the purpose for which the bond is constituted 
and the ladder leads from accountability by 
standards to accountability by judgment 
• As the ladder of accountability rises, the type of 
information provided should also change.  
Financial data alone are not sufficient.  Other 
information such as output data (for 
performance accountability) and objectives (for 
programme accountability) should also be 
included.   
Romzek & 
Dubnick, 
1987 
• Bureaucratic  
• Legal 
• Professional 
• Political  
This is a case study on the space shuttle Challenger 
tragedy, highlighting the detrimental effect of 
multiple accountability systems and how 
inappropriate political and bureaucratic 
accountability at NASA leads to the Challenger 
disaster when decision makers relied upon 
supervisors to make the decisions rather than 
deferring to professional experts. 
 
67 
Roberts,  
1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Individualizing 
forms of 
accountability 
• Socializing 
forms of 
accountability 
In this conceptual article on the concept of 
accountability, the author observed how two 
different forms of accountability produce different 
senses of self and the interdependencies of self with 
others i.e. individualizing sense of self and 
socializing forms of accountability.   
Individualizing forms of accountability refers to how 
one is absorbed with oneself to be recognized and 
accepted according to the expectation of others.    
Socializing forms of accountability indicates the 
interdependence between self and others.  
Accountability in practice is a form of social relation 
with moral and strategic dimensions.   
Fowles, 
1993 
The notion of 
accountability in 
social policy 
Discussion on the use of the notion of accountability 
from the social policy perspective 
Accountability began with the notion of professional 
competence, discretion and judgment 
Contemporary notion of accountability focus on 
providing better quality services to the consumers 
and users of services rather than merely internal 
checks on performance. 
public sector organizations particularly the local 
authority are encouraged to balance between the 
political demands for better-managed (cheaper) 
services and the public’s demand for better quality 
of delivery (more extensive and expensive) of 
services.   
 
Gray & 
Jenkins, 
1993 
Codes:  
• Financial codes 
• Professional 
codes 
• Managerial codes 
Rationalities: 
• Technical 
rationality 
• Legal rationality 
• Economic 
rationality 
• Social rationality 
• Political 
rationality 
The authors discussed on management’s 
accountability at the beginning of the 1990s.  
Reforms in civil service management have imported 
codes of accountability.  They suggest that codes 
can be characterized by the rationalities they 
embody.   Codes of accountability embody a 
substantive rationality to the exclusion of others.  
However, in practice the codes comprise 
combinations, even fusions of these rationalities.  
Economic rationality is promoted through new 
managerial and financial codes of accountability. 
 
Sinclair, 
1995 • Political 
• Public 
• Managerial 
• Professional 
• Personal 
Case study on 15 Chief Executive Officers of a 
public sector agency in Australia.  She noted that 
accountability in the public sector agency is 
subjectively constructed and changes with context. 
Multiple and fragmented (accountability in one form 
sacrifices other forms of accountability) tied to 
language and ideology; values and ethics and 
emotions and motivations  
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Taylor & 
Rosair,  
2000 
• Managerial 
accountability 
• Fiduciary 
accountability  
This is a survey on Principle Accounting Officers 
(PAO) of State government departments throughout 
Australia.  The study aims to develop an 
accountability-related disclosure index to rate the 
accountability of government departments.  They 
provide evidence that disclosure items are can be 
dichotomized into two conceptually and statistically 
different groups – fiduciary and managerial 
accountability-based disclosure.  Using these 
accountability-based index as dependent variables, 
the study found that the extent of fiduciary and 
managerial accountability-based disclosure provided 
by the government departments are influenced by 
the user that directly participate in the decision 
process of the department such as the Minister and 
not by the ultimate user such as the taxpayers.   
 
Kloot & 
Martin,  
2001 
 
• Accountability 
to state 
government 
• Accountability 
to ratepayers 
• Accountability 
to wider 
community 
• Accountability 
to Councillors 
This is a survey on all of the Australian local 
governments.  This study examines the way 
managers in different state-based systems of local 
government perceive and demonstrate their 
accountability to multiple stakeholders.  The result 
indicates that there are different perceptions of the 
importance of accountability to different 
stakeholders.  They found that managers throughout 
local government have strong notions of public 
accountability.  The managers in local government 
in Australia placed high emphasis on public 
accountability (accountability to ratepayers and the 
wider community) than they have on political 
accountability (i.e. accountability to state 
government).  They contend that although state 
governments have the power to remove and 
restructure local government, managers are more 
concerned with meeting the public expectations.  In 
summary, the study shows that managers can work 
successfully in a framework of multiple 
accountabilities. 
Luke (2008) • Political 
Accountability 
• Public 
accountability 
• Managerial 
accountability 
• Professional 
accountability 
The study is conducted using in-depth interviews 
with senior New Zealand state owned enterprises’ 
executives and analysis of textual data. The findings 
reveal that GBEs are facing multiple dimensions of 
accountability. The traditional dimensions of 
accountability of public, managerial and political 
accountabilities were mentioned in the executives’ 
discussions. 
Source: Othman (2005); Luke (2008) 
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2.5 LITERATURE GAP AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
  
 This chapter identifies the following gaps in the literature. First, the empirical 
studies on the relationships between corporate governance characteristics and 
financial performance – i.e. Donaldson and Davis (1991), Rechner and Dalton (1991), 
Coles et al. (2001), Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Rebiez and Salamenh (2006), Feng et 
al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2007) – are predominately focused on private-sector 
organisations. The current study seeks to extend this governance literature to the 
context of GBEs. Additionally, the special mission of GBEs that expects a balancing 
of financial performance and accountability requirements allows for an investigation 
of the relationships between governance arrangements and accountability-emphasis as 
well as financial performance.  
 
 Second, the study fills a gap in the capabilities and strategy alignments 
literature. This literature has predominately focused on private sector organisations – 
i.e., Conant et al. (1990) (American Health Maintenance Organisation industry 
(HMO)), Shoham et al. (2002) (Export oriented Manufacturing firms in Australia), 
Garrigo-Simon et al. (2005) (Spanish Hospitality firms) and Song et al. (2007) (US 
firms from electronics, pharmaceuticals, drugs, telecommunication industries). 
Evidence to date has not been extended to public sector entities or government owned 
business enterprises. This study modifies the capabilities-strategy match measure to 
make it relevant to the context of GBEs.     
 
Third, the study contributes to the methodologies used to develop a corporate 
governance index (CGI). The study contributes to the methods used to develop board 
governance index with different index scales and components from prior methods. 
The study uses, among other components, percentages of politically-related directors 
and financial literate directors. These governance characteristics have not been 
employed in the design of a CGI in any prior study. 
 
Fourth, the study adds to the public sector accountability literature by 
modelling the concepts of board governance quality and capabilities-strategies match 
as predictors of the degree of attention that GBEs’ management will give to processes 
and systems for discharging their managerial and public accountability requirements. 
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This type of investigation is distinct from prior studies on public sector accountability 
e.g. Sinclair (1995), Taylor and Rosair (2000), Kloot and Martin (2001) and Luke 
(2008) that predominately focuses on determining accountability dimensions. 
 
 Lastly, unlike prior studies that individually investigate either the 
relationships between corporate governance and performance or the relationship 
between capabilities and strategies alignments and performance, the current study 
combines the three literatures together and investigates the moderating affects of 
corporate governance on the relationships of capabilities and strategy match and 
performance. This investigation is expected to provide a more complete picture of 
factors affecting organisational performance.  
  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION  
 
 This chapter have reviewed literature on the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance. It also reviewed a separate body of literature on the 
relationships between capabilities and strategy match and performance. The literature 
on public sector accountability is also reviewed. The nature and theoretical 
underpinning of the major concepts found in these three areas of focal literature are 
included in the review. The review identifies the following gaps for research to 
address. First, majority of prior studies on corporate governance, organisational 
capabilities and strategy match and performance relationships are focused on private 
sector organisations only. Second, prior empirical studies on public accountability are 
focused on determining dimensions of accountability only, not on factors determining 
accountability achievements. Lastly, studies on congruence theory only look at the 
affects of capabilities and strategy congruence on financial performance or 
competitiveness, not on accountability-based performance.  The next chapter provides 
the theoretical framework and hypotheses development that establish the basis for the 
research design used to address these literature gaps. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter provides the theoretical framework and develops the hypotheses 
to answer the research questions and carry out the empirical stage of the study. The 
chapter has three sections. The first section provides a detailed diagram of the 
conceptual model developed for the study. The underlying theories and concepts used 
will be briefly discussed. The second section provides three hypotheses that are 
developed for testing, in order to address the posed research questions. A detailed 
rationale behind each hypothesis will be given. Lastly, a diagram of the empirical 
schema for the study is given.   
 
3.2 CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND DISCUSSION 
 
FIGURE 3.1 CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency 
Theory 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
Organisational 
Capabilities-
strategy match 
Accountability-
emphasis 
 
Financial 
performance:   
 
Strategic typology Organisational 
Capabilities 
Congruence theory 
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 Figure 3.1 depicts the theoretical and conceptual framework examined in this 
study. Discussion of this framework is divided into two parts; the agency theory 
derived part and the congruence theory derived part. As the research questions posed 
in the previous chapter aim at investigating the relationship between board 
governance arrangements of GBEs and organisational performance, agency theory is 
used as the underlying rationale for establishing board-related components of good 
corporate governance. From an agency theory prespective, board governance is a 
concept that suggests that board composition and structure should be arranged in a 
way that provides the necessary means for the board to perform its functions with 
minimum agency costs and in the best interests of the owner-government. Agency 
theory is preferred to stewardship theory (discussed in the literature chapter) because 
of the context specific nature of this study. In the GBE context, stewardship theory is 
less applicable as the chairperson of the board of directors is not permitted to hold the 
CEO position. As mentioned in the literature review, CEO duality is the major focus 
of stewardship theory-corporate governance empirical study. Stakeholder theory is not 
the focus of the current study and, hence, the current study makes no attempt to 
identify particular stakeholders represented on the board or investigate the influence 
of stakeholder groups.  Therefore, the board governance construct used in the current 
study will be perceived, through agency monitoring theory, as the mechanism to 
affect both financial performance and accountability-emphasis.     
 
 The organisational capabilities-strategy match construct is developed from 
combining a typology and a conceptual view together, namely the strategic typology 
(specifically the Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology) and the Resource Base 
View (RBV) concerning capabilities dimensions (specifically Day’s (1994) 
capabilities) and linking them through congruence theory. According to congruence 
theory, the fit between particular strategic types and sets of capabilities will impact on 
the achievement of both financial and non-financial performance (Miles and Snow, 
1978; Fry and Smith, 1987; Bahaee, 1992; Myers, 2004). For example, a good fit 
between a defender strategic-type and outside-in capabilities would have a positive 
impact on both financial performance and accountability-related performance. The 
positive relationship between capabilities-strategy match and financial performance 
has been empirically tested in prior studies, which including Song et al. (2007) and 
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Desarbo et al. (2005). Since prior studies focused predominately on private sector 
entities, the relationship between capabilities-strategy match and accountability 
related performance has not been empirically tested. Nevertheless, there are 
arguments (discuss below) pointing to their positive relationships. Therefore, 
congruence theory is used to underpin the concept of an organisation’s strategy and 
capabilities match or alignment. 
 
3.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Arising from the research questions, the literature review and the conceptual 
framework, a set of hypotheses is generated. 
  
 First, in this study, an index of items of board structure and composition that 
represents governance quality (Board Governance Index (BGI)) is used. The index is 
developed based on desirable characteristics of boards found in prior empirical studies. 
Agency theory is also used to construct the index.  Accordingly, the BGI is to be 
designed in a way that reflects a board that able to better act in the interests of the 
government-shareholder and, therefore, expected to have a positive impact on 
financial results of the GBE.  As discussed in the literature review, prior studies on 
the relationship between corporate governance index (CGI) and financial performance 
e.g. Black (2001); Gompers et al. (2003); Mothanty (2003) and Klien et al. (2005) 
indicate that CGI is positively related to financial performance. Furthermore, studies 
specifically focused on board governance index by Feng et al. (2005) and Chen et al. 
(2007) also indicate a positive relationship between their indices and financial 
performance. 
  
 The BGI is also expected to have a positive relationship with the attention 
given by a GBE’s management to processes and systems used to render managerial 
and public accountabilities (i.e. accountability-emphasis (ACCBTY)). A high BGI 
score is a proxy for high governance quality. The board as the agent for the 
government-shareholder, has a monitoring role. It is expected to monitor the 
enterprise’s financial position, control systems and budgets together with the action of 
the CEO and senior management. In addition the board can establish internal 
compliance processes to ensure that appropriate operating standards are met. Such 
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monitoring mechanisms should control the management of the enterprise and 
contribute to the efficient allocation of scare resources and attainment of pre-
determined outcomes. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) suggests that 
good governance quality assists in achieving internal conformance and accountability, 
which includes setting performance planning and monitoring, and external 
conformance and accountability, including the setting of programs to achieve 
specified external scrutiny and accountability (ANAO, 2003). An example of an 
empirical study on the relationship between board structure and board performance is 
Zona and Zattoni (2007). Their finding suggests that board structural features of 
percentage of NED on the board and board size have a positive impact on board’s 
monitoring and networking tasks. The attributes of boards’ monitoring task include 
adequately controlled organisation’s activities, monitor the organisation’s financial 
position, controls plans and budgets and monitoring the CEO. The networking tasks 
include the way the board contributes to the legitimisation of the organisation, and the 
way it provides contacts with relevant stakeholders. Basically, high quality 
governance provides the board the ability and willingness to direct and monitor its 
executive team in their achievement of the de facto contractual agreement, as 
specified in the Statement of Corporate Intent between the GBE and the owner 
government. Such Statements of Corporate Intent typically include reference to 
accountability. Therefore it can be expected that the quality of board governance 
structures will relate positively to an emphasis by GBE’s management on 
accountability.   
 
 Public accountability is mostly concerned with provision of information to the 
public and delivering satisfactory services to customers and public. The quality of 
board governance can be expected to have a positive relationship with emphasis given 
to processes and systems put in place to discharge public accountability. This is once 
again related to the nature of the board composition, which can provide the 
appropriate leadership. Board leadership roles such as setting public reporting 
guidelines to achieve high public accountability, including the disclosing of 
information to inform customers and the public about their operation, is directly 
concerned with discharging public accountability requirements. A preliminary review 
of GBEs annual reports indicates that some GBEs set their objectives to provide best 
customer services and putting customers in the forefront in developing business 
75 
strategy (ErgonAR 2005/06 and AdelaideShoresAR 2005/06). Thus, the following 
hypothesis is stated: 
 
H1: The quality of board governance of GBEs is positively related to (a) 
financial performance and (b) accountability-emphasis. 
    
Second, the literature on Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic-types and 
organisational capabilities finds that each strategic-type, except for reactor strategic 
position, is associated with identifiable sets of organisational capabilities (Di 
Benedetto and Song, 2003; Conant et al., 1990; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Song et 
al., 2007; Miles et al., 1978). In addition, these studies conclude that when 
organisational capabilities are congruent with strategy-type, then there is a positive 
effect on performance.  Song et al. (2007) contend that a match between capabilities 
and strategy has positive impact on performance at the business unit level. The current 
study, in pursuing these congruence relationships, will develop a capabilities-strategy 
match construct (CSM) to measure the extent of fit between Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
strategic-type and two sets of well defined and strategically focused organisational 
capabilities, namely Day’s (1978) inside-out and outside-in capabilities. This match is 
expected to have a positive relationship with financial performance.  
 
The study also expects the CSM to have a positive relationship with 
accountability-emphasis. It is contended that once an organisation has carefully 
developed its capabilities and aligned them with a chosen strategic position, there 
would be systems and processes in place to deliver strong productivity, efficiency and 
competitiveness of operations. Moreover, such an alignment should leads to achieving 
the organisation’s set outcomes and objectives. This implies a nexus between 
capability-strategy match and management’s emphasis on discharging managerial 
accountability.  
 
On the public accountability side, capabilities such as customer linking, 
channel-bonding and ability to retain customers that are part of the sets of capabilities 
used to develop the match, would assist the enterprise to achieve good customer and 
public relationships.  Customer satisfaction with the services and goods provided by 
the enterprise is another factor of public accountability. Thus the fit between 
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capability and strategy provides the necessary directions and means to operate 
processes and systems for the enterprise in away that makes it responsive to public 
concerns, and controls the quality of service delivery. That is, the management 
approach would be congruent with an emphasis on public accountability.  Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is stated: 
 
H2:  The extent of organisational capabilities-strategy alignment of GBEs is 
positively related to their (a) financial performance and (b) accountability-
emphasis. 
 
 Third, from a theoretical perspective, agency theory posits that corporate 
governance is a control mechanism designed to reduce the conflict of management’s 
interests from those of shareholders. This agency theory view suggests that effective 
governance mechanisms will better guide management to employ organisational 
resources, including organisational capabilities, effectively to achieve superior 
performance for the shareholders. Therefore, agency theory implies that higher quality 
governance arrangements lead to a better alignment of capabilities and strategy and 
ultimately higher overall organisational performance.  
  
 From a practical perspective, the board of directors is the most authoritative 
leadership group in the enterprise and if the board is structured to provide leadership 
desired by the government-owner, then it would steer the enterprise in the strategic 
direction that could best fulfil government’s multiple objectives. But a strategic 
position chosen by the board would expect to be supported by existing or planned 
organisational capabilities. Therefore, effective board governance should be able to 
provide the organisation with better knowledge and influence to achieve good 
capabilities-strategy match. The existence of a congruence between board 
configuration, capabilities and strategic and their affect on organisational performance 
is a matter that has not been previously empirically tested. The main effect of 
capabilities-strategy match on performance has been tested in prior studies (e.g. Snow 
and Hrebiniak, 1980; Miles and Snow, 1978; Smith et al, 1986; Conant et al, 1990). 
Board governance can be expected to interact with the extent of alignment between 
capabilities and strategy to affect organisational performance.    
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 Hence, the following hypothesis is stated, where board governance becomes a 
moderating variable: 
 
H3: When the quality of the board governance of GBEs is higher, the positive 
relationship will be strengthened between capabilities-strategy alignment and 
both (a) financial and (b) accountability-emphasis. 
 
It could also be argued that the association between corporate governance and 
performance is affected by strategic alignment. Like several aspects of corporate 
governance research, the model developed would face the possibility of endogeneity 
problem. This problem is a limitation of the study. 
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3.4 EMPIRICAL SCHEMA 
 
Figure 3.2 depicts the empirical schema for testing the hypotheses of the study. 
 
FIGURE 3.2 EMPIRICAL SCHEMA 
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The independent variables are board governance index (BGI) and capabilities-
strategy match (CSM). The BGI comprises of four board governance mechanisms, 
which will be thoroughly discussed in the following chapter. The CSM is developed 
based on aligning strategic-types to sets of capabilities. Once again, the development 
of this variable will be comprehensively discussed in next chapter.  The dependent 
variables are measured in term of economic rate of return (ERR) and a subjective 
measure of management’s emphasis on processes and systems for rendering 
accountability requirements (ACCBTY). Lastly, there are four control variables 
included in the empirical relationships to be tested. 
 
 
Board 
Governance 
Index: 
Capabilities-strategy 
match 
Performance: 
• ERR 
• ACCBTY 
Board size 
% of NED 
% of PRD 
% of FLD
Control Variables: 
Organisation size, 
Legal forms of GBE, 
Nature of operation, 
Jurisdiction of 
government  
H2
H3
H1
Strategic-type: 
Defender; Analyser 
Prospector; Reactor  
Capabilities: 
Insi e-Out capabilities; 
Outside- In capabilities 
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 3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter has developed three hypotheses, each of which has put forward a 
positive relationship with both financial performance and accountability-emphasis. 
The first two hypotheses are developed based on prior empirical studies, agency 
theory and congruence theory. The third hypothesis is not supported by prior 
empirical evidence, but is argued on the grounds of an interaction between agency and 
congruence theories. The specification of these hypotheses as econometric models 
and the basis for measuring the variables shown in the empirical schema are the main 
focus of the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter provides the research design and methodology employed to test 
out the developed hypotheses and addresses the research questions posed earlier. The 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides the empirical models 
to be tested. The second section discusses the measurement methods for the variables 
and their underlying rationales. Detailed developments of the BGI and CSM are 
discussed in this section.  The last section provides discussion on sampling and data 
collection methods employed for the study.   
  
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF MODELS  
  
 The theories underlying the relationship between corporate governance, the 
board governance index in particular, and organisational performance assume that 
they are linearly related. The congruence theory also contends a good fit of 
capabilities and strategy has a linear relationship with organisational performance. 
Prior empirical studies have used linear regression models to model the phenomena of 
corporate governance, capabilities-strategy match and performance (Bahaee, 1992; 
Drobetz et al., 2003; Klein et al., 2005; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Smith et al., 1986; 
Yermack, 1996; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Therefore the current study, in line with 
the underlying theories and prior studies, also employs linear multiple regression 
models to test the relationships between the independent variables and dependent 
variables.  
 
 To counter the problem of endogeneity amongst multiple corporate 
governance characteristics, the current study will use control variables and a lag 
measure of dependent variables, i.e. the financial performance and accountability-
emphasis. The use of lag measure of dependent variable was suggested by Black et al, 
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(2003) and Klein et al, (2005). The study will use control variables that correlate with 
corporate governance (CG), namely size of GBEs, legal forms of GBEs and their 
nature of operation to address the endogenous issue of CG. This method of controlling 
endogeneity is consistent with Bhagat and Black (2002), Black (2001), Drobetz et al 
(2003), Klien et al (2005) and Weir et al (2002). The size of the entity correlates with 
governance in ways such as the size of the board and its committees, and the 
proportion of institutional or block shareholders. Small entities may adopt high 
quality CG at the time of raising external finance whereas large entities require 
comprehensive CG to enable monitoring of management and because they can more 
readily absorb agency costs of CG. The legal forms of GBE can be summed up to 
three categories based on the way they are governed by different legislation. These 
forms of GBEs can affect the CG mechanisms employed legislature requirements. 
The nature of operation can also affect CG, as different nature of operations and 
business ventures have different risks and thus required different governance 
structures.   
  
 The equations to be modelled and empirically analysed through hierarchical 
regression are as follow: 
 
ERR and ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY +  
    β 4 JURISDIC + ε     (1) 
 
ERR and ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY +  
    β 4 JURISDIC +β 5 BGI+ β 6 CSM + ε   (2) 
 
ERR and ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1 BGI + β 2 CSM+ β 3 (BGI*CSM) + ε   (3) 
 
Where: 
ERR: Economic rate of return; 
ACCBTY: Accountability-emphasis; 
BGI: Board governance index; 
CSM: Capabilities-strategy match; 
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LEGALF: GBE legal form; 
INDUSTRY: GBE industry type; and 
JURISDIC: jurisdiction of the controlling government of the GBE i.e. 
State/Territory/Federal. 
 
 
4.3 VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
4.3.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 
 As previously mentioned, the dependent variables comprise of financial 
performance and accountability-emphasis measures. The financial performance will 
be measured using a computed economic rate of return (ERR) method. The ERR is 
measured as follow: 
 
 
   (EBIT + Da + NIBL + FL + CSO) + (Ae – Ab – NI)  
 ERR =          (4) 
     Ab + (NI/2)        
 
Where  
 EBIT: Earning after abnormals and extraordinaries, but before interest 
and tax; 
 Da: Accounting depreciation and amortisation; 
 NIBL: An adjustment for the implicit interest cost of non-interest 
bearing liabilities; 
 FL: An adjustment for interest cost of assets under financial leases 
(only made if no already included in EBIT); 
 CSO: Community service obligations, an adjustment for the net 
economic cost of CSOs (if applicable); 
 Ae: End period gross value of assets; 
 Ab: Beginning period gross value of assets; and 
 NI: Value of net investments through out the year. 
  
83 
 The numerator of equation (4) comprises of two components; the first 
represents cash income and the second represents capital income. The sum of the two 
components gives rise to economic income.  GBEs expect to be compensated by the 
government for the capital that is foregone in delivering community services 
obligations (CSOs). In this case the recoupment amount will be added back to the 
EBIT.  The interest on NIBL is calculated by multiplying the value of trade creditors, 
other creditors and prepaid revenue by a prevailing rate of return. The Steering 
Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises 
(will be referred to as Steering Committee) suggests the prime overdraft rate for the 
year is suitable (Steering Committee, 1996). The current study will use National 
Australia Bank (NAB) prime business overdraft rate as of September 20071.  
  
 The NI component of the equation is calculated as follow:  
 
NI = Ae – Ab (AsRRe – AsRRb) + Da     (5)
      
Where   
  AsRRe:  the end of period value of asset revaluation reserve; and 
  AsRRb: the beginning of period value of asset revaluation reserve. 
 
NI is included as part of the capital component because the cash income may 
include earnings from assets purchased during the year. And this income has material 
affect on the measure economic of income.  
 
Another interest component that could be added to the numerator (or 
economic income) is the interest tied up with construction costs. As most GBEs are 
capital intensive organisations and involve with many construction project, the tied up 
interest could be seen as significant. The Steering Committee suggests two alternative 
methods. The first method involves calculating the interest using the following 
formula: 
 
IDC = CWIP e  - CWIP b + CTB e  - CAPEX e      (6) 
                                                 
1 The rate is 9.2% and was obtained over a phone enquiry made by the researcher. 
84 
Where 
 IDC:  Interest on construction costs; 
 CWIP e : Value of capital works in progress account at the end of the period; 
 CWIP b : Value of capital works in progress account at the beginning of the 
 period; 
CTB e : Value of assets constructed by the enterprise and commissioned at the 
end of the period, and  
 CAPEX e : Value of asset construction costs for the current period. 
 
 The second method is to exclude assets under construction from the asset base 
until they are completed. The current study opts to exclude assets under construction 
from the asset based instead of calculating the implicit interest. The reason is lack of 
data availability, as not all necessary data is disclosed in the annual report in 
compatible manner among GBEs. It is to be noted that, the data used to calculate ERR 
comes from   publicly published annual financial reports.  
 
The ERR method was chosen by the Steering Committee and this study 
because the reforms of GBEs in the 1990s have made the traditional performance 
measurement methods, which include return on profit, return on assets, return on 
equity (Tasmania Department of Treasury and Finance, 1999) and accounting rate of 
return (Steering Committee, 1996) become less comparable as a means of assessing 
performance of GBEs in comparison to private sector companies. These methods, it 
was argued, are not consistent with certain private sector benchmarks that 
incorporated risk-adjusted rates of returns. Moreover, they do not consider the 
opportunity costs of capital and can therefore lead to a misallocation of resources 
within both owner government and GBEs and, lastly, they do not reveal whether the 
economic value of a GBE is increasing or decreasing for its shareholders (Tasmania 
Department of Treasury and Finance, 1999).   
 
    As GBEs are not organisations listed on a stock exchange, performance 
measurement methods like Tobin’s Q and other value-based performance 
measurement methods – i.e. Shareholder Value Added (SVA), Weighted Average 
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Costs of Capital (WACC) – cannot be measured without substantive judgements. 
ERR is deemed, therefore, the most suitable measurement method to measure the 
financial performance of GBEs. 
 
 Turning to the other dependent variable in this study, accountability-emphasis 
(ACCBTY), it will be measured using a survey questionnaire. A 6-point Likert scale 
questionnaire will be used to ask respondents (Management of GBEs) to indicate their 
agreement (1 as Strongly Disagree and 6 as Strongly Agree) on their organisation’s 
attention given to managerial and public accountability processes and systems. The 
attributes of managerial and public accountabilities are developed base on prior 
normative discussions and empirical studies on managerial and public accountabilities 
(Kloot and Martin, 2001; Taylor and Rosair, 2000; Sinclair, 1995; Parker and Gould, 
1999; Othman and Taylor, 2006; Roberts, 1991). In addition, these questionnaire 
scales will be informed by the findings of content analysis and interviews in this study.  
 
ACCBTY is conceived in this study as the emphasis given by management to 
processes and systems for discharging accountability outcomes. It is defined as the 
aggregate of the following two dimensions:  
• The extent of attention given by management to managerial 
accountability systems and processes for setting operating targets and 
strategic goals, monitoring the quality of service delivery and meeting 
organisational objectives in an efficient and effective ways; and 
• The extent of attention given by management to public accountability 
systems and processes for considering customers and public feedback 
and response rates, and informing the public about services, projects 
and plans. 
 
4.3.2 CONTROL VARIABLES 
   
 There are four control variables, namely organisation size, legal form, nature 
of operation and jurisdiction. The organisation size control variable is measured using 
natural log of average equity. The GBE legal form, industry and jurisdiction are 
measured using categorical measure.  
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A preliminary review of GBEs’ annual reports and their enabling Acts 
(provided in previous chapter) indicates that a GBE’s legal form comprises of 
statutory corporation (STC), state owned company (SOC) and direct company (COM).  
These legal forms are denoted as 1, 2, and 3 respectively.  
 
The nature of operation is divided into two categories, public financial 
enterprises and public trading enterprises. Public trading enterprises include water 
services, electricity (retailers, distributors and generators), transportation (rail and 
buses), and port authorities. Public financial enterprises include investment fund 
authorities, managed funds (i.e. Victorian Rural Finance Corporation) and treasury 
corporations (McDonough, 1998; SA Department of Treasury, 2007; WA Treasury, 
2007). This nature of operation variable is denoted as 1 and 2 respectively. 
Alternatively, the nature of operation can be categorised in term of a more detailed 
break down of industry type. GBEs can be categorised into eight industries, namely 
energy, port authorities, finance, water, transport, infrastructure, tourism and others, 
which are denoted 1 to 8 respectively. The two types of categorisation will be used in 
the current study.  
 
The jurisdiction control variable is the State, Territories and Federal 
governments that own GBEs.  They are denoted 1 to 9 in order as listed in Table 4.3. 
 
4.3.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND INDICES DEVELOPMENT   
 
The study has two independent variables, namely BGI and CSM. This section 
will discuss each variable in turn. 
 
 The BGI consists of three individual governance components, namely board 
size, board composition, and director’s financial knowledge (FLD). The board 
composition component consists of two elements, the percentage of non-executive 
directors (NED) and percentage of politically related directors (PRD). The index is 
developed base on agency theory, prior literature on corporate governance index 
(CGI), best practice recommendations and context specific considerations. The board 
size, percentage of NED, percentage of PRD and FLD each has a maximum index 
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score of 3. The minimum index score for NED is 1, where the minimum score for 
Board size, PRD and FLD is 0. The criteria for allocating the score are shown in 
Table 4.1. 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 BGI SCORING MECHANISMS  
Component Criteria Score 
 
Board size Size = 0 – 4 members 3 
Size = 5 – 7 members 2 
Size  = 8 - 10 members 1 
Size > 10 0 
 
Percentage of NED NED = 71% – 100%  3 
NED = 51% –  70%   2 
NED = 0% –  50%   1 
 
Percentage of PRD PRD = 41% – 60% 3 
PRD = 21% –40% 2 
PRD = 1% – 20% 1 
PRD = 0 0 
 
Percentage of FLD FLD > 60% 3 
FLD = 31% – 60%  2 
FLD = 1% – 30% 1 
 FLD = 0 0 
 
 The index is thus designed to capture board autonomy, structure and 
effectiveness. Prior studies on board size suggest that board size has a negative 
relationship with performance. Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Yermack 
(1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) found that board size has a negative impact on firm 
performance.   A preliminary review of GBEs’ board size indicates that the maximum 
board size is 12 and minimum is 3 members.  Based on these characteristics and 
empirical findings, the board size component is designed to capture the level and 
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significance of its negative relationship with performance. This design is consistent 
with Feng et al. (2005) in the development of their board governance index. 
  
 Non-executive directors possess two characteristics that enable them to fulfil 
their monitoring function. First, their independence and second their reputation (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990). Empirical studies on 
NEDs reveal both positive and negative relationships with performance. For the 
purpose of developing the BGI, a positive stand is taken. This is consistent with 
agency theory. Moreover, the majority of best practice recommendations suggest that 
NEDs add value to the board (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003; Business 
Roundtable, 2005). A preliminary analysis of the distribution of NEDs within the 
sample indicates that some boards comprise of solely NEDs and some comprise of 
only 50% of NEDs. Combining the literature and GBE characteristics, the NED index 
score is designed to illuminate the full nature of its relationship with performance.  
Once again this index design is similar to that of Feng et al. (2005) and Klein et al. 
(2005).   
 
 The percentage of PRDs is included as a component of the index to reflect the 
unique characteristics of GBE, as its board may consist of members that are public 
servant, politician or represent pressure groups i.e. the union. The percentage of PRD 
is the proportion of board members who are tied to the government or pressure groups. 
Thus the existence of PRD implies a close link with the government and community 
groups. The greater the proportion of PRDs, the stronger the connection between  the 
government and pressure groups in setting business strategy and operations (Thynne, 
1998a).  This would in turn assist the board to focus on strategy that best reflects 
wider performance targets than just financial performance. Moreover, it is likely to be 
beneficial to have more PRDs on the board when GBEs need to develop budgets and 
operation plans (Statement of Corporate Intent) through the process of  due 
consultations with the portfolio and shareholding ministers on a regular basis. The 
PRDs can assist in clarify the requirements (Thynne, 1998a). On the other hand, an 
agency theory argument is also valid for this situation. It could be argued that the 
lesser the number of PRDs on the board the more private enterprise and market 
focused will be the board. In turn, the board could be better at setting strategies aimed 
at achieving superior economic performance for the GBE. Since the study investigates 
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the relationships between BGI and both financial performance and accountability-
emphasis, the first argument is used. An empirical study in the context of Canadian 
state-owned enterprise by Bozec (2005) suggests that the proportion of public 
servants has a positive effect on performance. This finding is consistent with those 
found in the context of Singapore state-owned corporation, where they found that the 
proportion of public servants on the board has a positive relationship with efficiency 
and profitability (Thynne and Ariff, 1990). Lastly, a recent study by Seng and Taylor 
(2008a; 2008b) on the effect of board and audit committee on performance also 
suggests that PRD is a desirable characteristic of Australian GBE boards.  
 
Once again, a preliminary analysis of the context in this study is conducted. 
The finding reveals that in some boards PRD comprises of 60% of the board and in 
some there isn’t any PRD. Therefore, the score of the percentage of PRD will be 3 
when the percentage of PRD is between 41% and 60%, 2 is when PRD is between 
21% and 40% and 1 is when 1% and 20%. A zero score is given to PRD when there 
isn’t any PRD on the board.   
 
 The percentage of FLD is measured by dividing the number of directors with 
formal qualifications and experience in the fields of economics, finance or accounting 
by the total number of directors. Directors with financial knowledge are expected to 
have a positive influence through the board, on the organisation financial management. 
The financial literacy of the directors helps them to understand the implication of 
financial decisions. Agrawal and Chandha (2005) report that financial expertise of 
board of directors limits the likelihood of accounting fraud. The findings of Bull and 
Sharp (1989) and DeZoort (1997) also suggest that financial literacy is important in 
carrying out board tasks, especially the general standards of care, skill and diligence. 
A survey of US top company directors finds 69% of the directors has accounting and 
public reporting expertise (Nadler, 2004). Additionally, Seng and Taylor (2008a; 
2008b) in their study of board and audit committee effects on performance find that 
the percentage of FLD on board of directors has a significant and positive effect on 
performance. A preliminary analysis of FLDs in the annual reports in this study 
indicates that the maximum number of FLD on the board is 90% and the minimum is 
0%. In this study the actual proportion of FLDs is the measure used. Any GBE that 
doesn’t have an FLD on its board is given a zero score.  
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 The capability-strategy match (CSM) is developed in two parts: first the 
relationship between firm’s strategic-type and organisational capabilities is 
established for the context of study. This is because the context of study is distinct 
from those of prior studies. Second, the match is established.   
  
 The study employs Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology. The data will 
be collected via survey questionnaire, using a modified paragraph approach developed 
by Snow and Hrebiniak (1980). Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology is 
applicable for GBEs as it was based on a field study of a diverse range of industries 
and have been empirically tested in various context of studies (as indicated in the 
literature chapter).  Day’s (1994), Di Benedetto and Song’s (2003) and Song et al.’s 
(2007) outside-in and inside-out capabilities will be used as firm’s capabilities. The 
data for these capabilities will be collected via 6 point- Likert scale survey 
questionnaire indicating the firm’s strengths and weaknesses on each capability’s 
attribute. In addition, both the strategic types and the sets of capabilities attributes will 
be further modified to accommodate the findings from the textual analysis of GBEs’ 
annual reports and transcripts of the interviews.  
 
Once data is collected the alignment of capabilities and strategic position can 
be established. Following, Di Benedetto and Song (2003), Conant et al, (1990) and 
Song et al. (2007), one-way ANOVA is used. The ANOVA is used to determine the 
significant distinction between outside-in and inside-out capabilities’ mean scores 
among the four strategic-types. The outcome of this process provides a relative basis 
for each strategic-type GBE in term of their inside-out and outside-in capabilities’ 
mean scores. For example, the prospector GBEs may have a relatively higher inside-
out than outside-in capabilities’ mean scores.  
 
The match is determined based on Miles and Snow’s (1987) strategic positions 
and the Resource Base View (RBV) on capabilities and strategies alignments. It is 
expected that the ANOVA results reveal the prospector strategic focused GBEs, on 
average, have more of inside-out than outside-in capabilities and the defenders, on 
average have more of outside-in and than the inside out capabilities.  The capability-
strategy match (CSM) for these two strategic positions will be the raw inside-out 
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capabilities data for the prospectors and the raw outside-in capabilities data for the 
defenders. For analyser GBEs, their CSM are established based on the average of 
inside-out and outside-in capabilities. The rationale behind this choice is that analyser 
strategic position comprises of both prospector and defender’s characteristics. Thus, 
the average of the two groups of capabilities is seemed to be reasonable for this 
strategic position. The reactor strategic position is omitted from the study. This is 
consistent with majority of prior studies (Conant et al., 1990; Shoham et al., 2002; 
Desarbo et al., 2005; Song et al., 2007).    
 
Table 4.2 below provides a summary of the variables used in the study, their 
measurement methods and relevant references. 
 
TABLE 4.2: SUMMARY OF DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT OF THE 
VARIABLES  
Variable 
Acronym 
Definition Expected 
sign to 
DVs 
Measurement Reference 
Dependent 
variables 
    
ERR Financial 
Performance; 
uses Economic 
Rate of Return 
drawn largely 
from financial 
statement 
numbers   
N/A ERR = ((EBIT + Da + NIBL 
+CSO) (Ae – Ab – NI))/ (Ab + 
NI/2) 
Where: 
EBIT = earning after abnormals 
and extraordinaries, but before 
interest and tax; 
 
Da  = accounting depreciation 
and amortisation; 
 
NIBL = an adjustment for the 
implicit interest cost of non-
interest bearing liabilities; 
 
FL = an adjustment for interest 
Steering 
Committee on 
National 
Performance 
Monitoring of 
Government 
Business 
Enterprises, 
(1996); 
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cost of assets under financial 
leases (only made if no already 
included in EBIT); 
 
COS = community service 
obligations, an adjustment for 
the net economic cost of CSOs 
(if applicable); 
 
Ae = end period total value 
of asset; 
 
Ab = beginning period 
total value of asset; and 
 
NI = value of net 
investment through out the 
year. 
 
NI = Ae – Ab (AsRRe – 
AsRRb) + Da 
Where: 
AsRRe  = the end of period 
value of asset revaluation 
reserve; and 
AsRRb = the beginning of 
period of value of the asset 
revaluation reserve. 
 
ACCBTY Accountability-
emphasis 
NA The data is collected via survey 
questionnaires, which are 
constructed base on the 
references given. 
 Taylor and 
Othman (2008), 
Stewart (1984), 
Sinclair (1995) 
Independent 
Variable 
    
BGI Board +ve The index is constructed based   
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Governance 
Index 
on prior studies on corporate 
governance index (CGI) and 
GBE context specific. The 
index has four components, 
namely board size, NED, PRD 
and FLD. 
CSI Capabilities-
strategy match  
+ve  The match between 
capabilities and strategies is 
developed in two stages. First, 
an ANOVA of the capabilities 
among the strategic types is 
conducted. Second, the match 
between capability and 
strategic type is established. 
O’Regan and 
Ghobadian, 
(2004); Vorhies 
and Harker, 
(2000); Vorhies 
et al., (1999); Di 
Benedetto and 
Song, (2003); 
Day (1994) 
Control 
variables 
    
ORGSIZE Organisation 
size 
NA Ln Total Asset Judge, 
Naoumava, 
Koutzevol, 
(2003) ; Peng, 
Buck, 
Filatotchev, 
(2003) 
LF Legal form of 
GBEs 
NA Statutory Corporation = 1 
Company SOC = 2 
Company GBEs  = 3 
 
INDUST Nature of GBEs’ 
operation 
NA Public trading enterprise = 0 
Public financial enterprise = 1 
 
JURSDIC Jurisdiction that 
the GBE belong 
i.e. 
State/Territory 
Federal 
NA ACT = 1 
Federal = 2 
NSW = 3 
NT = 4 
QLD = 5 
SA = 6 
TAS = 7 
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VIC = 8 
WA = 9 
 
 
4.4 SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION 
4.4.1 METHODS OF COLLECTING DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
 The study uses interview, survey questionnaire and secondary data methods to 
collect the necessary data. The data is collected in three stages. First, the interview 
method is used to gather contextual data on GBEs, including data on accountability-
emphasis, organisational capabilities, and strategy, as well, as the contextual data is 
gathered via content analysis method, which is conducted on selected GBEs’ annual 
reports. A pilot test of the drafted questionnaire (drawn from the literature) is also 
conducted with the interviewees.  The survey questionnaire, which is modified against 
the results of the pilot test and contextual data, is carried as the second stage of data 
collection. The questionnaire is addressed to the chief financial officers or principal 
accounting officers and at least two other senior management personnel or company 
secretary in the enterprise. This will enhance the validity of the data collected and at 
the same time address the problem of a low response rate. This practice was employed 
in Wan and Ong (2005) and Zona and Zattoni (2007) and suggested by Zahra and 
Pearce II (1990) in measuring strategy and capabilities. The questionnaire is 
distributed as initial mail out and as a follow up reminder.   
 
The third stage of data collection relates to corporate governance structure-related 
data and financial data, collected from GBEs’ published annual reports and their 
websites. The board governance data is collected from Governance, Board of 
directors and Director reporting sections of their 2005/06 published annual reports. In 
addition, information on the GBEs’ website is used to confirm the relevant directors’ 
financial literacy and other backgrounds. The financial data is collected from the 
Financial Statements section of their 2006/07 annual reports. GBEs’ annual reports 
and websites have been accessed and collected from the following links: 
 
• South Australia’s GBEs: the A-Z Government web page and the 2006-07 
Budget Paper No. 3 provides the list and link to each GBE’s website  
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http://www.sa.gov.au/site/page.cfm?u=52&area=2&path=4372,4373&listMod
e=listLinks 
• New South Wales’ GBEs: List of GBEs and link to their  websites are 
available via the treasury information page as follow: 
http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/links.htm 
• Western Australia’s GBEs: the A-Z Government web page and the 2006-07 
Budget Paper No. 3 provides the list and link to each GBE’s website  
http://wa.gov.au/agencies/ 
• Victoria’s GBEs: GBEs’ websites are listed under respective government 
department links. The URL for Victorian government website is as follow: 
http://www.vic.gov.au/VictoriaOnline?takeSnapshot=true&action=browse&id
=%5BDirectory%5DState+Government&taxonomy=Directory&sort_by=%2B
ADC.Title,AGLS.Availability.corporateName&transaction=false&track=Gov
ernment+Entry+Point+for+Victorians&nav=flyout 
• Tasmania’s GBEs: List of GBEs and link to their websites are available 
through the department of Treasury and Finance as follow: 
http://www.treasury.tas.gov.au/domino/dtf/dtf.nsf/v-
GBE/A3161BD5D85A2469CA256D7500082A80 
• Queensland’s GBEs: List of GBEs and link to their websites available through 
Queensland’s general government website as follow: 
http://www.qld.gov.au/departments/more_qld_government_websites.html#oth
er 
• Commonwealth government’s GBEs: List of GBEs and link to their websites 
are as follow: http://www.finance.gov.au/gbab/ 
• Australian Capital Territory’s GBEs: List of GBEs and link to their websites 
are as follow:  http://www.directory.act.gov.au/ccExternal_5.1/webdir/cgi-
bin/webdua.cgi?ea2_.&organizationalUnit&ou=PUBLIC+AUTHORITIES+%
26+TERRITORY+OWNED+CORPORATIONS,o=Australian+Capital+Territ
ory,c=AU 
• Northern Territory’s GBEs: A-Z Government website provides link to GBEs’ 
website as follow: 
http://www.nt.gov.au/ntg4/Subject?documenttitle=*&myLevel=2&myRefPoin
t=cn=A-Z%20Government%20Listing&opt=6&layout=hide 
 
  The GBEs selected for the study are all States, Territories and Federal 
governments’ GBEs. In particular, the GBEs must operate under a corporate format, 
have a board of directors, have a profit motive and be subject to managerial and 
public accountabilities as defined in the literature chapter and measurement section. 
The selected sample comprises of 141 GBEs. This sample will be used to test the 
relationship between board governance configuration and performance, i.e., research 
question and hypothesis 1. This sample represents 97% of GBE population. The 
questionnaire data is used to test the relationship between capabilities-strategy match 
and performance and the moderating impact of governance on their relationships – i.e. 
research questions and hypotheses 2 and 3 will be different. The response rate to the 
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questionnaire affects the extent to which the number of GBEs left in the data-set falls 
below 141.       
 
4.4.2 STRUCTURE OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 The survey questionnaire contains five sections, covering demographic 
questions, accountability-emphasis, organisational capabilities, strategic position and 
open ended questions. The demographic section contains questions on characteristics 
of the respondents and their organisations. These questions serve two important 
purposes; first it allows for construction of the respondents’ profiles and second it 
provides their organisations’ names, which use to link the questionnaire data to 
secondary data on board governance and financial performance. 
 
 The second section contains questionnaires on managerial and public 
accountabilities. It has eight accountability emphases, with the first four represents 
management’s attentions on processes and systems put in place for discharging 
managerial accountability and the last four represents processes and systems used to 
render public accountability. The questionnaire is structured on 6-point Likert scale; 
seeking the respondents to rate their agreement on the emphases. These scales were 
adapted from Taylor and Othman (2008) and Stewart (1984) and were moderated 
against the responses from interviewees. 
 
 Turning to organisational capabilities and strategy, the questionnaire uses 
Likert scale to measure organisational capabilities and categorical to measure strategic 
positions.  The respondents are asked to rate their organisational capabilities strengths 
on eight 6-point Likert scale questionnaires.  The four Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
strategic positions are presented in four sets of statements, which the respondent will 
be asked to identify a strategic position that closely assemble their current strategic 
position. In addition, the respondents are asked to indicate their strategic position in 
the past three years as well. This serves an instrumental purpose in establishing 
capability and strategy match variable.   
 
 Lastly, two open-ended questions are added to the questionnaire. The first 
question seeks insights from the respondents on the degree of contribution that the 
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board has in developing organisational capabilities, strategies and setting performance 
targets.  The second question seeks information on emphasis that each GBE has in 
aligning its strategies with capabilities.  The full questionnaire is provided in the 
appendix. 
 
4.4.3 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  
 
 The interview is semi-structured with lead questions focused on accountability 
emphases, organisational capabilities and strategy. Theories, conceptual models and 
prior empirical studies are incorporated into the questions. Moreover, a guided 
discussion of each topic is undertaken in order to allow the managers to reveal their 
perceptions and views on the topic in more detail. Questions about relationships 
between capabilities-strategy match and performance and governance and 
performance are explored as well. This can provide a rich context of relevant textual 
data for analysis and support of the quantitative findings. 
 
 The interview is intended to be conducted on a cross-sectional selection of 
representative GBEs, which include West Beach Trust (AdelaideShores), Australian 
Rail Track Corporation (ARTC), SAWater, Ergon Energy Corporation.  
 
4.4.4 TEXTUAL ANALYSIS   
 
 The accountability, capabilities and strategy data is collected using content 
analysis. Guthrie and Mathew (1985) suggest that a content method of analysis should 
have four distinct features. These features help insure consistency and validity of the 
outcome of the analysis. The four features are: (1) categories of analysis are clearly 
defined, (2) the categories are mutually exclusive, (3) there is a clear classification 
scheme and (4) there is consistent application of the classification scheme. These 
features are not all applicable to the current analysis, because no attempt is made to 
quantify the data in the form of disclosure indexes, as was the approach of Guthrie 
and Mathew (1985). Rather the categories of analysis are broadly defined and used to 
guide the assembly of information into themes. Since the categories of data collected 
are significantly different from each other, the second feature is automatically met.   
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 In addition, critical questions like “Are the relevant themes present in the 
data?”, “Are the themes presented in all data sources?” and “Is there any relationship 
between themes?” are prepared to assist in searching for the relevant themes.  The 
relevant themes will be selected after three stages of data coding. The first coding is 
open coding; a process of assigning initial codes and labels to the data in order to 
identify and select themes. The second coding is axial coding, which involves 
organising the selected themes into a more conceptual and structural order. Lastly, a 
selective coding is performed to select the desired themes, concepts and relationships.  
  
 The categories for accountability orientations include the main four 
accountability dimensions espoused by Othman and Taylor (2006), namely, political, 
public, managerial and fiduciary accountability orientations faced by GBEs’ board of 
directors and management. First, political accountability is mainly focused on, lines of 
responsibility to government oversight bodies and parliament. GBEs need to report on 
their operations to a relevant Department of Treasury and Finance and their 
responsible minister(s) in the form of a statement of corporate intent, corporate plan, 
half yearly and annual reports and other disclosure arrangements (Tasmania Treasury 
and Finance Department, 1995; Queensland Department Treasury, 2006; NSW 
Treasury, 2005). There is a formal channel for the relevant ministers to communicate 
with management and impose government policies, price controls and community 
services obligations (CSOs) (Uhrig, 2003). The chain of political accountability 
requires management of GBEs to accountable to be the relevant ministers and, in turn, 
the relevant ministers to be accountable to the parliament regarding GBEs’ activities 
and performance (Bottomley, 2001; Department of Treasury and Finance, 1998).  
Second, public accountability is focused on providing satisfactory services to 
customers and the public. Third, explains that managerial accountability is focused on 
monitoring both input and outputs or outcomes as a measure of management’s 
effectiveness in setting and achieving output targets as well as managing resources 
efficiently. Managerial accountability includes the achievement of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Lastly, fiduciary accountability is concerned with 
procedures and guidelines that needed to be followed in using granted funds or 
reimbursements of capital outlay. Basically, it is concerned with due diligent in use of 
funding by GBEs management (Tasmania Treasury and Finance Department, 1996; 
NSW Government, 1994; Queensland Treasury Department, 1999). Therefore the 
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analysis looks will look for discussions, statements and diagrams reported in the 
annual reports and the discursive pattern in senior executives’ interviews of meaning 
that are indicative of political, public, managerial and fiduciary accountability 
orientations.    
 
 Turning to organisational capabilities, Day’s (1994) broad definition of 
organisational capabilities will be used to guide the analysis. Day’s (1994, p.38) 
defined organisational capabilities as a ‘complex bundles of skills and accumulated 
knowledge, exercised through organisational processes, that enable firms to 
coordinate activities and make use of their assets’.  Moreover, evidence is sought in 
the text of Day’s (1994) inside-out and outside-in capabilities categories. These 
capabilities have been identified and defined in the organisational capabilities and 
strategy section of the Literature review chapter. Once again the analysis process is to 
look for discussions, statements and indications that pick up the presence of these 
capability categories.   
   
 Similarly, a broad view of the concept of strategy is used to guide the 
extraction of contextual data about organisational strategy. Three broad concepts of 
strategy will be used as guidelines, namely the linear, adaptive and interpretive 
strategy models (Chaffee, 1985; Kald et al., 2000). These three models are widely 
accepted in the management literature in categorising organisations’ strategies 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Kald et al., 2000; Chaffee, 1985). In addition, Miles and Snow’s 
(1978) strategic typology will be used. The process of identifying an enterprise’s 
strategy is to look at strategic positions, plans, anticipated work projects, customer 
demographic, products and industries reported and align them to the three defined 
models and strategic type.   
 
 The content analysis is conducted on annual reports of selected GBEs. The 
GBEs selected for the analysis are representative of strata of jurisdictions and industry 
types. This document analysis facilitates an assessment of the key concepts modelled 
in quantitative analysis stage of this study in a way that provide richer contextual 
background. Moreover it assists in developing a contextual relevant survey 
questionnaire for the study.   
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The analysis will be conducted on the 2005/06 annual reports. The six selected 
GBEs, industry types and their jurisdictions are listed in Table 4.3. 
 
TABLE 4.3 SELECTED GBES, INDUSTRY TYPES AND JURISDICTIONS 
GBEs Industry types Jurisdictions 
SA Water Water and Wastewater 
Services 
SA 
Adelaide Shores Holiday Resort SA 
HomeStart Finance Financial Institution SA 
Ergon Energy Corporation Energy Corporation QLD 
Queensland Ports 
Corporation 
Port Corporation QLD 
Rail Corporation Transportation NSW 
 
 The preliminary analysis of relationships among the constructs is done by 
looking at patterns and descriptions of their relationships as reported in the annual 
reports. This is a highly subjective process; hence the result will only be used to 
complement the quantitative findings. 
 
 According to prior studies a firm’s capabilities are developed inline with its 
strategy (Miles and Snow, 1978; Snows and Hrebiniak 1980; Smith et al. 1986; Di 
Bennedetto and Song, 2003; Porter, 1980).  For example, an organisation that prides 
itself as a cost leader in the market will mostly require good cost management, 
financial management and technology (know- how) capabilities. Prior studies also 
suggest that a capabilities-strategy match (i.e. when capabilities are aligned with the 
firm’s strategy) has a positive relationship with firm’s financial performance (Song et 
al., 2007; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Smith et al., 1986; Davig, 1986).    
 
4.5 APPROACHES TO ANALYSE OF QUANTITATIVE DATA 
 
 The study will conduct descriptive statistics, univariate analysis, factor 
analysis and multiple regression analysis. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
include discussion of the frequencies, means, and standard deviation of the variables. 
The univariate analysis consists of correlation analysis of the independent variables 
and analysis of the association between independent variables and dependent 
variables. The correlation analysis of the independent variables provides insight on 
101 
multicollinearity, which ensures basic assumptions are met before conducting 
multivariate analysis. The analysis of the association between independent variables 
and dependent variables also provides a preliminary check of the correlation between 
each independent variable with the dependent variables.  Principal components factor 
analysis is conducted on accountability-emphasis and organisational capabilities 
survey attributes to test for their construct validity. In addition, a comparison of 
means analysis (ANOVA) will be conducted. This ANOVA will be conducted to test 
the responses time bias.  
 
 The causal relationships between the independent variables and dependent 
variables in the study are investigated using multiple regression method. All data 
analysis will be conducted using SPSS software. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION  
 
 
 The study uses linear multiple regression models to test the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter.  The independent variables, namely BGI and CSM, 
are developed in a way that gives consistency with prior studies and underlying 
theories. Similarly, the dependent variables are measured according to authoritative 
guidelines, namely the Federal government’s Steering Committee on GBE 
performance, as well as prior studies and normative discussions. The data used in the 
models is collected through three consecutive stages, with the first stage involving 
collecting contextual data on GBEs’ accountability, organisational capabilities and 
strategies. The data collection methods used in this stage are textual analysis and 
semi-structure interview. The second stage involves collecting quantitative data on the 
same constructs. In this stage, a survey questionnaire instrument is used as the method 
of data collection. Lastly, the governance data is collected through secondary data 
collection method from GBEs’ annual reports. This three-stage process is employed to 
achieve aa full dataset necessary for quantitatively testing the models, and 
qualitatively corroborating the findings.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTABILITIES, 
CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES FROM CONTENT 
OF ANNUAL REPORTS AND INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter presents qualitative analysis of textual data from both secondary 
and primary data sources relating to the context of policies, processes and outcomes 
of GBEs’ accountabilities, capabilities and strategies. Contextual data is drawn from 
both content analysis of the annual reports of six GBEs and the transcript of 
interviews with two senior executives of two GBEs.   
 
5.2 ACCOUNTABILITY, CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGY AS INDICATED 
IN ANNUAL REPORTS AND PROVIDED BY THE INTERVIEWEES  
 
 In this section, the results of the content analysis are presented for each 
concept in turn. Relevant text for each concept is presented on an organisation by 
organisation basis. The quotations from the interviewees are added to relevant 
sections of the content analysis. It acts as a complement and reinforcement of the 
content analysis findings. The interviewees will be notated as executives of GBE A 
and GBE B respectively. This approach allows for assembling of rich contextual data 
about the relevant concepts and the relationships among them. 
 
5.2.1 ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN GBE CONTEXT  
  
 The information, which includes statements, discussions and chart 
presentations reported in SA Water, Adelaide Shores, HomeStart Finance, Ergon 
Energy Corporation, Ports Corporation of Queensland (PCQ) and Rail Corporation 
annual reports suggests the presence of both political and public accountability 
orientations. SA Water’s annual report includes a chart that indicates political 
accountability orientation, as it displays SA Water’s management, CEO and the board 
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of directors are responsible for their conduct and SA Water’s operation to the Minister 
for Administrative Services and Government Enterprises, Industrial Relations, 
Recreation and Sports and Racing (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 9). It also states that the 
Treasurer is the sole shareholder of the enterprise. This implies that SA Water is not 
only owned by the SA government, but is under shareholder-type control by the 
Minister. So the management of SA Water is deemed to be firmly under a political 
chain of accountability. HomeStart Finance also provide similar chart with 
responsibilities ending up with the Minister for Housing and lines of relationship with 
the Department of Families and Communities’ chief and deputy chief executives 
(HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 11). Ergon Energy similarly provides a chart with the 
responsibilities ending up with the shareholding Ministers (ErgonAR, 2005/06, p. 40).  
 
 Beside these charts there are many statements that imply the six enterprises are 
under a chain of political accountability as illustrated below.  
 
SA Water makes the following statements: 
  
SA Water is responsible to the minister for Administrative Services and 
Government Enterprises, The honourable Michael Wright MP whose portfolio 
includes industrial Relations and Recreation, Sport and Racing.  
 (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 9) 
  
 The Public corporations Act requires SA Water to operate within the Parliament 
 and Government’s intentions for the nature and scope of corporation activities as 
 expressed by the South Australian Water Corporation Act 1994 and the SAWater 
 charter… 
 (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 15) 
 
HomeStart Finance: 
 We report to the Minister for Housing, the Hon. Jay Weatherill MP, and work
 closely with the Department for Families and Communities to coordinate and 
 deliver housing services.  
 (HomeStart 2005/06, p. 10) 
 Within the framework of government policy, our Board and Chief Executive 
 Officer establish policies and procedures governing how HomeStart operates. 
 (HomeStart 2005/06, p. 3) 
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AdelaideShores: 
 
The Trust is managed through a Board under the control and direction of the 
Minister for Urban Development and Planning. (AdelaideShoresAR 2005/06, p. 1) 
  
 …the inclusion of an accountability framework, Ministerial approval is  now 
 required annually for a: 
 • Charter that authorises the Trust to act within agreed strategic objectives and 
 comply with various policies and Acts 
• Performance Agreement that identifies the achievement of key financial and 
non financial targets 
 • Strategic Plan that outlines long-term directions 
 • Business Plan that provides short-term annual strategies and targets, and 
 resources needed to meet the charter, performance agreement and plans. 
  (Adelaide ShoresAR 2005/06, p. 1) 
 
Ports Corporation of Queensland: 
 
The Board of Directors is formally accountable to the shareholding Ministers: the 
Deputy Premier, Treasurer and Minister for Infrastructure and the Minister for 
Transport and Main Roads under the Government Owned Corporations (GOC) 
Act 1993. (PCQAR 2005/06, p. 13) 
 
From 1 July 1994, the organisation [Ports Corporation of Queensland]  became 
a statutory Government Owned Corporation (GOC) under the Government 
Owned  Corporations Act 1993(GOC Act)…under the GOC Act, activities are 
governed by: 
 • a Statement of Corporate Intent which is agreed annually between the Board 
 and shareholding Ministers 
 • a five-year Corporate Plan. (PCQAR 2005/06, p. 4) 
 
Rail Corporation of NSW: 
 
RailCorp has a Board of Directors responsible and accountable to the Voting 
Shareholders who each hold one share for and on behalf of the New South Wales 
Government. 
 (RCorpAR 2005/06, p. 40) 
  
 The Board is accountable to the Voting Shareholders for ensuring the long 
 term success of the Corporation and for achievement of the shareholders’ 
 objectives of ensuring the rail network enables safe and reliable passenger and 
 freight services to be provided in an efficient, effectiveand financially 
 responsible manner. (RCorpAR 2005/06, p. 40) 
 
Ergon Energy: 
 
 As Government Owned Corporation, this document [Statement of Corporate 
 Intent] is fundamentally a performance agreement with our shareholding 
 Ministers. 
 (ErgonAR 2005/06, p. 10) 
 
105 
 The duty to report to the responsible minister(s) and other authoritative bodies 
is also evidenced in the annual reports as illustrated below.  
 
SA Water states that its board of directors needs to ‘regularly reports to the Minister 
on SA Water’s performance’ (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 10) and that any ministerial 
direction is to be published in its annual report (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 15).  
 
HomeStart Finance explicitly indicates its reporting requirements in the objective of 
the annual report by included a letter discharging its reporting obligations to the 
Minister for Housing stating that: 
The Annual Report complies with the requirements of the Housing and Urban 
Development (Administrative Arrangements) Act 1995 (SA), the Public  Finance 
and Audit Act 1987 (SA), the Public Sector Management Act 1995(SA) and the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet Annual Reporting Requirements 
(HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 1).  
Also the board is committed to keep the Minister and Treasurer informed about 
HomeStart’s operations (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 41).  
 
PCQ provides similar statements stating that:  
The report is sent to key stakeholders in Queensland, Australia and overseas. It 
forms an important reporting mechanism for PCQ’s two shareholding Ministers 
and meets PCQ’s obligations under the Government Owned Corporations Act 
1993 (GOC Act).  
The report is also distributed to all members of Queensland Parliament, 
customers, suppliers and contractors, industry and community groups and 
relevant academic institutions and libraries (PCQAR 2005/06, p. 1). 
   
Rail Corporation indicates its reporting requirements in the Directors’ accountability 
section, which stated that: 
[The board needs to report to] the voting shareholders on the operations of 
RailCorp on a half yearly basis [and] deliver an Annual Report, including audited 
financials, within four months of the end of the financial year’ (RCorpAR 
2005/06, p. 40).  
 
AdelaideShores, as reported in the chain of accountability statements above,, indicates 
the requirements to submit its strategic plan, business plan and annual report to the 
Minister for Urban Development and Planning.  
 
Ergon Energy states that its board needs to: 
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Keeps the State Government informed with general briefings and through the 
reporting regime prescribed by the Government Owned Corporation Act 1993’ 
(ErgonAR 2005/06,  p. 36).  
 
In terms of reporting requirements, Part 11 of the Act provides that both Statutory and 
Company GBEs need to provide quarterly reports, annul reports and the board of 
directors needs to keep the relevant minister(s) informed. Reporting requirements are 
also mentioned on many occasions during the interviews with the two senior 
executives. In the first interview, the executive of GBE A stated that ‘we have 42 days 
to have our financial statements ready for audit and then our annual report must be 
presented to the minister no later then 30 [of] September each year’. The minister then 
tables the report within ‘12 sitting days’ (Executive, GBE A, 2007). These reporting 
requirements are also mentioned in the second interview held with the executive of 
GBE B. He indicated that ‘we meet on a quarterly basis with the shareholders’ 
[Ministers] representatives to provide an overview of what’s going on’ and ‘we 
provide four more half-yearly and annual reporting to our shareholders and we 
provide annual report’. The annual report is also ‘through their shareholders…tabled 
in Parliament’ (Executive, GBE B, 2008). 
 
 Lastly, evidence of formal channel for the responsible minister to direct 
government policies and the provision of CSOs to the enterprise is also provided in 
the annual reports. Under SA Water Corporation Act, SA Water needs to carryout 
functions in its field of operations as well as ‘any other function conferred on the 
corporation by… the minister, or delegated to the corporation by the minister’ 
(SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 16). This statement on publishing any ministerial direction 
in the annual report also suggests that SA Water is subject to ministerial directions. 
SA Water carries out CSOs in forms of providing concesssional rate to eligible 
pensioners and provision of water and wastewater infrastructure in regional areas 
(SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 16, 28).  
 
In contrast HomeStart Finance provides no straight forward indication of a 
channel relationship with the Minister. It is blended in with the discussion of the 
provision of CSOs. This is seen in their statements that ‘HomeStart maintained its 
position as a sustainable vehicle for delivering on government policy issues’, and that 
a new product was launched by the Minister in line with the State Housing plan 
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(HomeStartAR 2005/06). Similarly there is no direct statement regarding ministerial 
direction in Rail Corporation and PCQ annual reports. Nevertheless, PCQ states that it 
manages the ports ‘in accordance with government policies’ (PCQAR 2005/06, p. 3) 
and Rail Corporation listed various statements relating its CSOs. Rail Corporation 
indicated a concesssional fare for senior citizen travel on its rail services and that it is 
subject to price setting (RailCopAR 2005/06, p. 38).   
 
The formal channel for ministerial direction is also apparent in the line of 
accountability, responsibility and requirement of ministerial approvals. Adelaide 
Shores divides its business structure into commercial operations and community 
services. Its community services include managing golf park, Skate Park and boating 
facilities. Moreover, evidence of CSOs arises in the discussion of its operating 
environment when it went about the increase in ‘demands by our stakeholders for 
more non-commercial activities, facilities and services’ (AdelaideShoresAR 2005/06, 
p. 5). Ergon’s CSOs are evident in the form of providing concesssional rates and in 
receiving reimbursement from QLD government on the provision of CSOs.  
 
The activities identified above are the suggested indicators for CSOs provided 
by the Federal and State governments (Cook, 1999; Baird, 2001). The CSOs and 
ministerial direction requirements faced by GBEs are also raised in the interviews.  
From the interviews, there is a distinction of the requirements among legal forms of 
GBEs, namely the Statutory Corporation and the Company/State Owned Corporation 
types. The text from the first interview confirmed the nature of CSOs and ministerial 
direction found in the annual reports as it was mentioned that ‘we do get some 
ministerials here and there’. It was indicated that ministers are given top priority as 
suggested in the comment: ‘if we got a ministerial…we go to answer it and generally 
ministers require it by the end of the day’ (Executive, GBE A, 2007). The second 
interviewee, however, down graded the level of importance of ministerial direction. 
Ministerial requests are treated ‘as we would treat an inquiry …a reasonable inquiry 
from anywhere [customers or public]’ (Executive, GBE B). Moreover, the enterprise 
is claimed to take a leading role, having the enterprise’ mission in mind, when consult 
with the ministers instead of accepting any direction given.  These interviews reveal 
there are different degrees of political accountably requirements faced GBEs, which 
can not identify through annual reports. 
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 Public accountability of GBEs is mainly concerned with the provision of 
satisfactory services. Community services and the services of their commercial 
operations are considered as part of their day-to-day business operation and similar to 
those of both private sector and charitable organisations. For example, providing 
excellent services to customer and taking care of the environment. The matter of 
environment that becomes part of GBEs’ public accountability is typically found 
when it is explicitly stated as part of its main function and directed in its enabling 
Act(s).    
 
 HomeStart Finance provides testimonial of customer satisfaction with its 
products and support services throughout the annual report. The products included in 
the testimonial are both a CSO-related product (namely, the EquityStart that was 
launched by the Minister for Housing) and other commercial products. Additionally, 
HomeStart Finance has a dedicated network of distribution teams that received a 
Small Business Award in 2006 (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 19). This suggests high 
attention to customer services as part of its public accountability. SA Water did not 
distinguish its CSO services from commercial operations in its customer satisfaction 
report. However, it provides many statements and commitment to improve its overall 
customer service satisfaction. SA Water stated that ‘each year we seek feedback via 
our customer satisfaction survey to support our decision making and help shape 
communication to our customers’ (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 31). In addition, it is 
committed to provide information about its services and water conservation tips to the 
public (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 32).  
 
 PQC manages trade ports and community ports and says it is committed to 
being a market-oriented organisation, to empowering customers, and to providing 
information to its customer. This suggests the importance of discharging public 
accountability through declaring its orientation to serving customers. Rail Corporation 
is also committed to providing safety and reliable services to its customer. It has put 
many measures in place to ensure all customers experience the best services on its rail 
transport services. The measures include Mystery Shopper Service Quality Audits, 
Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator (ITSRR) mini and annual 
surveys and Cleanliness Survey (RailCorp 2005/06, pp.6, 26, 27). AdelaideShores 
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also states it is committed to providing satisfactory services as indicated in its goal to 
‘maintain and enhance customer loyalty and brand image awareness for tourist 
accommodation’ (AdelaideShoresAR, 2005/06, p. 8). It conducts a survey on its 
community service line as well (maintaining its golf course) which found that ‘over 
87% of customers would recommend the facility’ (AdelaideShoresAR, 2005/06, p. 9). 
Public accountability orientation was raised by both executives in both interviews. 
The sentiment was that the enterprise feels obligated to inform the public and market 
about its operations’ agenda. The executive in GBE A stated that ‘we ring them 
[competitors and customers] to say this is what we’re doing so that they at 
least…not…shock’ (Executive, GBE A, 2007).  
  
 Managerial accountability orientation in term of performance indicators is 
evident throughout the annual reports of the selected GBEs. The management 
discussion section provides the most information on managerial accountability faced 
by GBEs. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the performance indicators found in the 
GBEs’ annual reports. Discussions of managerial accountability are also present in the 
text of the interviews. The efficiency, economy and effectiveness elements were much 
discussed by both executives, as given in the following quotes:  
 
We have good rapport with Glenelg Golf Course [and] Regency Park Golf 
Course [and we compare] how long does it takes you guys versus our guys to 
mow a fairway and things like cleaning…room and cabin. [The result would be] 
we’re not efficient in those areas or we are. We can say well it obviously costs us 
more than private because they don’t have some of the levies…but we go back to 
time factor and say we’re taking 45 minutes, they’re taking 45 (Executive GBE A, 
2007). 
 
We do estimate at the beginning of the year and say…well…100 million tones is 
what’s expected to be shifted in a year, and if…it was going to cost us $100 
million, then we charge them $100 a tonne. If at the end of the year it’s cost us 
$105 million instead of 100, then we’d send them a bill (Executive GBE B, 2008). 
 
If we do if for them for $100 million a year, then we will get our management fee 
of a certain percentage. If we do it for $105 million, we’ll still get the $105 
million but our management fee…will reduce and if we actually blew the budget 
by more then 10 percent we wouldn’t be entitled to a management fee (Executive 
GBE B, 2008). 
 
Fiduciary accountability is less transparent in the annual reports. This may due to the 
nature of internal government approval processes and management reporting 
requirements in place for capital injection and major development plans. Nevertheless, 
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there are some comments from the interviews to indicate that fiduciary accountability 
does exist in GBEs organisations.  
 
So what can then happen is that we get feedback then to say well [in] your capital 
works program you said you were going to spend $1 million this month, you’ve 
only spent 200,000, why? (Executive GBE A, 2007). 
  
…we can take out loans whenever we like, with ministerial approval. The 
minister also gets to read our board minutes every month, we include in our 
financials (Executive GBE A, 2007). 
 
…we’re not allowed to [borrow from private banks]. We’ve got to go 
through…government finance first (Executive GBE A, 2007). 
 
…there’s a separate exercise where the government of the day might decide for 
political purposes…[inject more money to the improve the industry and the 
enterprise] is the organisation that’s appropriately placed to apply those funds in 
the most suitable manner…[we] told them what we would do with the that 
money (Executive GBE B, 2008). 
 
 Therefore, GBEs are subjected to political, public, managerial and fiduciary 
accountability expectations and requirements. The annual reports reveal a strong 
political accountability orientation in the articulation of chains of accountability, and 
meeting ministerial information demands. Public accountability orientation is also 
evident in various statements about striving to provide customers with satisfaction 
with delivery of CSOs and overall public satisfaction with services. Managerial 
accountability is another dimension that is present in the annual reports. Some GBEs 
in the sample provide more information on performance indicators than others.  
Fiduciary accountability is less evident in the annual reports but is drawn out in the 
interviews because it entails less public disclosure and more internal reporting within 
government hierarchies. Each of the political, public and managerial accountabilities 
were comprehensively discussed by both executives in the interviews.   
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TABLE 5.1: NON-FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ABSTRACTS/INDICATORS IN GBE’S ANNUAL REPORTS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION AND RESEMBLANCE TO SUGGESTED INDICATORS 
GBE Abstracts/Indicators Interpretation/ 
Efficiency/Effectiveness and 
Quality 
 Taskforce’s suggested 
indicators 
Adelaide Shores Number of guests visit the resorts in a year Effectiveness indicators Percentage of set objective(s) achieve 
for the period 
  
 Percentage of increases in occupancy 
Nights occupied per site (Caravan site) 
Customer satisfaction survey Service quality indicators Level of satisfaction with services as 
perceived by customers/ public 
  
Accommodation rating (star rating) 
Training cost per revenue Efficiency indicator Training as a proportion of the total 
employee remuneration budget 
Injury frequency rate for new lost-time injury/disease 
for each million hours worked 
Work time loss due to sickness, or 
industrial accidents or disputes 
Sites (Caravan site) per staff member Employees employed per unit output 
Rail Corporation Passenger journeys (millions), Suburban train on time 
(%), Intercity trains on time (%), total CityRail trains 
on time, CountryRail trans on time (%) 
Effectiveness indicators Percentage of set objective(s) achieve 
for the period 
  
Safety indicators: reportable safety incidents, SPAD 
(signal passed at danger), Fatalities 
Effectiveness indicators, safe and 
reliable objectives 
Crime rate on rail premises 
Customer satisfaction survey rates on: frequency, 
punctuality, journey time and delay and cancellations 
Service quality indicators Level of satisfaction with services as 
perceived by customers/ public 
Lost time injury frequency rate (LTFR), 
Average time lost rate (ATLR) 
Efficiency indicators Work time loss due to sickness, or 
industrial accidents or disputes 
Many training program but no measures   
HomeStart Finance Number of registration of interest (EquityStart) 
Number of applications, number of settlements 
Effectiveness indicators Percentage of set objective(s) achieve 
for the period 
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Account payment performance: paid by due date, paid 
more than thirty days from due date 
Efficiency indicators  
Injury frequency rate for new lost-time injury/disease 
for each million hours worked 
Work time loss due to sickness, or 
industrial accidents or disputes 
Training programs, no measures   
Testimonials of customer satisfaction, no measures  
SA Water Percentage of wastewater reused      Effectiveness indicators Percentage of set objective(s) achieve 
for the period 
Population served (water and wastewater, 
metropolitan and country) 
 
Highest 24hr volume delivered (ML)  
(water, Adelaide) 
Average daily volume delivered (ML)  
(water, Adelaide) 
Service interruptions restored in 5 hours Efficiency indicators  
Mainbreaks per 1,000 customers 
Mainbreaks per 100km of main 
% interruptions responded in 1 hour 
Chokes in sewer mains per 100km of main 
Chokes in sewer mains per 1,000 customers 
Lost time injury rate (LTiFR) Work time loss due to sickness, or 
industrial accidents or disputes 
Many training programs, no measures  
Customer satisfaction survey Service quality indicator 
 
Product quality indicator 
Level of satisfaction with services as 
perceived by customers/ public 
% of samples with faecal coliforms absent (test for 
water quality) 
Water quality/ Percentage of set 
objective(s) achieve for the period 
% of sample free from E Coli 
PCQ Lost time due to injuries Efficiency indicator  
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Meeting standards (port risk management, 
environmental management system 
Quality indicators  
Training and development program, no measure  
Ergon energy Network Reliability Performance: Duration index 
(system average interruption duration index), 
Urban/Short Rural/ Long Rural distributions 
Frequency index (system average interruption 
frequency index)   
Effectiveness indicators Percentage of set objective(s) achieve 
for the period 
Lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR) Efficiency indicator Work time loss due to sickness, or 
industrial accidents or disputes 
Customer satisfaction survey Service quality indicators Level of satisfaction with services as 
perceived by customers/ public 
Customer loyalty index  
Customer responsiveness index 
Meeting standards (environmental)  Percentage of set objective(s) achieve 
for the period 
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5.2.2 CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE GBE CONTEXT 
 
 The information relating to organisational capabilities is mainly located in the 
management discussion, objectives and operation review sections of the annual 
reports. As previously mention the content and thematic analysis process is to look for 
evidence about the enterprises’ abilities.  
 
SA Water provides indications of procurement and contract management 
expertises in its Commercial objective section, which stated that ‘we strive for best 
practice performance in procurement and contract management in order to deliver 
value to our customers and stakeholders and meet our Strategic Objectives’. In 
addition it indicates a cost saving of over $500,000, which is raid to have been 
achieved because ‘our procurement team assists SA Water to achieve these outcomes 
by providing expertise in the areas of contract management, supplier management and 
by ensuring probity and maximum value for SA Water in commercial transactions’ 
(SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 29). These quotes suggest a direct link between contract and 
procurement management abilities and commercial performance. SA Water further 
indicates its commitments to achieve cost efficiency and efficiency in capital work 
investment in its objectives. These abilities and commitments are part of the elements 
of Day’s (1994) cost and financial management capabilities, which is part of the 
inside-out capabilities category. Thus the abilities discussed can be considered as cost 
and financial management capabilities.   
 
AdelaideShores also reveals signs of financial and cost management 
capabilities. The annual report states that AdelaideShores’ operating surplus of 
$918,000 was a result of ‘prudential financial management and continued increases in 
revenue’ and that the ‘annual operating and capital expenditure are contained within 
specific Board approved budgets’ (AdelaideShoresAR 2005/06, p. 30).  
 
PCQ comprehensively discloses and discuss its financial management policies, 
ranging from Capital structure to Investment policy to Foreign Exchange and 
Derivative policy and General Borrowing policy. The discussions further illuminate 
its ability to manage its financial assets as reflected in its statement about cash that 
‘cash at bank or on hand, not currently required by PCQ, is invested in Board-
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approved investments. PCQ monitors cashflows daily and invests any surplus’ 
(PCQAR 2005/06, p. 17). Further commitments to financial management are 
indicated in its strategies, which ‘ensure financial and capital/debt structure is 
appropriate and strategies are in place to meet long-run rate of return targets’ and 
‘maintenance of an investment grade credit rating’ (PCQAR 2005/06, p. 6).   PCQ 
indicates not only its cost management ability, but also its commitment to carrying out 
maintenance services of its infrastructure, environmental management and project 
development costs within the budget. Also PCQ strives to be a cost effective provider 
of port infrastructure services to its customer (PCQAR 2005/06, pp. 3-7). This 
implicitly requires PCQ to be efficient in cost management in order to provide low 
cost services to its customers. 
 
HomeStart Finance stated that its financial management philosophy is based 
on ‘best practice concepts and principles aimed at continuous improvement in how we 
go about meeting financial performance targets that will sustain our business activities 
in the long term’ (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 36). It further claims that its ‘highly 
qualified and experienced finance team continually strives to improve process 
efficiency to reduce operational costs…’ (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 36). These 
statements indicate HomeStart’s sound financial management and commitment to 
monitor its operating cost. In addition, HomeStart also indicates strong ability to 
monitor its financial risks through treasury risk management, asset and liability 
management and risk transfer vehicle (RTV) and to use this ability to earn profit and 
improve performance (HomeStartAR 2005/06).  This sound prudential financial 
management is not unusual given HomeStart is a financial institution. 
 
Ergon Energy likewise claims an ability to manage its financial assets as it 
reported that the strong financial performance of net profit after tax of $144.2 million 
was the result of ‘…financial market trading expertise with underlying retail activity 
to optimise hedging opportunities and add incremental trading to the portfolio’ 
(ErgonAR 2005/06, p. 32). Once gain this statement implies a direct link between 
ability and performance. A sound financial risk management is also evidenced in the 
annual report as indicated in the statement: ‘…financial…risks are identified, assessed, 
monitored and managed to produce better performance outcomes and greater financial 
and operational stability’ (ErgonAR 2005/06, p. 44). This risk management 
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philosophy is guided by the risk management framework of Australian and New 
Zealand Risk Management Standard AS/AZ 4360 and consistent with financial 
policies set by the Code of Practice for Government Owned Corporations Financial 
Arrangements (ErgonAR 2005/06, pp. 43-44).        
 
Lastly, Rail Corporation emphasises its cost management with commitment to 
‘…minimise the cost of …services’ (RailCorpAR, 2005/06, p. 38) and that its project 
work ‘…was introduce on time and within budget’ (RailCorpAR 2005/06, p. 39). It 
indicates a satisfactory result of financial efficiency in its strategic framework 
(RailCorpAR 2005/06).   
 
Therefore, the cost and financial management capabilities that have been 
employed in prior studies on organisational capabilities are applicable to the context 
of GBEs’ capabilities.  
 
The next ability that is revealed in the annual reports is general management 
ability. This ability has been employed in studies by Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) and 
Smith et al, (1986) of organisational capabilities. SA Water claims a sound general 
management ability, from staffing and organisational restructuring to performance 
assessment. This is reported in the management discussion section as ‘we are 
equipped with all the things we need to meet our business requirements, and 
supporting challenges such as emergencies should they arise’ (SAWaterAR 2005/06, 
p. 18) and that ‘in the coming year, our planning, reporting and performance 
management initiatives will be aligned to the Strategic map’ (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 
24). In addition, it set up a new management team model that 
‘…represent…[the]…desire to more closely reflect our core business 
[and]…balancing of the top level management with more presentation from the 
operational side of the business’ (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 24).  
 
Similarly, AdelaideShores indicates the ability to organise and direct the 
enterprise in a way it could achieve its overall objectives, balancing commercial and 
CSOs. It states that as the ‘organisation grow there is a greater need for delegation, 
teamwork and more formal directing, managing and operating system and practices’ 
(AdelaideShoresAR 2005/06, p. 9). Other discussions of sound general management 
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include ability to adopt a governance model that fosters productivity and performance 
and the ability to determine factors effecting its revenue creation (AdelaideShoresAR 
2005/06).  
 
The other enterprises also indicate similar general management ability, 
although Rail Corporation provides little information about it general management 
except for human resource management. Abstracts of the discussions and statements 
about general managements’ contributions of its capabilities are provided in Table 5.2.  
 
 
TABLE 5.2 STATEMENTS RELATED TO GENERAL MANAGEMENTS’ 
CAPABILITIES CONTRIBUTIONS 
GBE Abstract 
Ergon Energy The Executive Management Team (EMT) focused its leadership by 
providing the business with clear priorities and no compromise areas…to 
ensure that the key strategic outcomes of the business are achieved 
(ErgonAR 2005/06, p.45).  
PCQ Corporate services are provided in the areas of finance and administration, 
corporate strategy, corporate relations and information management 
(PCQAR 2005/06, p. 5). 
HomeStart Sustainability practices are vital to our organisation so that a balance can 
be maintained between maximising social outcomes while continuing to 
meet our commercial obligations (HomeStart 2005/06, p. 35). 
 
HomeStart uses balanced scorecard method of performance 
measurement…[which provide a] holistic view of the organisation assists 
the Board and management in identifying key areas of achievement, areas 
where corrective action is required and new opportunities for the future 
(HomeStart 2005/06, p. 36) 
 
 The selected GBEs also demonstrated strong commitments to provide service 
satisfaction to their customers. There are many different measures set up to ensure 
customers receive the best quality service. SA Water has developed a Customer 
Charter that details their ‘commitments to ensuring the services…deliver 
to…customers are efficient and summarises…customers’ rights and obligations when 
dealing’ (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 31) with them. They also state a commitment to 
continuously improve the Charter and keep customers inform. Their measures include 
providing schemes, payment support and a well trained contact person to assist 
customers experiencing financial hardship. Furthermore, the annual report states that 
‘SA Water’s customer contact centre was…named State winner in the Australian 
Teleservices Association awards’ (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 33). SA Water also 
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commits to ‘establish links with electricity and gas retailers in the State to pursue 
partnership approaches to hardship customers’ (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 33).  These 
measures would be intended to develop good and durable relationships with its 
customers. Moreover, the measures assist in retaining customers. These characteristics 
suggest that SA Water has customer linking capability. 
 
 Ergon Energy puts its customers as the driver of its operations by setting it 
objective as ‘to be a customer-driven business, providing service excellence for our 
customers… [and]…placing customers at the centre of our decision making…’ 
(ErgonER 2005/06, p. 17). Another strong statement of its dedication to its customers 
is: 
As part of an internal communications campaign, known as everything in Your 
Power’, we diverted the focus of the organisation into our customers and  service 
with a clear set of customer-centric behaviours that are enabling  individuals, and 
the organisation as whole, to improve service delivery (ErgonAR 2005/06, p. 22).  
 
The systems put in place to achieve the above objectives include meeting 
International Customer Service Standard rating, establishing an Office of Customer 
Advocate (OCA) to get customer feedback, working with Energy Consumer 
Protection Office (ECPO) to solve customer issues, establishing a National Contact 
Centre and a speech recognition system, and providing special assistance to customers 
experiencing financial hardship. Therefore, Ergon clearly has the ability to create and 
manage durable customer relationships and thus customer linking capability. 
 
 The evidence of an ability to create and manage durable customer 
relationships provided by other enterprises is listed in Table 5.3. 
 
TABLE 5.3 STATEMENTS RELATED TO CUSTOMER LINKING ABILITY 
GBE Abstracts 
PCQ Create a market-oriented organisation, empowering customers and 
improving commercial performance. 
Foster market-oriented corporate culture focused on customer 
satisfaction. (PCQAR 2005/06, p. 6) 
 
Started a Customer Management Framework -a formal system to record 
feedback on PCQ customer management best practice. Generally the 
feedback from customers was positive and aligned with the internal 
assessments undertaken with the Commercial Managers. (PCQAR 
2005/06, p. 6) 
119 
HomeStart 
Finance 
Our Customer Relations Group (CRG) continued to provide efficient, 
friendly and personalised service, fielding almost 38 000 calls over the 
past 12 months. 
HomeStart supports and practices multicultural diversity and provides 
interpreting and translating services in accordance with state government 
policy. We offer information about our loan products and services in 15 
different languages other than English: 
 
Amharic, Arabic, Chinese, Croatian, 
Greek, Italian, Khmer, Persian, Polish, 
Serbian, Spanish, Swahili, Tagalog, 
Tigrigna, and Vietnamese. 
 
HomeStart’s Women’s Unit was established in 2004 in response to an 
identified need amongst female home buyers and potential home buyers 
for professional, independent advice and support with regard to home 
ownership. (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p.19) 
Rail 
Corporation 
Customer Management Response Plans… Our Customer Management 
Response Plans, which are based on input from CityRail stations, bus 
companies and other external agencies, helped staff to manage 
emergency alternate transport and communications on a line-by-line 
basis. 
 
Customer Focus Project… will: • Establish an integrated research 
program and a customer satisfaction measurement regime to help us 
better understand our customers; • Define projects to close service gaps; 
and• Establish customer service standards. 
 
Customer Relations… implemented an enhanced database and new 
procedures to improve the organisation’s process for managing customer 
feedback. (RailCorpAR 2005/06, p. 27) 
Adelaide 
Shores 
Customer focus… understand, through sound research and survey, the 
specific needs of each customer group (both external and internal)  
and actively manage their experiences with services and facilities  
that enhance and protect our market leadership.  
(Adelaide ShoresAR 2005/06, p. 2) 
 
Innovation and technology development capability is also evidenced in the 
annual reports. This capability was used in Day’s (1994) and Di Bennedetto and 
Song’s (2003) studies of organisational capabilities and Adler and Shenbar’s (1990), 
Christensen’s (1995) and Guan and Ma’s (2003) studies of innovation capability. 
Based on the different elements of the concept of innovation and technology 
capability, HomeStart Finance provided many indications of innovative capability like 
its production development where it stated that ‘on the new product front, we 
[HomeStart] undertook a significant amount of research and modelling to arrive at a 
Shared Appreciation Loan facility’ (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 5) and ‘it is our 
innovative range of products and services that have allowed us to assist people for 
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whom traditional lending structures do no work’ (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 10). 
These statements also suggest a link between innovative ability and performance. 
Innovation orientation and commitment are also evident in HomeStart Finance’s 
claim to ‘focus on innovate home loan solutions that will assist the customer at all 
points on their home ownership journey’ (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 14).  
 
 Rail Corporation introduced two new timetables and 12 new refurbished cars 
to allow a more comfortable journey and to meet customers’ need and market demand.  
Rail Corporation invests in many new technologies, including Safety Management 
System (SMS), Safety Knowledge Management system. It contends that it is 
continuously working to find better ways to provide safe and reliable services to its 
customers. These characteristics indicate Rail Corporation’s innovative ability. 
 
 AdelaideShores refer to their innovative philosophy as drawing the 
organisation to ‘challenge existing ways of doing things and self-manage 
improvements in services, facilities, processes, relationships, technologies and assets 
that create win-win outcomes for individuals, teams, and Adelaide Shores’ 
(AdelaideShoresAR 2005/06, p. 2).  Other indications of capabilities among the 
selected GBEs are listed in Table 5.4. 
TABLE 5.4 STATEMENTS RELATED TO INNOVATION ABILITY 
GBEs Abstracts 
PCQ …investment of over $200 million at PCQ’s three largest ports–Hay 
Point, Abbot Point and Weipa. This diversified major capital works 
program is designed to deliver the required port infrastructure for our 
customers’ growth well into the future. 
 
At the Port of Hay Point, work has started on a $70 million dredging 
project… One of the largest single dredging projects in the southern 
hemisphere this year, the project will result in a much needed departure 
path being created for coal bulk carriers departing the port for 
international destinations. (PCQAR 2005/06, p.9)
SA Water Two new Australian Research Council Linkage projects… The first 
project will look at the conversion of winery wastewater rich in organics 
to value added products and the second project will look at using titanium 
dioxide catalysts to disinfect wastewater (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p. 37). 
 
Victor Harbor Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP)…  
The high quality ‘A class’ reclaimed water produced from the plant is 
suitable for the irrigation of farmlands, parks and gardens and will meet 
the growing population needs of the area to 2025 (SAWaterAR 2005/06, 
p. 41). 
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The statements in Table 1.4 infer that GBEs have many different innovative 
activities. Such activities are in line with the established literature on innovative 
ability of organisations.  
 
Capabilities such as channel bonding, information technology, and ability to 
retain customers and are evidenced in the annual reports. Table 5.5 below provides the 
abstracts and brief interpretations of these capabilities. 
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TABLE 5.5 TYPES OF CAPABILITIES IN STATEMENTS OF GBES 
Capability GBE Abstracts Interpretation 
Information 
technology 
HomeStart 
Finance 
Our Information Technology (IT) team implemented a new data 
and communications network to coincide with our office 
relocation to 153 Flinders Street in November 2005. This ensures 
the organisation is well equipped to support its staff, customers 
and business partners (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 5).  
This statement indicates HomeStart Finance’s information 
technology capability and improvement to serve the 
purpose of relocation. It also supports Homestart Finance 
in making connection with business partners and 
customers as well. This suggests that the IT capability also 
provide HomeStart Finance channel capability as well. 
Rail 
Corporation 
Enterprise Resource Planning system... 
The new system has streamlined our business processes and 
improved efficiency in administering human resources, finance, 
payroll, maintenance and supply (RailCorpAR 2005/06, p. 30). 
 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system is an 
integrated system that coordinates major functions within 
the organisation. It is an IT based system, involving using 
latest computer technology, software packages and 
networking. Thus by implementing an ERP system, Rail 
Corporation equipped with a powerful IT capability that 
support and integrated business functions.  
Ergon 
Energy 
Ergon Energy implemented several IT programs to improve its 
business. The programs include JET (Joint Enterprise 
Transition), Interactive Voice Recognition system, Lodestar 
Integrated Portfolio Management (IPM) system and ERP system. 
(ErgonAR 2005/06)*  
This indicates Ergon’s IT capability and its strength. 
Channel 
bonding 
Ergon 
Energy 
A major success in the strategy to develop our FRC [Full Retail 
Competition] capability was the acquisition of small business 
retailer Powerdirect (ErgonAR 2005/06, p. 28).  
Ergon operates in both distribution and retailing energy 
market in Queensland and by purchased a retailer it 
improved its distribution channel. Thus this indicates 
Ergon channel bonding capability. 
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Adelaide-
Shores 
AdeliadeShores works with other agencies and develop strategic 
alliances to deliver its services and foster growth in both 
commercial and social obligations areas. This is indicated in 
page 5 of the annual report and some of the alliances include ‘SA 
Water [for] Glenelg Effluent Re-Use Project and potable water” 
and “South Australian Tourism Commission [for] Cooperative 
marketing.” 
 
Adelaide Shores also works with other recreational providers and 
sport clubs. It leases its facilities include Golf Parks, Boating 
facilities and Sporting facilities to private providers and sport 
clubs. (AdelaideShoresAR 2005/06)* 
 
 HomeStart 
Finance 
We expanded our support for community finance and the 
affordable housing supply through consolidation of working 
relationships with industry and government, underpinned by an 
internal restructure to allow development in this area 
(HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 6). 
HomeStart works with housing industry and 
government to develop their product and providing 
affordable housing supply 
Ability to 
retain 
customer 
Adelaide-
Shores 
The Trust continued to achieve high occupancy rates, high repeat 
visitation levels and a loyal customer base by catering for the 
needs of families for tourist accommodation (AdelaideShoresAR 
2005/06, p. 8) 
This indicates Adelaide Shores’ ability to provide 
such quality services to its customers, which lead to 
high customer loyalty and high customer retention. 
HomeStart 
Finance 
[In]…improving access to our Home Equity Loan…[we are] 
introducing a discount on the establishment fee for discharging 
customers to encourage their return to HomeStart (HomeStartAR 
2005/06, p. 17) 
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Rail 
Corporation 
New CityRail Timetables… RailCorp successfully introduced 
two new timetables in the 2005-06 financial year. 
 
Reliability and On-time Running (OTR)… On-time running 
performance for the year finished at 88.8%, a significant 
improvement compared with 62.7% in 2004-05. 
XPT Refurbishment… RailCorp had introduced 12 refurbished 
trailer cars into the service, all with interior and exterior repaints 
new carpet and curtains, and one with upgraded toilets 
(RailCorpAR 2005/06, p. 26). 
Indicating Rail Corp. ability to improve their services 
in order to retain and attract new customers, 
 
On time services, comfortable seats and pleasant 
journey, reliable, 
 
* Not direct quote 
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Manufacturing capability is another dimension that evident in the annual 
reports. However, it is from a different perspective than traditional manufacturing 
company. White (1996) and Corbett and Claridge (2002) suggest manufacturing 
capability includes product/volume/ process flexibilities, delivery speed and 
dependability, cost, product reliability and durability and conformance quality. Based 
on these criteria, HomeStart Finance and SA Water reveal some elements of 
manufacturing capability with HomeStart Finance mentions product flexibility by 
stating that: 
 
The loan amount is set as a multiple of gross annual income to make sure it is 
proportional to the customer’s earning capacity at that time. Centrelink benefits, 
part time and casual work, and child maintenance payments may all be 
included as income. 
 
Initial loan repayments are set at an affordable percentage of the customer’s 
income (generally around 28%) and in most cases will only change once a year 
in line with inflation. This means the customer’s repayment amount is 
unaffected by  changes in interest rates and their income is thus protected 
from sudden  increases in what they are required to repay on a regular basis 
(HomeStartAR 2005/06, p.17) 
 
Alternatively, SA Water indicates a conformance quality: 
 
SA Water adopts Water [a] Quality Framework continuous improvement 
tool… to assess  how well we were implementing the Australian Drinking 
Water Guideline Framework in SA Water. 
  
Established quality   systems officers to support SA Water operational staff 
[and]   
 Continued work on developing water quality management plans for our sixty 
 seven country water supply systems. (SAWaterAR 2005/06, p.36) 
 
The interview data fully confirms the existence of the capabilities used in prior 
studies among GBE type of organisation. Both Executives were able to provide a 
rating on a 1 to 6 Likert scale on each of Day’s (1994); Di Benneditto and Song’s 
(2003) and Song et al.’s (2007) elements of inside-out and outside-in capabilities. The 
reasoning behind the chosen rating further infers the existence of capabilities as 
provided by the interviews. For example: 
 
[F]inancial management capability, I’ve rated that six, I believe we’re very 
strong to the extent we have monthly board meetings, we have finance and 
governance committee, …we’re got all set down certain times, we change our 
forecasts about every three…to four months based on peak season (Executive, 
GBE A, 2007).  
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Creating durable relationships with suppliers. I’d say we’re pretty good at that. 
I’d put  a five [somewhat strong] on that. We have revisited a number of 
supply and procurement arrangements in relation to the support of the network 
and moved to  international and national tenders and improved, I think, the 
focus on the  interrelationships with the suppliers and the reliability 
information, et cetera  (Executive, GBE B, 2008). 
 
Therefore, the various dimensions of organisational capabilities articulated in 
the literature appear to apply to existing practices and aspirations in the context of 
GBEs. Risk management and performance management are abilities that found in the 
annual reports and have not been employed in prior studies of organisational 
capabilities. Nevertheless, they could be considered as part of general management 
and financial management capabilities. 
 
5.2.3 ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY WITHIN GBE CONTEXT 
 
 The statements and discussions about organisational strategy reported in the 
annual reports suggested that the selected GBEs have followed the adaptive strategy 
model in setting their strategic plans. Ergon Energy specifies that its vision is to ‘be a 
world class, customer-driven energy business’ (ErgonAR 2005/06, p. 8) and to 
achieve this vision it divided its strategic plan into five categories. The five categories 
are: (1) operational excellence, which aims to be ‘one of the most successful energy-
based organisations in Australia, in terms of network performance, wholesaling and 
retailing’; (2) customer service, which is to ‘provide service excellence through 
improving relationships with all…customers’; (3) people and development which is to 
‘effectively manage and support…[its] people’ (ErgonAR 2005/06, p. 10); (4) 
financial performance and growth and risk management to effectively manage 
business, network and (5) environmental risks throughout the group (ErgonAR 
2005/06). This approach to strategic development resembles the adaptive strategy 
model where it considers both external environments (i.e. the market and operating 
environments) and internal strength strengths and weaknesses (i.e. its people, network 
performance, financial objectives and risk managements) in developing an effective 
strategy. In other words the developed strategy seeks a balance between the 
opportunities and risks present in the external environment and the available 
organisation’s capabilities and resources used to exploiting the opportunities. This 
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approach is evidenced among the selected GBEs.  South Australia’s GBEs also 
consider South Australia State strategic plan in developing their strategic plan. This 
further indicates the adaptive nature of their strategies, as the developed strategies are 
not only accommodated to their internal and external strength and weaknesses but 
also the overall State strategic plan. 
 
 The adaptive nature of GBEs’ strategy is fully transparent in both interviews, 
where the Executives stated: 
 
Developing strategy…we obviously look at our organisational capabilities. 
We’re  also mindful of the fact that over time there were going to be less people 
available to do rail industry work in the way its traditionally been done. We are 
delivering technologies that enable us to reduce our reliance on…manual [labour] 
(Executive GBE B, 2008).  
 
We involved all staff, whether it be greenkeepers, cleaners, and it was a mixture 
of each person, each group, the modelling groups of 10 or 20 people asking for 
their views…what will they see is areas of inefficiency to weaknesses, what can 
we do better.  So all the staff have feedback and then we looked at areas of 
accommodation, corporate services, financial and all of that and then we have the 
facilitators then put it all together for us (Executive GBE A, 2007).   
 
 Another perspective on the adaptive strategy model is a strategic typology. 
Miles and Snow (1978) provide four strategic types, which can be identified using the 
paragraph approach developed by Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) and prior findings on 
the relationships between organisational strategy and capabilities.  
 In section 1.2 on the capability concept, it is suggested that AdelaideShores 
possesses the abilities of customer linking, innovation and product development, 
channel bonding, ability to retain customer, general management, and financial and 
cost managements. According to Di Benedetto and Song’s (2003), AdelaideShores 
would be is a prospector organisation, as it has relatively more of Day’s (1994) 
inside-out capabilities than outside-in capabilities. An analyser organisation shares 
both prospector and defender characteristics.  But since there is no measures of the 
relative strength of the capabilities, AdelaideShores can be considered as an analyser 
organisation as well.    
 
 Snow and Hrebiniak’s (1980) paragraph approach to identify strategic type 
analyses an organisation strategy on the basis of its product market domain, 
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involvement in product and service development and responsiveness to competitors’ 
actions. AdelaideShores’ commercial operation focuses in the area of Caravan Resort 
and Holiday Village. Adelaide Shores is committed to be the ‘preferred destination as 
prime seaside leisure playground in wider local, national and international markets’ 
(AdeaideShoresAR 2005/06, p. 2). In addition, it is the largest provider of its services 
in Adelaide’s western suburbs. The annual report indicates that AdelaideShores 
provides high value services with 4 star rating for its Holiday Village and 4.5 star 
rating Caravan Resort and is committed to performance benchmarking.   There are 
also indications of introducing new cabins for the Caravan Resort and deluxe 
bungalows for the Holiday Village and a leisure centre. This prosperity development 
is aimed by AdelaideShores to ‘improve facilities and hence services to sustain 
current rating levels’ (AdelaideShoresAR 2005/06, p. 9).  These features suggest that 
Adelaide Shores operates in a stable market, offers a limited range of services, 
provide high quality services and at same time introduces new lines of services to 
keep up the rating. These features characterise an analyser organisation, sharing both 
prospector’s and defender’s characteristics. 
 
 HomeStart Finance is believed to have innovation (product development), 
financial management, information technology (business and network perspectives), 
channel bonding, customer linking, ability to retain customer (discount incentive and 
high value services), product transformation and cost management. These abilities are 
associated with prospector organisations under Di Benedetto and Song’s (2003), 
Conant et al, (1989) and Snow and Hrebiniak’s (1980) findings. Once again without 
indication of strength of each of the capabilities within particular strategic position, 
HomeStart Finance can be viewed as an analyser enterprise as well. The paragraph 
approach also suggests HomeStart Finance is a prospector organisation. This is 
because its mission is to ‘develop, market manage home finance and housing 
initiatives’ (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 3) which indicates its broad product domain. 
The home loan market alone is already broad and may become redefined when 
economic conditions, housing industry and customer preferences are changes. The 
housing initiative side further increase the magnitude of its services’ range as   
suggested by the following statement. 
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Lead by the strategic vision of our Minister, the Hon. Jay Weatherill, MP, we 
will work toward addressing the issues that hinder access to suitable housing by 
building upon our current suite of innovative products, developing our 
community finance capacity and undertaking more affordable housing initiatives. 
(HomeStartAR  2005/06, p. 6) 
 
Accordingly HomeStart has a diverse range of customers with different needs and 
financial backgrounds. HomeStart Finance offers many home products, including 
home loan, Equitystart, advantage loan, Nunga loan, established graduate loan and 
more. As indicated in the capability section and statement above HomeStart is 
innovative in its housing initiative products and commercial products.  These features 
suggest that HomeStart is a prospector organisation. 
 
 Ergon Energy is considered to be a prospector organisation as well. This is 
because it has customer linking, general management, financial management, 
information technology (infrastructure and business), channel bonding and cost 
management capabilities, which match to a prospector organisations characteristics 
under Di Benedetto ad Song (2003), Snows and Hrebiniak (1980) and Contan et al 
(1989).  
 Ergon’s market domain is continuously redefining, as the National Electricity 
Market has progressively opened up to full competition in the retail market. As a 
result, Ergon acquired an ASX listed retail energy company to market its services in 
Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia. This was the ‘first acquisition of an 
ASX listed company by a Government Owned Corporation since 1998’ (ErgonAR 
2005/06, p. 28). However, the Queensland government by committed to full retail 
competition (FRC) considering selling off Ergon’s existing and newly acquired retail 
arms of the group. These changes will have tremendous effect on Ergon’s market and 
reduce it service range to distribution only. Ergon is committed to provide quality 
services to customers and be a cost effective provider. Ergon also prides itself on 
being the first national energy company to introduce state of the arts IT system. Thus, 
there is evidence of Ergon being a prospector organisation and progressively moving 
toward analyser and defender organisation. 
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 Following the same approaches to strategy classification, the remaining three 
GBEs, namely Rail Corporation, SA Water and PCQ are considered to be defender 
organisations.  
 
 The interview data strongly illuminates the nature of GBE’s strategic position 
and the applicability of the Miles and Snow (1978) strategic type. The Executive of 
GBE A comprehensively discussed on a few occasions his enterprises’ strategic 
position:  
‘is seldom first in and sometimes we are, sometimes we’re not but generally 
we’ll sat and see and then just get the feel from the market and then strictly move 
in. [A further comment is] we’re one of the first few to put in jumping pillows in 
the caravan park holiday village but some of other entrepreneurial things we 
quite often just sit back a fraction (Executive, GBE A, 2007).  
 
This is a description of a defender organisation. The Executive of GBE B stated that: 
  
We’re in a relatively specialised area of market being this provision of 
infrastructure and the supply of train control associated with that infrastructure 
and we don’t look much outside that (Executive, GBE B, 2008).  
 
This is again description of a defender organisation. 
  
5.3 THE MATCH BETWEEN CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGY AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO PERFORMANCE 
 
 Prior studies suggest that an organisation is expected to perform well on 
financial grounds when its capabilities are aligned with its strategy. The literature 
further contends that prospector, analyser and defender organisations have performed 
equally well and outperform reactor organisations (Miles and Snow 1978; Snow and 
Hrebiniak 1980; Conant et al, 1989; Smith et al 1986).  
 
 From the textual analysis of the selected GBEs, some matching nature 
between organisational capabilities and strategies is evident. The financial 
performance as recorded in the Income Statement of their annual reports is positive 
and increased in comparison to the prior year. This reinforces the literature in the 
GBE context. Further evidences can be found in the operation discussion section of 
the annual reports. For example, SA Water indicates that its expertise in the areas of 
procurement and contract management has saved it costs of over $500,000 
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(SAWaterAR 2005/06).   HomeStart Finance states explicitly that its financial result 
is ‘met through sustainable financial management and sound risk management 
practices’ (HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 6). It further claims that the increase in number 
of customers is the result of its innovative range of products and services 
(HomeStartAR 2005/06, p. 10). HomeStart’s channel bonding ability also contributes 
to its growth, especially in the regional housing initiatives. AdelaideShores also 
indicates some connection between its capabilities and financial performance. For 
example, it contended that its financial surplus for year was attributed to prudential 
financial management and its general management ability. Rail Corporation also 
provides some indications of the link between capability and financial performance. It 
indicates that its innovative capability improved service quality, safety and reliability 
boosts passenger journey number by 100,000 a week and fare box revenue by $3.3 
million (RailCorpAR 2005/06).   
 
As mention in the methodology chapter, the process in this chapter of 
establishing the match between capability and strategy and in turn, its relationship 
with performance is a qualitative assessment. It is open to interpretation by the 
researcher. Hence more attention will be placed on the findings from quantitative 
statistical analysis from closed-ended questionnaire data and accounting data to be 
presented in the next chapter.   
  
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
 The above findings provide confirmation of relevance of private-sector-
derived constructs of organisational capabilities and strategies in the context of GBEs. 
They also give credence to the importance of political and public accountabilities 
faced by GBEs. The findings point to the fact that capabilities derived in prior studies 
in the context of private-sector companies, do exist among GBEs. Hence, the 
organisational capabilities employed in prior studies can be used to develop scales 
through a survey questionnaire to measures these concepts among the GBEs selected 
for the study. Contextual differences discovered from the annual reports will be taken 
into consideration when development of the measurement items for capabilities in the 
questionnaire. The qualitative analysis in this chapter gives confidence to the 
researcher to extend the literature on organisational capabilities from the Plastics, 
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Semiconductors, Automotives, Air transportation, electronic manufacturing industries 
and Chinese SOEs used in prior studies (Di Benedetto and Song, 2003; Smith et al, 
1986; Conant et al, 1990), to the new context of Australian GBEs. 
 
  Another conclusion from this chapter relates to organisational strategy. The 
above findings indicate that GBEs’ strategies are developed following the adaptive 
strategy model. This perspective was developed in the literature for private sector 
organisations. The fact that GBEs will consider their State Government’s overall 
Strategic Plan does not limit the validity of the model adaptive strategy because 
another factor that GBEs need to balance in developing their own overall strategic 
plans. The strategy types of GBEs have been identified in this chapter as compatible 
with Miles and Snow’s (1978) schema. The conclusion is that GBEs can be 
meaningfully categorised into prospector, analyser and defender strategic type 
organisations. Further the chapter provides preliminary evidence of a positive 
relationship between capability and strategy match and financial performance of 
GBEs. These qualitative findings address the core framework of the current study and 
once again extent the literature to GBE the context.  
 133
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
SAMPLING, CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES AND 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the sample, dataset and 
variables used in the study. The analysis of the variables includes descriptive statistics 
and univariate analysis. For the questionnaire-data variables, validity, reliability and 
time-response-bias tests are also analysed. The analysis also includes comparative 
analysis with prior studies, theories and normative discussions.   
 
6.2 SAMPLING AND DATASET 
 
 A search for all GBEs in Australia has been conducted to determine the total 
number of GBEs across all government jurisdictions. The result provides a total of 
160 GBEs, but 16 GBEs are found to be unsuitable for this study.  The excluded 
GBEs comprise of 11 entities of a non-commercial nature, 3 GBEs no longer owned 
by their respective governments as of January 2008 and 2 GBEs with incomplete 
management structures (one does not have a management team and the other has no 
board of directors). Therefore, the GBE population applicable to this study is 144, and 
the sample used in the study is 141 GBEs, equivalent to 97% of the applicable 
population. There were a further three GBEs excluded because their annual reports 
were not accessible publicly.    
 
 Turning to the collection of primary data, the survey questionnaire was sent 
out in two stages. The first stage was in August 2008 and 423 survey questionnaires 
were sent to the 141 GBEs. Following common practices used in survey questionnaire 
data collection, three survey questionnaires were sent to three senior managers in a 
GBE.  At the end of this first period, 94 responses – a 21% response rate were 
received. A total number of 3 respondents did not identify their organisations, thus an 
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alignment with annual report data could not be made. This left 91 identifiable 
responses, representing 71 GBEs- approximately 50% of the sample applicable for 
data analysis. In order to maximise the coverage of number of GBEs in the responses, 
the follow up questionnaires were sent to GBEs that did not respond in the first stage. 
A total of 95 questionnaires were sent out to 31 GBEs in September 2008. At the end 
of the period 22 responses – a 23% response rate – were received. These responses 
represent 17 GBEs. Thus, at the end of the two mail-out periods a total of 115 
responses, representing 91 GBEs – 64% of the sample – were available for data 
analysis.  
 
 Therefore, the study uses two datasets, one from secondary data extracted 
from annual reports of GBEs for the analysis of the relationships between corporate 
governance and financial performance, and the other from primary data of 
questionnaire respondents used to for analysis of the relationships between capability 
and strategy match and both financial performance and accountability-emphasis and 
the relationship between governance and accountability-emphasis.  
   
6.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
 
 In this section, corporate governance variables i.e. board size, percentage of 
non-executive directors on the board (NED), percentage of politically related directors 
(PRD), percentage of financial-literate directors (FLD) and the board governance 
index (BGI) are profiled according to legal forms and industry types. This analysis 
will provide information on the distinctions of governance arrangements among 
different legal forms and industries. Moreover, univariate analysis between the 
corporate governance variables and the financial performance variable is conducted. 
 
 The study first uses one-way ANOVA to identify any significant distinctions 
within corporate governance variables among GBE’s legal forms. Table 6.1 indicates 
that, on average, the three forms of GBEs have similar number of directors on their 
boards and their boards comprise of similar proportions of FLDs. The F statistic and 
p-value of these variables indicates a rejection of the assumption that they come from 
different population. This result is interesting given that majority of finance 
corporation GBEs are of a statutory form and as indicated in Table 6.2, the proportion 
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of FLDs on finance corporation boards is significantly higher than other corporations. 
As well, the board size variable is not significantly different among industry types. 
 
TABLE 6.1 GOVERNANCE VARIABLES, LEGAL FORM AND ANOVA 
Variable Legal Form Mean Std. Deviation F Stat. and Sig.
BOARDSIZE Statutory Corporation 6.74 1.59 F = 2.554;  
Sig. = .081 State Owned Corporation 6.53 1.08
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001
7.50 1.65
 
NED Statutory Corporation .939 .089 F = 3.621; 
Sig. = .029 State Owned Corporation .893 .100
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001
.906 .063
 
PRD Statutory Corporation .133 .146 F = 3.199; 
Sig. = .044 State Owned Corporation .105 .132
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001
.045 .068
 
FLD Statutory Corporation .399 .247 F = .287; 
Sig. = .751 State Owned Corporation .379 .179
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001
.358 .182
 
BGI Statutory Corporation 6.85 1.36 F = 2.137; 
Sig. = .122 State Owned Corporation 6.78 1.13
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001
6.17 1.09
 
 In addition, the observed board sizes are significantly smaller than those of  
Canadian state-owned enterprises (Bozec, 2005) but fairly similar to board sizes of 
top Australian public listed companies (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  Turning to FLD, 
the observed proportion of FLDs on the board is significantly smaller than those of 
US companies of  similar board size (Chan and Li, 2008).  
 
Uhrig (2003), in his review of corporate governance of statutory authorities 
and office holders, suggests that the size of boards of commercial statutory authorities 
shall be arranged to add value to the organisation and shall take into account the 
authorities’ size, complexity and risk of operations and the needs of the board. The 
correlation analysis of board size with economic rate of return (ERR) indicates that 
board size does not correlate with ERR (see Table 6.3). Moreover, a negative 
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correlation sign is observed. This suggests that the current GBEs’ board sizes are not 
at a level to allow their boards to perform leadership roles in a way that positively 
adds economic value to the organisation.  
 
 The majority of authoritative bodies, namely ASX, Business Roundtable, 
OCED, Tasmania Treasury and Finance Department, NSW Audit Office and 
Queensland Treasury, suggest that the composition of the board of directors should 
comprise of non-executive directors and directors with suitable skills, background 
qualifications and experiences (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003; Business 
Roundtable, 2005; Department of Treasury and Finance, 1998; OECD, 2004; The 
Audit Office of New South Wales, 1998; Tasmania Treasury and Finance Department, 
1998; Queensland Department Treasury, 2005). Recently, financial expertise is 
portrayed as having a significant role to play in contributing to board leadership roles 
also (Chan and Li, 2008; DeZoort, 1997; Defond et al., 2005a; Deli and Gillian, 2008; 
Seng and Taylor, 2008b). The correlation analysis in Table 6.3 indicates that the 
proportion of FLDs is positively correlated with ERR. 
 
TABLE 6.2 GOVERNANCE VARIABLES, INDUSTRY TYPE AND ANOVA 
Variable Industry Type Mean Std. Deviation F Stat. and Sig.
BOARDSIZE Energy Corporation 6.82 1.29 F = 1.013;  
Sig. = .425 Port Corporation 6.45 1.82
Finance Corporation 7.06 1.83
Water Corporation 7.25 .844
Transport Corporation 6.00 1.82
Infrastructure Corporation 6.64 2.42
Tourism Corporation 6.62 .518
Other 6.75 1.32
 
NED Energy Corporation .898 .074 F = .575; 
Sig. = .775 Port Corporation .9398 .115
Finance Corporation .9061 .085
Water Corporation .9262 .078
Transport Corporation .9389 .081
Infrastructure Corporation .9431 .085
Tourism Corporation .9226 .144
Other .9330 .088
 
PRD Energy Corporation .0906 .110 F = .945; 
Sig. = .774 Port Corporation .1076 .142
Finance Corporation .1635 .159
Water Corporation .0792 .125
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Transport Corporation .1448 .133
Infrastructure Corporation .1623 .201
Tourism Corporation .1101 .167
Other .1203 .113
 
FLD Energy Corporation .4401 .185 F = 9.258; 
Sig. = .000 Port Corporation .2685 .196
Finance Corporation .6893 .243
Water Corporation .3211 .170
Transport Corporation .2888 .217
Infrastructure Corporation .2950 .121
Tourism Corporation .3333 .220
Other .4012 .165
 
BGI Energy Corporation 6.91 1.23 F = 4.591; 
Sig. = .000 Port Corporation 6.30 1.30
Finance Corporation 7.94 1.09
Water Corporation 6.07 1.08
Transport Corporation 7.00 1.49
Infrastructure Corporation 6.73 1.01
Tourism Corporation 6.38 .916
Other 6.88 .947
 
In contrast to board size and FLD, the proportion of NED and PRD on the 
board are significantly different among the legal forms and surprisingly not different 
among industry types. Table 6.1 shows that NEDs of state owned corporations (SOC) 
has the least NEDs out of the three forms. This could be explained by the fact that the 
majority of SOCs, 37% of SOCs in the sample, belong to NSW government and the 
majority of these SOCs have an internal governance practice of including at least one 
staff board member (evident from their annual reports). Nevertheless, the percentage 
of NEDs is not significantly different among industry types. The observed proportion 
of NED for each industry is in the top percentile, suggesting that all industries follow 
the authoritative guidelines. In addition, they are similar to those of Canadian SOEs 
and significantly higher than top Australian public listed companies (Bozec, 2005; 
Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The Pearson correlation result in Table 6.3 indicates that 
NED is not significantly correlated with ERR, however a positive sign is observed.  
 
 The proportion of PRDs is similar for statutory corporation and state-owned 
corporation types. However it is significantly lower for GBEs that are established 
under Corporation Act 2001. The governance arrangement guidelines for 
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Commonwealth GBEs require that departmental officers are appointed to the board 
only in exceptional circumstances, and this should be on the grounds of their ability to 
represent the interests of the government and their possession of business skills 
(Government Businesses Advice Branch, 1997). This suggests that the lower observed 
proportion of PRDs is due to the mis-matched between PRDs’ skills and the GBEs.  
Nevertheless, the proportion of PRDs is not significantly different among industry 
types. In addition, the observed level of PRDs is, on average, significantly higher than   
Canadian SOEs. The correlation analysis indicates a strong and positive correlation 
between PRD and ERR. 
 
TABLE 6.3 PEARSON CORRELATION OF GOVERNANCE VARIABLES WITH 
ERR 
 Board Size NED FLD PRD BGI ERR 
Board Size 1      
NED 
Sig.  
-.038 
.653 
1     
FLD 
Sig.  
.094 
.265 
-.132
.119
1    
PRD 
Sig.  
.011 
.901 
-.022
.796
.083
.329
1   
BGI 
Sig.  
-.340** 
.000 
-.092
.278
.654**
.000
.552**
.000
1  
ERR 
Sig.  
-.068 
.421 
.133
.117
.179*
.033
.292**
.000
.319** 
.000 
1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
 
 The board governance index (BGI) is a product of the four governance 
mechanisms discussed above. In comparison among legal forms, BGI is not 
significantly different; however it is significantly different among industry types. This 
suggests that the overall quality of board governance structures of GBEs is different 
even though some mechanisms are similar. The correlation matrix in Table 6.3 
indicates that BGI is positively and strongly correlated with ERR. This result, once 
again, infers that a combination of governance mechanisms provides a better 
indication of governance quality. 
 
 The correlation result also reveals that individual governance variables are not 
correlated with each other. Thus there is unlikely to be a multicollinearity problem 
when conducting multivariate analysis. Nevertheless, BGI, as expected, is correlated 
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with most of the individual governance variables. This may pose a problem when 
analysing the joint effect of BGI and individual governance variables on financial 
performance.  Consequently, appropriate statistical methods, namely mean-centred 
method (Song et al, 2007; Walker et al, 2003) will be employed to minimise this 
problem. 
 
6.4 ACCOUNTABILITY-EMPHASIS VARIABLE  
 
 This section tests the validity and reliability of the scales in the questionnaire 
used to measure the accountability-emphasis (ACCBTY) variable. In addition, it 
provides a test of non-response bias in the questionnaire data used to measure 
ACCBTY. Than an analysis is given on how dimensions of accountability-emphasis 
are perceived among GBE legal forms. A univariate analysis between governance 
variables and ACCBTY is also conducted. 
 
 The study uses factor analysis, principal components factoring, to validate the 
ACCBTY construct. Table 6.4 provides communalities for all attributes of the 
construct. The common variances of the attributes are at different levels, with the 
lowest variance value of .305 and the highest of .670. These variances indicate that 
there would be more than one factor to be extracted. A rotated factor matrix, using 
orthogonal rotation, is presented in Table 6.5 and provides two extractable factors. 
The first factor has Eigen-value of 3.04 and explains 38% of the total variance of all 
attributes. The second factor, on the other hand, only has Eigen-value of 1.53 and 
explains 19% of the total variance.  
 
TABLE 6.4 COMMUNALITIES  
Accountability attributes Initial Extraction 
Acct1 .619 .670 
Acct2 .614 .608 
Acct3 .442 .664 
Acct4 .587 .634 
Acct5 .354 .452 
Acct6 .679 .612 
Acct7 .663 .634 
Acct8 .308 .305 
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For the purpose of the current study only one factor is required, giving a single 
ACCBTY variable. The selected factor, thus, needs to represent all attributes and the 
purpose of ACCBTY. According to Brayman and Cramer (2005), a factor is selected 
through two stages of elimination. First, the selected factor is the one that has the 
greatest Eigen-value and thus explains the most variance of the attributes. In this case, 
the first factor is selected. Second, attributes that correlate less than 0.3 with a factor 
shall be omitted from consideration. This is because they account for less than 9 per 
cent of the variance and in turn don’t add a significant contribution to the factor. This 
resulted in omitting attributes Acct 3 and Acct 5 from factor one. In addition, the two 
items give emphasis to compliance oversight and accreditation requirements, which 
are not the major emphasis for managerial and public accountability-emphasis 
construct. 
TABLE 6.5 ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX 
Accountability attributes Factor 
1 2 
Acct1 .804 .156 
Acct7 .787 .117 
Acct6 .759 .189 
Acct2 .725 .288 
Acct4 .647 .456 
Acct8 .432 .343 
Acct3 .248 .776 
Acct5 .099 .665 
Extraction method: Principle Axis Factoring; Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization; 3 Rotations; Factor 1: Eigenvalue = 3.04; % of variance = 38 %; Factor 2: 
Eigenvalue = 1.53; % of variance = 19%; .Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test (excluded Acct3 
and Acct5) = .866 
 
 Therefore, the selected factor for the study contains six attributes. The omitted 
attributes, namely Acct3 and Acct5, were deemed to belong to managerial and public 
accountabilities emphases respectively. Hence, the selected factor still represents the 
same ratio as the original one. This in turn represents the ACCBTY construct well. 
 
 Turning to a reliability test of the measurement, the study uses Cronbach’s 
Alpha reliability test. The Cronbach’s Alpha of the selected factor is .866, indicating 
that the scales of the attributes are consistent with each other in measuring ACCBTY. 
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 Another test of the survey-based data concerns non-response bias. Table 6.6 
presents the ANOVA analysis of time-responses-bias test for ACCBTY variable. The 
result indicates that there isn’t any time response bias for the variable. 
TABLE 6.6 AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER RESPONSE AND ACCBTY 
Response Period No. Mean F Stat. and Sig.
August Reponses 95 5.38 F = .366; Sig. = .547
September Responses 24 5.27
Leven Stat. = .043; Sig. = .835 
 
The analysis of the distinctions of the accountability emphases among GBE 
legal forms is conducted using ANOVA. Table 6.7 provides the ANOVA results. First, 
the means indicates that all emphases are highly regarded as measures to discharge 
accountability requirements by all legal forms, namely statutory corporation, state-
owned corporation and GBEs under Corporation Act 2001.  
 
TABLE 6.7 RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY-EMPHASIS 
AND LEGAL FORMS 
Variable Legal Form Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Stat. 
and Sig.
Highly responsible to ensure 
the achievement of efficiency 
and effectiveness outcomes 
Statutory Corporation 5.70 .492 F =  
1.302;  
Sig. 
= .276 
State Owned Corporation 5.64 .492 
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001
5.40 1.392 
 
Sets clear operating targets 
that integrate with broader 
strategic goals 
Statutory Corporation 5.54 .695 F = .525;
Sig. 
= .593 
State Owned Corporation 5.59 .503 
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001
5.35 1.387 
 
Monitor the quality of service 
delivery through the use of 
relevant non-financial 
performance measures 
Statutory Corporation 5.23 .871 F = .518;
Sig. 
= .597 
State Owned Corporation 5.45 .800 
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001
5.15 1.694 
 
Strong emphasis on providing 
excellent service and 
responsiveness to customer 
enquiries and complaints 
Statutory Corporation 5.33 .944 F = .439;
Sig. 
= .606 
State Owned Corporation 5.14 .834 
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001
5.15 1.387 
 
Consider customer and the 
public’s feedback into the 
provision of services/product 
and operation of the 
organization 
Statutory Corporation 5.34 .866 F = .481;
Sig. 
= .620 
State Owned Corporation 5.18 .733 
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001 
5.15 1.268 
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Provide considerable public 
information about the 
organization’s services, 
projects and plans to 
customers and the public. 
Statutory Corporation 5.24 .999 F = .809;
Sig. 
= .448 
State Owned Corporation 4.95 1.046 
Company under 
Corporation Act 2001 
5.05 .999 
 
 
All legal forms place great emphasis on discharging their accountability 
requirements with average performance scores of 5 and above on a 1 to 6 scale. This 
is a desirable result as it indicates that GBEs’ legal form is not a factor driving 
commitments to discharge accountability requirements. In addition, it provides 
empirical support to arguments pose by Bottomley (2001); Thynne (1998a; 1998b), 
Luke (2008) Wettenhall (1998) and Ramanadham (1986) that a factor driving GBEs’ 
accountability is their ‘publicness’ as organisations owned by government and 
ultimately the public not their legal structures.  
 
This favourable result may come with a cost to GBEs’ financial performance.  
This is because GBEs operate in an environment that requires them to achieve 
financial performance and fulfil accountability requirements (Thynne, 1998a; 
Bottomley, 2001; Thynne, 1998b; Luke, 2008); hence diverting resources to achieve 
accountability requirements may result in depletion of available resources and thus 
constrain them from achieving their financial targets. 
 
TABLE 6.8 PEARSON CORRELATION OF GOVERNANCE VARIABLES WITH 
ACCBTY 
 ACCBTY 
Board Size 
Sig. 
.187* 
.045
NED 
Sig. 
-.038 
.684
PRD 
Sig. 
.003
.978
FLD 
Sig. 
.121
.197
BGI 
Sig. 
.064
.497
ACCBTY 1
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
 
 The Pearson correlation analysis is presented in Table 6.8. It indicates that all 
governance variables except for board size are not significantly correlated to 
ACCBTY. Board size has a positive relationship with ACCBTY. The comparison of 
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this result with the correlation analysis in Table 6.3 indicates that a governance 
arrangement that adds value in financial term does not add value in term of ACCBTY. 
In other words, a different governance configuration is required to facilitate the 
achievement of ACCBTY.  
 
6.5 CAPABILITY VARIABLES   
 
 This section consists of four parts. The first part discusses the validity and 
reliability of the questionnaire scales used to measure the inside-out (I-O) and outside-
in (O-I) capabilities groups. The second and third parts discuss the strengths of each 
capability among industry types and Miles and Snow’s (1987) strategic positions. 
Lastly, a univariate analysis between I-O, O-I, ERR and ACCBTY is conducted. 
 
 Similar to ACCBTY construct, both I-O and O-I questionnaires are validated 
with principal components factor analysis. Table 6.9 to Table 6.12 provide the 
communalities and factor matrix for the I-O and O-I respectively. The I-O capabilities 
load onto to one factor. This is consistent with prior studies (Song et al., 2007; Di 
Benedetto and Song, 2003; Desarbo et al., 2005) that used Day’s (1994) I-O. The 
factor has an Eigen-value of 2.57 and explains 51.49% of the total variance of the 
attributes. 
TABLE 6.9 COMMUNALITIES 
I-O Capabilities Initial Extraction 
Cost Management Capability .291 .264 
Monitor Predict Technological Changes .637 .656 
Technology Development and Innovation .652 .646 
Product Services Transformation Process .545 .663 
Financial Management Capability .337 .346 
 
TABLE 6.10 FACTOR MATRIX 
I-O Capabilities Factor  
Product Services Transformation Process .814 
Monitor Predict Technological Changes .810 
Technology Development and Innovation .804 
Financial Management Capability .558 
Cost Management Capability .514 
Extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring; 1 factor extracted; 7 iterations;  
Eigenvalue = 2.57; % of variance = 51.49%; Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test = .833 
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TABLE 6.11 COMMUNALITIES  
O-I Capabilities Initial Extraction 
Customer linking capability   .447 .623 
Creating Supplier Durable Relationship Capability  .360 .398 
Channel Bonding Capability  .366 .444 
Ability to Retain Customers  .368 .439 
Market Sensing Capability  .321 .382 
 
 
TABLE 6.12 FACTOR MATRIX 
O-I Capabilities Extraction 
Customer linking capability   .789 
Creating Supplier Durable Relationship Capability  .666 
Channel Bonding Capability  .663 
Ability to Retain Customers  .631 
Market Sensing Capability  .618 
Extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring; 1 factor extracted; 7 iterations;  
Eigenvalue = 2.28; % of variance = 45.73%; Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test = .80 
  
 The O-I capabilities also load onto a single factor. Once again this result is 
consistent with prior studies. The factor explains 44.73% of the total variances of the 
attributes.  
 
The Cronbach’s Alpha reliability statistics for each construct is .833 and .80, 
indicating that the scales used for measuring them generate data that are consistent 
with each other. The combination of validity and reliability tests confirms, on top of 
the outcomes of the textual analysis and interviews in the previous chapter, that 
constructs developed in the private sector context are applicable to a GBE context as 
well.  
  
The time-response-bias test for both I-O and O-I capabilities contructs are 
provided in Tables 6.13 and 6.14. The results indicated that there isn’t any time-
response-bias in the data for these constructs.  
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TABLE 6.13 AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER RESPONSES AND I-O 
Response Period No. Mean F Stat. and Sig.
August Reponses 95 4.76 F = .830; Sig. = .364
September Responses 24 4.60
Leven Stat. = .823; Sig. = .366 
 
TABLE 6.14 AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER RESPONSE AND O-I 
Response Period No. Mean F Stat. and Sig.
August Reponses 95 4.89 F = .601; Sig. = .440
September Responses 24 4.76
Leven Stat. = .787; Sig. = .337 
  
The study uses one-way ANOVA to analyse the strengths of each I-O and O-I 
capability among GBE industry types. Breaking down the I-O and O-I capability 
groups into individual capabilities and analyse them individually removes the 
normalising factor and in turn allows for better analysis of the capability strengths of 
each industry types. 
  
The ANOVA results in Table 6.15 and Table 6.16 indicate that the strengths 
of five of the eight capabilities are significantly different among industry types. The 
“financial management capability” is significantly different among industry types and, 
as expected, the finance corporations are stronger in managing their financial affairs 
than other corporations. The transport corporations have the least financial 
management ability. Nevertheless, a majority of the corporations has strong to very 
strong financial management capability.   
 
TABLE 6.15 RELATIVE I-O CAPABILITIES AND INDUSTRY TYPES 
Variable Industry Type Mean Std. Deviation F Stat. and Sig.
Financial 
Management 
capability 
Energy Corporation 5.29 .772 F = 4.589;  
Sig. = .000 Port Corporation 5.18 .751
Finance Corporation 5.83 .389
Water Corporation 5.35 .573
Transport Corporation 3.57 1.902
Infrastructure Corporation 5.00 1.323
Tourism Corporation 5.57 .535
Other 5.08 .935
 
Cost control 
capability 
Energy Corporation 4.94 .899 F = .731; 
Sig. = .646 Port Corporation 4.82 .982
Finance Corporation 5.00 .739
Water Corporation 4.96 .706
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Transport Corporation 4.43 1.512
Infrastructure Corporation 4.89 1.054
Tourism Corporation 5.43 .535
Other 4.81 .939
 
Ability to 
monitor and 
predict 
technological 
changes in the 
industry 
Energy Corporation 4.76 .903 F = 1.739; 
Sig. = .108 Port Corporation 4.73 .786
Finance Corporation 4.00 1.477
Water Corporation 4.78 .671
Transport Corporation 4.00 .690
Infrastructure Corporation 4.22 .833
Tourism Corporation 4.14 1.069
Other 4.54 1.029
 
Technology 
development 
(know how) 
and 
Innovation 
capability 
Energy Corporation  4.59 1.121 F = 1.573 ; 
Sig. =  .152 Port Corporation  4.73 .905
Finance Corporation  4.17 1.467
Water Corporation  4.52 .898
Transport Corporation  3.43 1.134
Infrastructure Corporation  4.33 .866
Tourism Corporation  4.43  1.134
Other  4.73 .874
 
Product or 
Service 
Transformation 
processes 
Energy Corporation  4.94  .899 F = 2.149 ; 
Sig. = .045 Port Corporation  4.27  1.009
Finance Corporation  4.17  1.337
Water Corporation  4.74  .915
Transport Corporation  3.43  .976
Infrastructure Corporation  4.44  1.014
Tourism Corporation  4.71  1.113
Other  4.50   .906
 
 Another capability that is significantly different among the industry types is 
“product or service transformation process capability”. The energy corporations have 
the strongest “product or service transformation process capability” and the transport 
corporations have the weakest. These results are expected as products provided by 
energy corporations involve many process transformation stages i.e. generation, 
distributions and retailing.  
 
TABLE 6.16 RELATIVE O-I CAPABILITIES AND INDUSTRY TYPES 
Variable Industry Type Mean Std. Deviation F Stat. and Sig.
Customer-
linking 
capability   
Energy Corporation 5.06 .899 F = 3.164;  
Sig. = .004 Port Corporation 5.18 1.168
Finance Corporation 5.00 1.044
Water Corporation 5.09 .668
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Transport Corporation 3.29 1.254
Infrastructure Corporation 4.78 .972
Tourism Corporation 5.00 .000
Other 4.69 1.192
 
Capability to 
create durable 
relationships 
with suppliers   
Energy Corporation 5.06 .659 F = .817; 
Sig. = .575 Port Corporation 4.64 1.027
Finance Corporation 5.08 .669
Water Corporation 4.87 .694
Transport Corporation 4.43 1.512
Infrastructure Corporation 5.00 1.000
Tourism Corporation 5.00 .577
Other 5.08 .796
 
Channel-
bonding 
capability 
Energy Corporation 4.59 .795 F = 1.101; 
Sig. = .368 Port Corporation 4.45 1.128
Finance Corporation 4.75 .866
Water Corporation 4.35 .832
Transport Corporation 4.00 .577
Infrastructure Corporation 4.00 .500
Tourism Corporation 4.43 .706
Other 4.54 .706
 
Ability to 
retain 
customers 
Energy Corporation 5.12 .781 F = 2.978; 
Sig. = .007 Port Corporation 5.45 .688
Finance Corporation 5.17 1.193
Water Corporation 5.74 .752
Transport Corporation 4.00 1.414
Infrastructure Corporation 5.00 1.000
Tourism Corporation 5.00 1.155
Other 4.96 1.038
 
Market 
sensing 
capability 
Energy Corporation 4.59 .870 F = 2.254; 
Sig. = .036 Port Corporation 5.27 .647
Finance Corporation 5.08 1.084
Water Corporation 4.83 .887
Transport Corporation 3.86 1.215
Infrastructure Corporation 5.00 .500
Tourism Corporation 5.29 .756
Other 4.81 .895
 
 The other capabilities that differ significantly among industry types are 
“customer linking capability”, “ability to retain customers” and “market sensing 
capabilities”. The ANOVA results also indicate that, on average, the transport 
corporations have the least strengths in all capabilities. According to Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) strategic position and prior empirical studies (Snow and Hrebiniak, 
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1980; Conant et al., 1990; Smith et al., 1986; Song et al., 2007; Slater and Narver, 
1993), the transport corporations have the characteristics of a reactor strategic focused 
organisation, which means an unsystematic approach to strategy setting and a poorly 
developed capability pattern. The crosstabulation of strategic position and industry 
types in Table 6.21 confirms this expectation as it provided that reactors strategic 
position accounts for 75% of the entire transport corporations. 
 
 Turing to the relative strength of I-O and O-I capabilities among strategic 
positions, Table 6.17 provides the ANOVA results. It indicates that the I-O and O-I 
capabilities are significantly different among types of strategic position. A Post Hoc, 
Turkey HSD, multiple comparisons test is provided in Table 6.18. 
 
TABLE 6.17 RELATIVE I-O AND O-I AND STRATEGIC POSITIONS 
Capability Strategic Position Mean F Stat. and Sig.
Inside-Out:  
 
Defender 4.87 F = 3.236;  
Sig. = .025 Prospector 5.04
Analyser 4.64
Reactor 3.85
 
Outside-In:  Defender 5.24 F = 8.500; 
Sig. = .000 Prospector 4.93 
Analyser 4.84 
Reactor 3.45 
 
TABLE 6.18 TURKEY HSD POST HOC TEST: MULTIPLE COMPARISONS 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
Strategy
(J) 
Strategy 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J)
Std. 
Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound
INSIDE-
OUT 
Defender Prospector -.17375 .20508 .832 -.7084 .3609
Analyser .22238 .18466 .625 -.2590 .7038
Reactor 1.02000 .39407 .052 -.0073 2.0473
Prospector Defender .17375 .20508 .832 -.3609 .7084
Analyser .39613 .15618 .060 -.0110 .8033
Reactor 1.19375* .38156 .012 .1990 2.1885
Analyser Defender -.22238 .18466 .625 -.7038 .2590
Prospector -.39613 .15618 .060 -.8033 .0110
Reactor .79762 .37098 .144 -.1695 1.7648
Reactor Defender -1.02000 .39407 .052 -2.0473 .0073
Prospector -1.19375* .38156 .012 -2.1885 -.1990
Analyser -.79762 .37098 .144 -1.7648 .1695
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OUTSIDE-
IN 
Defender Prospector .30875 .18044 .323 -.1617 .7792
Analyser .39556 .16247 .076 -.0280 .8191
Reactor 1.79000* .34672 .000 .8861 2.6939
Prospector Defender -.30875 .18044 .323 -.7792 .1617
Analyser .08681 .13742 .922 -.2714 .4450
Reactor 1.48125* .33571 .000 .6061 2.3564
Analyser Defender -.39556 .16247 .076 -.8191 .0280
Prospector -.08681 .13742 .922 -.4450 .2714
Reactor 1.39444* .32640 .000 .5435 2.2454
Reactor Defender -1.79000* .34672 .000 -2.6939 -.8861
Prospector -1.48125* .33571 .000 -2.3564 -.6061
Analyser -1.39444* .32640 .000 -2.2454 -.5435
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
 
 
The combination of the ANOVA and Post Hoc tests indicates that the 
prospector-GBEs have stronger I-O capabilities than the analysers and reactors but are 
not significant different from the defenders. The prospectors, however, still have a 
slightly stronger strength than the defenders. This result is supported by the Resource 
Base View (RBV), as it contends that a prospector organisation needs to have strong 
I-O capabilities strength in order to sustain its competitive philosophy as first-in-
market strategy. This is a strategy that required the prospectors to develop new 
technologies, products and markets rapidly to address the latent market needs (Walker 
et al., 2003; Song et al., 2007). On a relative basis, the RBV suggests that a prospector 
organisation has stronger I-O capabilities than a defender organisation. The observed 
result is also consistent with prior findings (Song et al., 2007; Di Benedetto and Song, 
2003).  
 
 On the O-I side, the above results indicate that the defender-GBEs, on average, 
have stronger O-I capabilities than the analysers and reactors, but not significantly 
different from the prospectors. Nevertheless, the defenders have a slightly stronger O-
I capabilities than the prospectors. This result is again supported by the RBV, as it 
contends that defender organisations need to have thorough understanding of their 
niche market, which includes customer needs and market changes, in order for them 
to sustain a competitive basis of maintaining their dominant position in the market 
(Song et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2003). Therefore, the defenders shall have stronger 
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O-I than the prospectors. Similar to the I-O capabilities, the O-I result is consistent 
with Song et al. (2007) and Di Beneditto and Song (2003).  
 
The analyser-GBE, given its strategic position as in-between prospector and 
defender (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Miles and Snow, 1978; Song et al., 2007), are 
expected to share I-O and O-I capabilities. This expectation is to some extent 
supported by the above results.   The result on reactor-GBEs is supported by Miles 
and Snow (1978) and prior findings (Smith et al., 1986; Conant et al., 1990).   
 
The results from Table 6.18 also provide a finding that is unique in the GBE 
context – i.e. not observed in prior studies (Song et al., 2007; Desarbo et al., 2005; Di 
Benedetto and Song, 2003; Hambrick, 1983; Smith et al., 1986). It is evident that, 
except for the defender strategic position, there is little difference among the I-O and 
O-I capabilities for the strategic positions.  This suggests that GBEs develop and 
perceive both capabilities groups as important factors in their operations. 
 
Moving to correlation analysis of the relationship among ERR, ACCBTY and 
I-O and O-I, Table 6.19 provides the correlation result. The result in Table 6.19 
provides several interesting insights. First, it indicates that I-O and O-I are positively 
correlated with each other, which supports the above findings. 
 
TABLE 6.19 PEARSON CORRELATION OF ACCBTY, ERR, I-O AND O-I 
 ACCBTY ERR I-O O-I 
ACCBTY 1
Sig.   
ERR .032 1
Sig.  .736  
I-O .648** .094 1
Sig.  .000 .319  
O-I .535** .026 .617** 1
Sig. .000 .779 .000
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 
 Second, it indicates that the I-O and O-I capabilities are positively correlated 
with accountability-emphasis (ACCBTY). This result suggests that GBEs develop and 
use their capabilities as tools to discharge their accountability requirements. Another 
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insight provided by the correlation outcome is that both capabilities groups are not 
correlated with financial performance (ERR). The comparison of this result with the 
correlation results in Table 6.8 and Table 6.3 reveals that GBEs may face a trade off 
in terms of achieving ACCBTY and ERR. It found, on one hand, that a governance 
arrangement positively correlated with ERR is not correlated with ACCBTY. On the 
other hand, the capabilities that positively correlated with ACCBTY are not correlated 
with ERR. The difficulty of balancing financial performance and the need to fulfil 
accountability requirements has been thoroughly discussed in authoritative guidelines, 
discussions on GBEs operating environment and empirical studies (Thynne, 1998b, 
1998a; Bottomley, 2001; Wettenhall, 1998; Barret, 2000).  Thynne (1998b) provides 
the following remark on GBEs’ operating environment: 
The establishment and operation of a company in government requires that 
some form of balance be achieved between and among a number of 
opposing forces. The most apparent of these involve the demands 
of…economic efficiency leading to wealth maximization (in pursuit of 
clearly defined commercial objectives) and price-capping on the goods 
and services provided (as a means of being socially responsible or 
discharging what are referred to as community service obligations). 
 
 
6.6 STRATEGIC POSITION 
 
This section presents the distribution of GBEs among Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
strategic positions or strategy-types. In addition, it provides an analysis of the relative 
performance of each strategic position in term of financial performance and 
accountability-emphasis (ERR and ACCBTY). 
 
The distribution of GBEs among Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic position is 
conducted using crosstabulation distribution. Table 6.20 presents the distribution 
output. It indicates that a majority of GBEs adopt an analyser strategic position, 
followed by prospector, defender and reactor strategic positions respectively. Given 
GBEs’ ownership structure and operational environment, this distribution pattern is 
expected.  The head of corporate services of GBEA, in an interview, indicates the 
influence of operation environment and ownership structure on strategy setting as 
follow: 
Well I rated us as strategic type three [analyser]…the first one [defender] 
I think that limitations because of what we can and can’t do. The second 
one [prospector] can be a bit political in that first it can be to the 
 152
detriment of  private industry. So therefore three [analyser] can sit 
really well… 
 
 
In terms of individual industries, only the distribution pattern of the Transport 
and the Other industries is consistent with Miles and Snow’s (1978) original finding, 
which contended that the four strategic positions exist in an industry.  
 
 The study uses one-way ANOVA to determine the relative performance of 
each strategic position. The result of the analysis is presented in Table 6.20 and 
indicates that, on average, GBEs adopting defender, prospector and analyser strategic 
positions will perform equally well and better than the reactor GBEs in term of 
ACCBTY.  
 
 
TABLE 6.20 RELATIVE ACCBTY, ERR AND STRATEGIC TYPE 
Performance Strategic Type Mean St. Deviation F Stat. and Sig.
ACCBTY Defender 5.50 .555 F = 13.80;  
Sig. =.000 Prospector 5.39 .568
Analyser 5.39 .536
Reactor 3.37 1.90
 
ERR Defender .136 .234 F = 1.33;  
Sig. = .267 Prospector .130 .145
Analyser .083 .111
Reactor .034 .053
  
 Turning to ERR, the four strategic types are not significantly different. 
However, on average, the defenders, prospectors and analysers have higher ERR than 
the reactors. These results are consistent with Miles and Snow’s (1987) original 
findings and prior empirical studies (Smith et al., 1986; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; 
Song et al., 2007; Shoham et al., 2002; Miles and Snow, 1978).  
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TABLE 6.21 STRATEGIC POSITION AND INDUSTRY TYPE 
   Industry
Total   Energy Port Finance Water Transport Infrastructure Other Tourism
Strategic 
positions 
Defender Count 5 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 19 
% within Strategy 26.3% 15.8% 15.8% 5.3% 5.3% 10.5% 15.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
% within Industry 27.8% 27.3% 25.0% 4.2% 14.3% 22.2% 11.1% 14.3% 16.5% 
Prospector Count 1 2 1 6 1 6 10 5 32 
% within Strategy 3.1% 6.2% 3.1% 18.8% 3.1% 18.8% 31.2% 15.6% 100.0% 
% within Industry 5.6% 18.2% 8.3% 25.0% 14.3% 66.7% 37.0% 71.4% 27.8% 
Analyser Count 12 6 8 17 2 1 13 1 60 
% within Strategy 20.0% 10.0% 13.3% 28.3% 3.3% 1.7% 21.7% 1.7% 100.0% 
% within Industry 66.7% 54.5% 66.7% 70.8% 28.6% 11.1% 48.1% 14.3% 52.2% 
Reactor Count 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 4 
% within Strategy .0% .0% .0% .0% 75.0% .0% 25.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Industry .0% .0% .0% .0% 42.9% .0% 3.7% .0% 3.5% 
Total Count 18 11 12 24 7 9 27 7 115 
% within Strategy 15.7% 9.6% 10.4% 20.9% 6.1% 7.8% 23.5% 6.1% 100.0% 
% within Industry 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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6.7 CONCLUSION  
 
 The current study uses a sample of 141 GBEs, representing 97% of the GBE 
population, in order to conduct empirical analysis on relationships between corporate 
governance and financial performance. This sample is reduced to 91 GBEs, 
representing 64% of the sample in light of the response rate to the mail questionnaire. 
The reduced sample is used to conduct analysis of the relationships between 
capabilities-strategy match (CSM) and accountability-emphasis, as well as interaction 
relationships between CSM and corporate governance with financial performance and 
accountability-emphasis.   
 
 The ANOVA of the governance variables indicates that, except for financial 
literate directors and the board governance index, all variables are significantly 
different among GBE legal forms. This result is supported by prior studies, normative 
discussions and authoritative guidelines. In addition, all governance variables, except 
for board size, are positive correlated with financial performance. For emphasis 
placed on processes and systems for discharging accountability requirements, there 
isn’t any distinction among legal forms. All GBEs place great emphasis on 
discharging their accountability requirements. The accountability-emphasis is 
correlated (positively) with board size only.  
 
Turning to capabilities variables, significant differences are observed among 
industry types. Such differences are expected as different industries require different 
capabilities. The relative strength of inside-out and outside-in capabilities among 
Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic positions is consistent with prior studies and the 
RBV. The correlation analysis between the governance, capabilities and both 
performance variables suggests that GBEs may face  a trade off situation, where the 
achievement of financial performance may come at a cost of accountability 
requirements or vice versa.  
 
Lastly, the relative performances (in term of ERR and ACCBTY) among the 
four strategic positions are consistent with Miles and Snow’s (1987) original finding 
and prior empirical studies.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter presents the findings of three sets of multivariate analyses 
associated with the hypotheses developed in chapter 3. The first analysis looks at 
impacts of corporate governance (i.e. board governance configurations) on financial 
performance and accountability-emphasis. The results from this analysis provide 
empirical findings to test hypothesis 1. The second and third sets of analysis examine 
the effects on performance of strategy-capabilities match and the moderating affects 
of board governance arrangements on strategy-capabilities match, respectively. The 
results from these second and third sets of analysis provide empirical evidence to 
answer hypotheses 2 and 3. 
  
This chapter also draws on prior empirical findings, textual analysis of the 
interviews and the open-ended questionnaire to provide a deeper and more integrated 
discussion of the multivariate analysis results. 
 
7.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD GOVERNANCE AND 
PERFORMANCE 
 
The affects of board governance arrangements on financial performance and 
accountability-emphasis is analysed using multiple regressions. 
 
7.2.1 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BOARD GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE  
 
 The impact of the governance arrangements on financial performance is 
analysed first. The empirical models to be tested are as follow. 
 
ERR = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY + β 4 JURISDIC + ε (6) 
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ERR  = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY +β 4 JURISDIC 
 +β 5 BORDSIZE + β 6 NED + β 7 PRD + β 8 FLD + ε    (7) 
 
ERR = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY +β 4 JURISDIC 
  +β 5 BGI + ε         (8) 
 
 The regression result for Model (6) is presented in Table 7.1. The result 
indicates that all control variables have no significant relationships with ERR. The t 
statistics of the variables are low and less than the t critical of α = .025 at 4 degree of 
freedom (df) (two-tailed test) of 1.39. The F statistic and p-value of the model also 
indicate no significant relationship between the variables and ERR. This result is 
expected as these specific organisational characteristics were not hypothesised to have 
an impact on firms’ performance. Thynne and Ariff (1990) and Seng and Taylor 
(2008b) also find such organisational characteristics have no relationships with 
performance in government-owned enterprises. 
  
 
TABLE 7.1 MODEL (6) CONTROL VARIABLES AND ERR 
DV = ERR 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) .116 .067  1.739 .084   
ORGSIZE -1.030E-8 .000 -.102 -1.178 .241 .974 1.026
LEGALFM .007 .020 .033 .367 .714 .882 1.134
INDUSTRY .017 .044 .033 .387 .699 .985 1.015
JURISDIC -.004 .006 -.062 -.679 .498 .861 1.161
Model Summary: R = .125; R 2 = .016; Adj. R 2 = -.013; Durbin Watson = 2.070; F Stat. = .540;
Sig. = .707  
 
  
 Turning to the relationships between individual governance variables and ERR, 
the regression determining their relationships, i.e. Model (7), is presented in Table 7.3. 
The basic assumptions of the model are discussed in Table 7.2.  
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TABLE 7.2 MODEL (7) BASIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
Key assumptions Description Discussion Satisfied/ 
Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity 
among independent 
variables (IVs) 
Multicollinearity exists 
when there is strong 
correlation or linear 
relationship among IVs. 
The presence of 
multicollinearity leads 
to an unstable predictor 
equation. In other 
words, the estimated 
value of the regression 
coefficients will be 
unstable from sample to 
sample. 
There are several ways 
to identify 
multicollinearity; SPSS 
provides variance 
inflation factor (VIF) 
indicator of 
multicollinearity. The 
cut-off VIF score is at a 
different level 
according to different 
researchers. According 
to Field (2005), when 
VIF is greater than 2 
then multicollinearity 
exists among the IVs. 
Mayers (1990), on the 
other hand, suggests 
that the point of 
concern should be 10 
and above. 
Table 7.3 
indicates that the 
VIF scores for 
all IVs are 
around 1. Hence 
it is safe to say 
that Model (7) 
meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Homoscedasticity 
exists when the residual 
terms variances are 
constant. When this 
assumption is violated 
the conventional t –test 
for regression 
estimators can no 
longer be justified 
(Berry, 1993).  
This assumption can be 
detected by looking at a 
scatter plot of the 
standardised residual 
(Y-axis) and 
standardized predicted 
value (X-axis). When 
residual are plotted in 
random and there is a 
dispersed pattern, then 
homoscedasticity is 
assumed (Field, 2005). 
Figure 7.1 
provides the 
residual scatter 
plot for the 
model. It looks 
randomly plotted 
and in a 
dispersed 
pattern, hence it 
is safe to say that 
this assumption 
is met. 
Linearity This assumption 
requires that the IVs 
have a linear 
relationship with the 
DV. If linearity is not 
present then linear 
regression is not the 
right model to analyse 
the data. 
This assumption can be 
detected in the same 
way as 
homoscedasticity. 
From figure 7.1, 
this assumption 
is met. 
Normality This assumption 
required the residuals 
of the model to be 
randomly distributed 
with mean of zero. A 
significant violation of 
the normality 
assumption leads to 
This assumption can be 
detected by looking at a 
histogram and normal 
probability plot (P-P). 
If the histogram has a 
bell shaped curve then 
the residual is normally 
distributed. On the P-P 
Figure 7.2 
indicates that the 
residuals are 
distributed 
roughly 
normally. There 
is a little positive 
skewness. The P-
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significant statistics 
becoming unreliable. 
plot, if the residuals are 
plotted along the 45 
degree line then it is 
normally distributed 
(Field, 2005).  
P plot in figure 
7.2 also indicates 
normality and 
positive 
skewness.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (7) meets the assumptions. 
  
  
 
FIGURE 7.1 SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- GOVERNANCE 
VARIABLES AND ERR  
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FIGURE 7.2 HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- 
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES AND ERR 
 
 
FIGURE 7.3 NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT- GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
AND ERR 
 
 
 
 
 According to the Gauss-Markov Theorem, satisfying the above assumptions  
(except for independence errors) is required in order for the least square estimators (β) 
to be the best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) of the of the parameter in a multiple 
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regression model (Hill et al., 2001). Therefore, the regression result of model (7) can 
be used to analyse the impacts of the governance variables on ERR without bias. The 
discussion of these basic multiple regression assumptions is carried out for each 
multiple regression analysis in this chapter. However, to avoid repeating the above 
details in full only an indication of whether each model meets the assumptions or not 
is provided in the rest of this chapter and the detailed discussion is provided in the 
appendix. 
 
 
 From the model that includes the hypothesised board governance variables, 
the regression results in Table 7.3 indicate that three of the governance variables have 
a significant relationship with ERR. The proportion of non-executive directors (NED) 
and the proportion of financial-literature directors (FLD) are statistically significant at 
p-value < .05; and the proportion of politically-related directors (PRD) is significant 
at p-value < .01. Their t statistics are greater than the t critical at α = .05 (right tailed 
test, df = 8) of 1.86. All of these independent variables have positive relationships 
with performance, which as expected. The coefficients of the parameters (i.e. β) are 
significantly large, suggesting a unit change in the variables will have significant 
impact on ERR. In contrast, Board size has no significant relationship with ERR. 
However, it has a negative coefficient. The F test of the model is also significant, with 
p-value < .01. These results are similar to the correlation result in the previous chapter, 
except for NED as it has no significant correlation with ERR in the Pearson 
correlation analysis. 
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 First, the positive relationship between NED and ERR suggests that the 
inclusion of NED on the board improves board monitoring tasks. Non-executive 
directors, being more independent from the management, are in a position to raise 
questions and call for thorough checks on management proposals put forward by 
executive management to the board. There are usually not inherent conflicts of 
interest to deviate NEDs off course in performing their task efficiently and effectively. 
This finding is consistent with predictions in agency theory about the behaviour of 
NEDs (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Moreover, it is consistent with the majority of 
authoritative guidelines in both realms of private and public sectors (Tasmania 
Treasury & Finance, 1998; NSW Treasury, 1991; ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2003; Business Roundtable, 2005; Government Businesses Advice Branch, 
1997; Queensland Treasury, 2005). The result is also consistent with a majority of 
prior studies on the impact of board composition on performance, namely Seng and 
Taylor (2008b); Andres and Vallelado (2008); Weir et al, (2002) and Cottier et al. 
(1997).  
 
 Second, the empirical finding on the relationship between politically-related 
directors (PRD) and ERR in the context of Australia GBEs is a new contribution to 
governance studies. The positive relationship between PRDs and ERR provides 
empirical evidence to several normative discussions in the realm of public 
TABLE 7.3 MODEL (7) INDIVIDUAL BOARD GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
AND ERR 
DV = ERR 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) -.281 .161  -1.748 .083   
ORGSIZE -1.155E-8 .000 -.114 -1.429 .155 .967 1.034
LEGALFM .034 .019 .154 1.778 .078 .821 1.217
INDUSTRY .029 .041 .056 .707 .481 .972 1.028
JURISDIC -.006 .006 -.084 -.945 .346 .775 1.290
BOARDSIZE -.012 .008 -.111 -1.382 .169 .957 1.045
NED .364 .147 .206 2.485 .014 .897 1.114
PRD .373 .093 .322 4.002 .000 .948 1.055
FLD .142 .058 .200 2.438 .016 .915 1.093
Model Summary: R = .463; R 2 = .190; Adj. R 2 = .141; Durbin-Watson = 2.089; F Stat = 3.867; 
Sig. = .000 
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administration (Wettenhall, 2001; Thynne, 1998a, 1998b; Seidman, 1968; Peres, 
1968). The argument, supported by the result in Table 7.3, is that PRDs create a vital 
organisational link between the GBE’s management and the GBE’s responsible 
minister(s) who represent(s) the government shareholder. Such a link is vital to the 
ability of the management to operate autonomously but in the political interests of the 
owner government. The politically-related directors, thus, can best facilitate the flow 
of information, operational arrangements and accountability requirements between 
GBE and their relevant ministers. They can have particular skills in participating in 
the process of setting of performance targets and the statement of corporate intent, 
which is the de-factor performance contract with government. These skills of PRDs 
can bring about more achievable performance outcomes for GBEs. Such rationale 
concerning the impact of PRDs on organisational performance was developed by 
Peres (1968), as cited in Thynne (1998). Further, the Commonwealth government’s 
Business Advice Branch provides a political skills-related rationale for PRD 
appointments (Government Businesses Advice Branch, 1997). They state that the 
appointment of PRDs to GBEs’ boards:  
 
… will only be considered in exceptional circumstances, having regard to 
their ability to represent the interest of the Government, their possession of 
the business skills…and to any potential conflicts of interest that might 
arise (p. 10, Government Business Advice Branch, 1997).  
 
 This government advice suggests that each PRD appointed to the board should 
be equipped with the appropriate balance of skills and interests and political-links. 
Such appointments on the board can provide the benefit of effectively finding ways 
for the GBEs management to meet or modify on-going government demands on their 
organisation, or divert potential demands, that would otherwise weaken the GBE’s 
business performance. 
 
Another explanation on the observed relationship between PRD and ERR can be 
drawn from the interviews. The head of corporate services of GBEA (named as 
GBEA to ensure confidentially) explains the selection of PRDs on its board as follow: 
 
For instance…the Charles Sturt representative is involved in building 
infrastructure and asset management. That’s something we have identified 
with, so she does that. The other person is from West Torrens. He’s on 
occupational health and safety. So once again, you know, this is a good 
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thing we can drag off him. One of the other persons is a union 
representative although his background is in workplace reform. So it was 
good to have those different areas of political experience and skills on the 
board to give us those abilities and connections plus the Treasury/Finance 
person (GBA, 2007). 
 
 This result in Table 7.3 of a positive relationship between PRDs and 
organisational performance is consistent with the findings of two prior studies, 
namely, Thynne and Ariff (1990) in the context of Singapore government-owned 
companies and statutory corporations and Bozec (2005) in the context of Canadian 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
 
Additionally, the positive relationship between PRD and ERR can be 
construed as consistent with the perspective of agency theory. Given that PRDs are 
similar to blockshareholder-appointed board members, in the sense that both are 
appointed to look after the interest of the relevant large shareholders, then they are 
less likely to create agent-principal conflict problems and more likely to have lower 
agency costs. Lower agency costs would produce higher economic performance by 
the organisation. 
 
 Third, the empirical finding on the relationship of financially-literate directors’ 
(FLDs) to ERR is also a new contribution to the literature. Prior studies appear to 
have only focused on FLDs in the context of board audit committees, not FLDs on the 
board of directors (DeZoort, 1997; Chan and Li, 2008; Chen et al., 2005; Defond et al., 
2005a; Bull and Sharp, 1989). Nevertheless, rationales about relevant technical 
expertise that are behind the positive affects of FLDs on the effectiveness of an audit 
committee are extendable to the context of boards. The result in Table 7.3 suggests 
that if there are proportionately more directors with finance and accounting 
qualifications and/or senior work-experience on the board, the ERR will be stronger. 
The inference is that the board can more adequately review the accounting 
determinations and financial arguments associated with project and policy evaluations 
and approvals, thereby leading the organisation to economically sounder operating, 
financing and investment decisions.   
 
Corroborating evidence is seen from the interview with GBEA that mentions 
the Treasury/Finance representatives on the board providing a major contribution of 
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their skills in the carrying out by the board of financial monitoring and planning tasks. 
Further corroborating evidence is found in prior findings by Chan and Li (2008) and 
Defond et al (2005a) about the positive effects of FLDs in the context of the 
composition of audit committees.  
 
 Fourth, the non-significant finding on board size in Table 7.3 is consistent 
with  Rebiez and Salamenh (2006) in their study of board size in the construction 
services industry. However, this result adds to the body of conflicting findings in the 
literature, where both positive and negative relationships between board size and 
performance are observed (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Bozec, 2005; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).   
  
 Turning to the final model regarding board governance and ERR, a composite 
index of board governance characteristics (BGI) is used. The positive effects of 
individual board governance characteristics on ERR, as reported in the above findings, 
leads to the anticipation that the BGI will also have a positive relationship with ERR. 
The regression result of Model (8), analysing the impacts of BGI on ERR, is 
presented in Table 7.4. This multivariate regression analysis also meets the basic 
assumptions in Table 7.2. The BGI variable is statistically significant at p-value less 
than .01. The computed t statistic is far greater than the t critical at α = .01 (right tailed 
test, df =5) of 3.36. The F statistic and p-value indicated that the model is also 
statistically significant. The standardized BGI coefficient is large. It is larger than 
those of individual governance variables in Model (7). This result suggests that a 
change in one index score would have a significant impact on ERR. 
  
 As expected the BGI has positive relationship with financial performance. 
This result implies that the composite index is a good indicator of the quality of 
governance practices, as it captures the interacting effects of individual governance 
mechanisms that may complement or substitute for each other in there influence on 
ERR. The finding in Table 7.4 is consistent with the majority of studies, in various 
contexts, on relationships between a governance index and performance (Gompers et 
al., 2003; Black, 2001; Klapper and Love, 2002; Klein et al., 2005; Drobetz et al., 
2003). In particular, the result is consistent with Feng et al. (2005) in their 
development of a board governance index in the context of real estate investment 
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trusts (REIT) and Chen et al (2007) in their use of a board governance index in the 
context of Taiwan listed companies.  
 
 
TABLE 7.4 MODEL (8) BGI AND ERR 
DV = ERR 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) -.216 .102  -2.106 .037   
ORGSIZE -1.191E-8 .000 -.121 -1.481 .141 .971 1.030
LEGALFM .025 .020 .112 1.271 .206 .840 1.190
INDUSTRY .034 .042 .065 .802 .424 .976 1.025
JURISDIC -.002 .006 -.028 -.327 .744 .854 1.172
BGI .041 .010 .342 4.108 .000 .935 1.070
Model Summary: R = .354; R 2 = .125; Adj. R 2 = .093; Durbin Watson = 2.050; F Stat. = 
3.857; Sig. = .003 
 
 
7.2.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BGI AND ACCOUNTABILITY-EMPHASIS  
 
 The effects of board governance arrangements on accountability-emphasis 
(ACCBTY) are analysed using the following models.  
 
 
ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY  
  + β 4 JURISDIC + ε       (9) 
 
ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1  BORDSIZE + β 2  NED + β 3  PRD + β 4 FLD + ε  (10) 
 
ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY +   
  β 4 JURISDIC +β 5 BGI + ε      (11) 
  
 The regression result for Model (9) is presented in Table 7.5, which meets all 
the basic assumptions listed in Table 7.2. The result in Table 7.5 indicates that the 
control variables have no significant relationships with ACCBTY. The t statistics of 
the variables are much lower than the required t critical at α = .05 of 2.78. The F 
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statistics and p-value also indicate that the variables have no influence on 
management’s perceived extent of attention given to their organisation’s rendering of 
public and managerial accountability (ACCBTY). As mention in the discussion of the 
outcome of Model (6), organisational characteristics are expected to have no 
relationships with performance. The non-significant result in this study gives some 
insight into GBEs’ attention to accountability. The result suggests that the 
accountability, overall, is not given greater or less emphasis due to the legal form, 
jurisdiction of government or industry-type of GBEs. The correlation analysis in 
Chapter 6 provided the same non-significant result. 
 
TABLE 7.5 MODEL (9) CONTROL VARIABLES AND ACCBTY 
DV = ACCBTY 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 5.603 .336  16.681 .000   
ORGSIZE 8.290E-8 .000 .122 1.284 .202 .964 1.037
LEGALFM -.137 .095 -.149 -1.440 .153 .822 1.217
INDUSTRY .132 .223 .056 .590 .556 .975 1.026
JURISDIC -.032 .031 -.109 -1.060 .291 .832 1.202
Model Summary: R = .189; R 2 = .036; Adj. R 2 = .001; Durbin Watson = 1.208; F Stat. = 
1.019; Sig. = .401 
 
 Table 7.6 presents the regression result of Model (10). The control variables 
are excluded from the model as a result of the reduced sample size (discussed in the 
previous chapter). The regression outcome in Table 7.6 meets all relevant 
assumptions. The empirical findings of this Model and Model (11) provide new 
contributions to the combined fields of corporate governance and accountability 
research. The result in Table 7.6 indicates that most of the governance variables have 
no significant impact on ACCBTY. Their t statistics are well below the required t 
critical level at α = .05. Board size, however, has a significant and positive 
relationship with ACCBTY at p-value = .05.   This result suggests that the larger the 
board size, the more attention is given to the rendering of managerial and public 
accountability by the organisation. 
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TABLE 7.6 MODEL (10) GOVERNANCE VARIABLES AND ACCBTY 
DV = ACCBTY 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 4.737 .792  5.982 .000   
Size .097 .048 .187 2.008 .047 .992 1.008
NED -.210 .765 -.026 -.274 .784 .956 1.046
PRD .039 .482 .008 .081 .936 .959 1.042
FLD .380 .318 .116 1.196 .234 .925 1.082
Model Summary: R = .224; R 2 = .050; Adj. R 2 = .016; Durbin Watson = 1.243; F Stat. = 
1.451; Sig. = .222 
  
 The probable greater attention to accountability issues given by larger boards, leads 
to the perception by management that accountability-emphasis by the organisation is 
better. This result in Table 7.6 contrasts to the result in Table 7.3 (Model 7), where 
board size has no significant relationship with financial performance and a negative 
coefficient is observed.  
 
The problem with the results in Table 7.6 is that the overall explanatory power of the 
model (i.e., model 10) is very poor. In this model, the adjusted R-squared is less than 
2%, the F statistic of the model is insignificant and p-value is greater .05.While NED, 
PRD and FLD have no significant relationships with ACCBTY, the inclusion of 
Board Size has done very little to increase the overall power of the model to explain 
the dependent variable, ACCBTY. 
 
 Turning to the affect of BGI on ACCBTY, the regression result of their 
relationships is presented in Table 7.7. This regression result also meets all the 
relevant assumptions. This table reveals that the board governance index has no 
significant relationship with ACCBTY, providing further evidence that board 
governance, particularly board composition, does not have an impact on the rendering 
throughout GBEs of managerial and public accountability.  The empirical findings of 
Models (10) and (11) lead to a rejection of H1 (part b), which stated that high 
governance quality as proxy by BGI would facilitate the board to perform its 
managerial and public accountabilities-related tasks better.  
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TABLE 7.7 MODEL (11) BGI AND ACCBTY 
DV = ACCBTY 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
 (Constant) 5.282 .568  9.294 .000   
ORGSIZE 8.713E-8 .000 .129 1.340 .183 .956 1.046
LEGALFM -.129 .096 -.140 -1.339 .183 .809 1.235
INDUSTRY .147 .225 .063 .655 .514 .965 1.036
JURISDIC -.031 .031 -.105 -1.018 .311 .830 1.205
BGI .046 .057 .079 .701 .417 .939 1.065
Model Summary: R = .204; R 2 = .042; Adj. R 2 = -.002; Durbin Watson = 1.167; F Stat. = .945; 
Sig. = .455 
 
7.2.3 COMPARING THE EFFECTS OF BOARD GOVERNANCE ON 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY-EMPHASIS 
 
 The results obtained in this study on relationships between board governance 
mechanisms and the attention given by GBEs’ management to the rendering of 
managerial and public accountability, are quite contrasting to the results obtained on 
the relationships between board governance mechanisms and financial performance 
(ERR). In particular, the greater presence on the board of a GBE of independent 
directors (NEDs), politically-connected directors (PRDs) and financially expert 
directors (FLDs) provides a strong explanation for the GBE achieving a higher ERR, 
but provides no explanation for the GBEs extent of attention to the rendering of 
accountability.  
 
Such contrasting findings pose a question as to whether GBE boards view the 
achievement of ‘bottom line’ financial performance to be incompatible with the 
achievement of broader accountability to the public. Although GBEs are given 
operating autonomy and can take a commercially competitive stance, they also face 
unique government-owner restrictions on their financing, investing and 
product/service pricing decisions. The rendering of accountability through various 
customer and general public-oriented programs and processes can be a costly exercise 
for GBEs. If these costs of rendering accountability can not generate incrementally 
higher financial returns to the GBE because of financial restrictions such as pricing 
controls on the GBE’s products and services, then giving emphasis to initiatives and 
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systems that improve public accountability may result in a weakening of the ability to 
meet the key financial performance indicator of ERR.   
 
The results in this study infer that directors on the boards of GBEs who are 
non-executive, politically-linked and financially-expert will channel their knowledge, 
experience and skills to the organisation’s achievement of financial performance 
outcomes as a higher priority than the organisation’s attention to managerial and 
public accountability systems and processes. As mentioned in chapter 6, this issue of 
a trade-off between GBE’s financial performance and their concern for public 
interests and public accountability has been raised in several normative and 
qualitative empirical studies on government-linked entities (Luke, 2008; Bottomley, 
2001; Baird, 2001; Thynne, 1998a, 1998b; Hill et al., 1989; Seidman, 1954). Luke 
(2008) in her study of dimensions of accountability in New Zealand’s state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), a similar context to the current study, concluded that financial 
accountability is interrelated and at same time conflicted with many other types of 
accountability.   
 
 Apart from governance mechanisms, there will be other factors both internal 
and external to the organisation that could be affecting a GBE’s financial and 
accountability-emphasis. In this study, organisational capabilities and strategies have 
been chosen as performance drivers to be employed to determine whether financial 
performance outcomes and an emphasis on accountability initiatives and systems can 
be improved at the same time.  
 
 
7.3 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CAPABILITIES-STRATEGY MATCH 
AND PERFORMANCE 
 
7.3.1 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CAPABILITIES-STRATEGY MATCH AND 
ERR 
 
 Multiple regression is also use to analyse the relationships between 
capabilities-strategy match (CSM) and ERR. The empirical model used to conduct the 
analysis is as follow. 
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 ERR = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY +   
  β 4 JURISDIC +β 5 CSM + ε      (12) 
  
The regression results for Model (12) are presented in Table 7.8. This multiple 
regression meets all basic assumptions.  
 
TABLE 7.8 MODEL (12) CAPABILITIES-STRATEGY MATCH AND ERR 
DV = ERR 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) -.009 .121  -.073 .942   
ORGSIZE -1.669E-8 .000 -.121 -1.234 .220 .948 1.055
LEGALFM .030 .021 .155 1.461 .147 .808 1.237
INDUSTRY .021 .047 .043 .443 .658 .953 1.049
JURISDIC -.001 .006 -.020 -.193 .848 .822 1.216
CSM .014 .022 .063 .646 .520 .959 1.043
Model Summary: R = .203; R 2 = .041; Adj. R 2 = -.005; Durbin Watson = 1.361; F Stat. = .901; 
Sig. = .483 
 
 Once again all control variables have no significant relationships with ERR. 
The result also reveals that CSM does not have any significant relationship with ERR. 
Its t statistic is very small and lower than t critical at α = .05 of 2.02 (right tailed test, 
df = 5). This result contradicts the predictions of congruence theory, which states that 
when an organisation’s business structure, input resources/capabilities, environment, 
strategies and other factors fit well together (i.e., are congruent) then the organisation 
would function effectively and achieve superior performance (Fry and Smith, 1987; 
Bahaee, 1992; Myers, 2004). In addition, the non-significant result in Table 7.8 
challenges the Resource Base View (RBV) in aligning capabilities to Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) strategic positions. Since this study is the first in using CSM to predict 
performance and using multiple regression instead of ANOVA, the result is not 
directly comparable to prior studies. The aggregated CSM measure in this study may 
be masking important components of the match between types of capabilities and 
strategies used by GBEs in the sample. Given the degree contradiction to the relevant 
theories, a break down analysis of the impacts of each strategic position alignment 
with its respective set of capabilities on ERR is conducted. The break down analysis 
is conducted using the following regression model. 
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  ERR = β 0  + β 1 Defender*O-I + β 2 Prospector*I-O +  
  β 3 Analyser*Ave + ε       (13) 
 
Where: 
Defender*O-I = defender strategic position aligned with outside-in capabilities; 
Prospector*I-O = prospector strategic position aligned with inside-out capabilities; 
Analyser*Av = analyser strategic position aligned with average of outside-in and 
inside-out capabilities. 
 
Model (13) is developed based on Song et al.’s (2007) study of the 
relationship between capabilities, strategies and performance in US firms. The control 
variables are excluded from the model due to small sample size. To avoid a 
multicollinerity problem the I-O and O-I data are mean centered. This method was 
used in Song et al. (2007) and suggested by Jaccard et al. (1990) and Aiken and West 
(1991).  
 
The regression result of Model (13) is provided in Table 7.9. This regression 
result meets all assumptions that required to generate the best linear unbiased 
estimators (BLUE) (Hill et al., 2001). Model (13) provides a more favourable result in 
comparison to Model (12) and indicates that the capabilities and strategy match of one 
of the three strategic positions is positively related to ERR. The result shows that the 
alignment between defender strategic position and outside-in capabilities has a 
significant and positive impact on performance. The F statistic and p- value indicate 
that the model is statistically significant. Given all other variables have no significant 
impact on ERR; the significant of the model is based on the impact of the extent of 
match of defender strategy - outside-in capabilities on ERR. 
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TABLE 7.9 MODEL (13) REGRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY-
CAPABILITIES MATCHES  ON ERR 
DV = ERR 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig.
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) .095 .014  6.643 .000   
Defender*O-I .143 .052 .256 2.761 .007 .999 1.001
Prospector*I_O .030 .034 .081 .875 .384 .999 1.001
Analyser*Av -.037 .030 -.114 -1.233 .220 1.000 1.000
Model Summary: R = .288; R 2 = .083; Adj. R 2 = .057; Durbin Watson = 1.406; F Stat. = 
3.222; Sig. = .026 
 
 This result suggests that the defender strategy-type GBE needs to develop 
strengths in market-oriented capabilities to enable it to maintain a dominant position 
in it’s niche market which can enable it to achieve superior financial performance. 
Two responses to the second open-ended question of the questionnaire shed some 
light into how defender oriented GBEs consider their capabilities and strategies. 
These responses are as follow: 
 
The organisation prepares an Annual Business Plan which defines the 
strategic goals, the strategies to achieve those goals and the 
resources/skills required to achieve those goals. These issues are 
discussed at board meetings on a regular basis and approaches put 
forward and agreed to realign any divergence between targets and 
achievement (Defender, Chief Financial Officer, GBE AE) 
 
[Aligning strategies to capabilities] is achieved by holding regular 
Business Plan Reviews with all managers- where performance against 
the plan is reviewed with all involved. Separately a strategic update is 
provided to all employees each quarter by the managing director 
(Defender, General Management Team, GBE AG). 
 
These findings lend partial empirical support to congruence theory and RBV in terms 
of aligning capabilities to Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic-types.  Support is given 
to Song et al.’s (2007) finding that a defender with strong market-linking capabilities 
(same orientation as O-I) has a positive impact on profit margin.  Nevertheless, Table 
7.9 does not support the findings by Song et al (2007) concerning the significant 
impact of a capabilities and strategy match of the prospector and analyser strategic-
types on ERR.  
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7.3.2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CAPABILITIES-STRATEGY MATCH AND 
ACCBTY 
 
 The study also explores the relationships between CSM and the 
accountability-emphasis of GBEs (ACCBTY) using the same method of analysis as 
the previous section. The empirical model is as follow. 
 
 ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY +  
   β 4 JURISDIC +β 5 CSM + ε     (14) 
 
 
 The result from the regression analysis is presented in Table 7.10. The result 
indicates that CSM has a significant relationship with ACCBTY. The t statistic of the 
aggregated CSM variable is much greater than its t critical at α =.01 of 3.36 (right-
tailed test, df = 5). The F statistic and p-value of the model is also statistically 
significant.  
 
 
TABLE 7.10 MODEL (14) RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CSM AND ACCBTY 
DV = ACCBTY 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 2.692 .330  8.152 .000   
ORGSIZE 6.683E-9 .000 .013 .181 .857 .948 1.055
LEGALFM .031 .056 .044 .556 .580 .808 1.237
INDUSTRY -.019 .128 -.011 -.152 .880 .953 1.049
JURISDIC .005 .018 .025 .312 .756 .822 1.216
CSM .548 .059 .678 9.286 .000 .959 1.043
Model Summary: R = .681; R 2 = .464; Adj. R 2 = .438; Durbin Watson = 1.711; F Stat. = 
18.164; Sig. = .000 
 
 This result suggests that a fit between strategies and capabilities allows GBE 
management to give high attention to putting in place within the GBE various 
initiatives and systems for monitoring and reporting on the  efficiency and 
effectiveness of meeting operating targets and program outcomes as a basis for 
fulfilling their managerial accountability obligations. On the public accountability 
side, the result suggests that the alignment between capabilities and strategy enables 
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management to focus more strongly on the GBE providing higher quality services and 
products to customer and provide information and responsiveness in the public’s 
interests. This result is consistent with congruence theory and supports the RBV in 
aligning capabilities to Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategy-types. Prior literature has 
not provided such evidence in relation to the concept of fulfilling accountability 
requirements. Therefore, it is a new empirical contribution to the accountability 
research literature.  
 
 As an extension to Model (14), the following empirical model is presented to 
analyse the affects on accountability-emphasis of the alignments of Miles and Snow’s 
(1978) separate strategic-types with Day’s (1994) inside-out and outside-in 
capabilities.  
  
 ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1 Defender*O-I + β 2 Prospector*I-O +  
 β 3 Analyser*Ave + ε        (15) 
 
 Table 7.11 presents the regression result. This regression result meets the basic 
assumption discussed in Table 7.2. It reveals that all three key 
 
 
TABLE 7.11 MODEL (15) REGRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIC-
CAPABILITIES MATCHES ON  ACCBTY 
DV = ACCBTY 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 5.376 .040  134.812 .000   
Defender*O-I .573 .145 .280 3.945 .000 .999 1.001
Prospector*I_O .519 .095 .388 5.477 .000 .999 1.001
Analyser*Av .573 .085 .480 6.775 .000 1.000 1.000
Model Summary: R = .680; R 2 = .462; Adj. R 2 = .447; Durbin Watson = 1.692; F Stat. = 
30.66; Sig. = .000 
alignments between strategic-types and their respective capabilities have a positive 
relationship with ACCBTY. Table 7.11 shows that t statistics are much greater than 
the required t critical level at α = .01 and the F statistic and p-value of the model are 
also statistically significant. These findings reinforce the positive result for the 
aggregated CSM variable in Model (14). 
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7.3.3 DISCUSSION OF THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF CAPABILITIES-
STRATEGY MATCH ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY-EMPHASIS 
 
The comparative findings of Models (13) and (15) provide an interesting 
insight into the relationships between capabilities-strategies match and the two 
performance-related dependent variables – ERR and ACCBTY. It can be inferred that, 
except for defender strategy-types, a desirable match between capabilities-strategy 
does not bring about an improvement in a GBE’s single, objective, quantifiable 
financial performance outcome (i.e., ERR), but it does lead to an improvement in a 
GBE’s multi-dimensional, subjectively-rated set of management emphases on 
activities, initiatives and implementation of accountability processes and systems (i.e., 
ACCBTY).   
 
This observation could be interpreted as pointing to the existence of an 
inherent performance conflict for organisations that are managed to perform both like 
a market-driven private enterprise and a government-policy-driven public entity. 
There can be conflicting objectives set for financial performance versus accountability 
requirements in a GBE’s operating environment, such as a conflict between the 
improving of quality of service delivery and external reporting systems and the 
improving of profitability through cost-reductions.  Barret (2000), Auditor General for 
Australia, provides remarks on balancing accountability and efficiency as follow: 
 
The adoption or adaptation of private sector approaches, methods and 
techniques in public service delivery has highlighted trade-offs between 
the nature and level of accountability and private sector cost efficiency (p. 
58) 
 
Hence, it can be concluded from the comparative results in Tables 7.9 and 7.11 (i.e., 
models 13 and 15) that a GBE is unable to increase both its ERR and ACCBTY 
simultaneously by improving its capabilities-strategy match, unless the type of match 
pursued consists of a defender strategy and O-I capabilities. For the other types of 
strategy-capabilities matches, namely, prospector/I-O and analyser/ave, there is 
evidence from interviews with GBE management indicating that fulfilling 
accountability requirements is the main emphasis in the exercise of aligning 
capabilities to strategies. The ability to achieve financial targets can be a secondary 
 176
consideration in deliberations over changes to capabilities and strategies. The 
comments are as follow: 
 
They are seriously aligned with government policy i.e. state strategic plan; 
internally they are aligned to maintain a delivery organisation (Prospector, 
General Management Team, GBEAK) 
 
[Our organisation pays attention to aligning our strategies to capabilities] 
to [the] best of its abilities but much of its work is what the government 
wants. Business planning, risk management and compliance structure have 
become more important over the past years (Analyser, General 
Management Team, GBEAJ). 
 
This qualitative evidence that management does not given the same extent of attention 
to financial targets as to managerial and public accountability processes, could be 
attributed to the nature of operations and markets of GBEs. Many of the GBEs under 
study have a monopoly market in their geographical area, for example, port 
authorities and water corporations. These geographical areas are commonly limited by 
the jurisdiction of their government-owner – e.g., state and territory governments. 
There are also government pricing controls on services that GBE’s provide. Thus, 
strategies that aim to expand market share beyond their geographical areas are not as 
successful as strategies to defend the market niche. Once all of a geographically 
bounded market share is captured and pricing of major services is outside the control 
of management, then there is reduced incentive for management to seek innovative 
ways to increase the profitability of their GBE. In other words, the aligning of 
capabilities with a defender strategy-type creates a more suitable fit for GBEs in 
meeting their relatively stable and predictable financial performance requirements. 
This then frees up management to give more attention to accountability initiatives and 
processes.  
 
Such an emphasis on accountability is also found in this study to apply to the 
other types of strategy-capabilities matches, apart from the defender/O-I alignment (as 
revealed in Table 7.11). Presumably, the fact that a GBE has a high quality 
management will be reflected in both a strong alignment of any correct strategy-type 
to capabilities, and a high attention to the implementation of accountability initiatives 
and systems to satisfy the key stakeholders who are government and the public.  
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7.4 MODERATING IMPACTS OF BGI ON CSM AND PERFORMANCE   
7.4.1 MODERATING IMPACTS OF BGI ON CSM AND ERR 
 
 The study employs the following models to analyse the moderating impact of 
corporate governance (i.e. board governance index) on the relationship between 
capabilities-strategy match and financial performance.  
 
 ERR = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY +   
  β 4 JURISDIC +β 5 BGI + β 6 CSM +β 7 (BGI*CSM) + ε  (16) 
 
 ERR= β 0  + β 1 Defender*O-I*BGI + β 2 Prospector*I-O*BGI +   
  β 3 Analyser*Ave*BGI + β 4 Reactor*Av*BGI +β 5 BGI+ ε  (17) 
 
To avoid a multicollinearity problem, the BGI and CSM variables in Models (16) and 
(17) are mean-centred. The outcome of Model (16) is presented in Table 7.12. This 
regression result meets all relevant assumptions. 
 
 
TABLE 7.12 MODEL (16) MODERATING EFFECTS OF BGI ON CSM & ERR 
RELATIONSHIP 
DV = ERR 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) -.144 .155  -.926 .356   
ORGSIZE -1.110E-8 .000 -.081 -.842 .402 .930 1.075
LEGALFM .035 .020 .183 1.777 .079 .799 1.252
INDUSTRY .034 .045 .072 .754 .453 .943 1.060
JURISDIC -.002 .006 -.029 -.287 .775 .822 1.217
CSM .003 .022 .012 .124 .902 .869 1.150
BGI .025 .012 .200 2.100 .038 .937 1.068
BGI*CSM .038 .018 .201 2.069 .041 .899 1.112
Model Summary: R = .351; R 2 = .123; Adj. R 2 = .063; Durbin Watson = 1.433; F Stat. = 
2.069; Sig. = .054 
 
 The result of Model (16) indicates that overall the model is fairly weak with an 
Adj.R-squared of .063, but its F test is significant. The important finding in Table 
7.12 is that the interaction between BGI and CSM has a positive relationship with 
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ERR. The inference from this finding is that the presence of stronger board-
governance structures and practices (BGI) in a GBE, coupled with a better alignment 
of capabilities to strategy-type (CSM) will significantly improve the entity’s ERR.  
Since the relationship in Table 7.12 between CSM and ERR is not significant, the 
inference is that, on it’s own, a strong alignment between an appropriate set of 
capabilities and strategy-type is not sufficient to generate improved financial 
performance.  
 
 
 Turning to the breakdown of individual capabilities-strategy combinations, 
Table 7.13 presents the findings for Model (17). Table 7.13 provides the same pattern 
of results as Model (13) in Table 7.9, which indicates that only the defender/O-I 
match is positively related with ERR. The other strategic positions have no significant 
impact on ERR even with the moderating affects of BGI. The result of the 
defender/O-I match interacting with board governance (BGI) is statistically 
significant at sig. = .018. This finding infers that a high quality of board governance 
structures and practices, when coupled with a strong alignment of O-I capabilities and 
defender strategy, will result in achieving a higher ERR. However, a stronger BGI 
does not have sufficient interactive impact on the capabilities match with prospector 
or analyser strategy-types to be able to significantly increase ERR. This result reveals 
that the presence of higher quality board governance does not change the finding and 
explanation given in the previous section. This finding was that the alignments 
between capabilities and strategy for the prospector and analyser oriented GBEs do 
not bring about improved ERR. This is attributed to the nature of the markets for 
GBEs’ services where expansion of market share and pricing of services is restricted 
by government controls.  
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TABLE 7.13 MODEL (17) INTERACTION EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL 
STRATEGY-CAPABILITIES MATCHES AND BGI  ON ERR 
 
 
DV = ERR 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) -.008 .085  -.097 .923   
Defender*O-I*BGI .079 .033 .231 2.397 .018 .878 1.138
Prospector*I_O*BGI .001 .033 .004 .040 .968 .875 1.142
Analyser*Av*BGI .016 .028 .055 .585 .560 .924 1.082
BGI .015 .012 .121 1.240 .218 .857 1.166
Prospector*I_O .033 .035 .089 .934 .352 .899 1.112
Defender*O-I  .099 .053 .177 1.872 .064 .918 1.090
Analyser*Av -.036 .030 -.111 -1.197 .234 .945 1.058
Model Summary: R = .398; R 2 = .158; Adj. R 2 = .101; Durbin Watson = 1.487; F Stat. = 
2.769; Sig. = .011 
 
2.4.2 MODERATING IMPACTS OF BGI ON CSM AND ACCBTY 
 
 On the ACCBTY side, Models (18) and (19) will be used to analyse the 
moderating effect of BGI on the relationship between CSM and ACCBTY.  
 
 ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1 ORGSIZE + β 2 LEGALFM + β 3 INDUSTRY +  
   β 4 JURISDIC +β 5 BGI + β 6 CSM +β 7 (BGI*CSM) + ε (18) 
 
 ACCBTY = β 0  + β 1 Defender*O-I*BGI + β 2 Prospector*I-O*BGI +  
   β 3 Analyser*Ave*BGI + β 4 Reactor*Av*BGI +β 5 BGI+ ε  (19) 
 
The regression output for Model (18) is provided in Table 7.14. Once again, the result 
indicates that CSM has a significant and positive relationship with ACCBTY. BGI, on 
the other hand, has no significant relationship with ACCBTY. The interaction affect 
between BGI and CSM is also not significantly related with ACCBTY.  
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TABLE 7.14 MODEL (18) MODERATING EFFECT OF BGI ON THE CSM & 
ACCBTY RELATIONSHIP 
DV = ACCBTY 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 2.895 .442  6.551 .000   
ORGSIZE 5.619E-9 .000 .011 .149 .881 .930 1.075
LEGALFM .028 .057 .040 .493 .623 .799 1.252
INDUSTRY -.024 .130 -.014 -.186 .853 .943 1.060
JURISDIC .005 .018 .024 .307 .760 .822 1.217
BGI -.020 .033 -.045 -.602 .549 .937 1.068
CSM .538 .062 .665 8.609 .000 .869 1.150
BGI*CSM .024 .052 .036 .470 .639 .899 1.112
Model Summary: R = .683; R 2 = .467; Adj. R 2 = .430; Durbin Watson = 1.738; F Stat. = 
12.869; Sig. = .000 
 
Nevertheless, a break down analysis is required to understand the moderating effect of 
BGI on the relationships between components of CSM and ACCBTY. Table 7.15 
provides the results for Model (19). It indicates that all interactions between strategy-
types, capabilities and BGI are not significantly related to ACCBTY. It should be 
notice that control variables are excluded because the sample size would be too small 
for the number of variables to be modelled. 
 
 
TABLE 7.15 MODEL (19) INTERACTION EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL 
STRATEGY-CAPABILITIES MATCHES AND BGI ON ACCBTY 
 
 
DV = ACCBTY 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 5.477 .242  22.668 .000   
Defender*O-I*BGI -.129 .094 -.104 -1.374 .173 .878 1.138
Prospector*I_O*BGI .103 .096 .081 1.073 .286 .875 1.142
Analyser*Av*BGI .085 .081 .077 1.050 .296 .924 1.082
BGI -.013 .034 -.029 -.374 .709 .857 1.166
Prospector*I_O .483 .100 .362 4.850 .000 .899 1.112
Defender*O-I .630 .151 .307 4.164 .000 .918 1.090
Analyser*Av .550 .087 .461 6.340 .000 .945 1.058
Model Summary: R = .697; R 2 = .485; Adj. R 2 = .450; Durbin Watson = 1.718; F Stat. = 
13.879; Sig. = .000 
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The regression result in Table 7.15 indicates that BGI has no moderating 
effect on the relationship between capabilities-strategy match and accountability-
emphasis. The good matches between capabilities and strategy still have a significant 
and positive influence on management’s emphasis on processes and systems for 
discharging managerial and public accountability requirements.    
 
It is to be noted that the NED measure in the BGI  shows proportionately more  
non-executive directors. The executive directors who were interviewed in this study 
state their concerns about accountability requirements and how this limits financial 
performance as follow: 
 
Yes we have to abide by certain government mandates and Treasury and 
Finance instructions in the government framework and some of 
those…cost us money because government has agreed to be with Fleet SA, 
say use of AGL or Telstra and because we have affiliations with the 
Caravan Park Industry of Australia. We’re in Big Four Caravan Parks in 
Australia. Across Australia we can expect cheaper rates than what the 
government can here, but we have to live with those. Certain other 
government departments are similar but so your scrap that commercially 
but we’ve got to- our board also acknowledges to the minister that we 
can’t actually, you know, this might cost us extra (Head of Corporate 
Services, GBEA, 2007). 
 
 
…our vision is to ensure that rail is an integral, sustainable element of the 
nation’s transport logistics network…satisfying our customers, expand our 
industry, provide efficient access across modes to the interstate rail 
network and assist in development, etcetera… but we run along 
commercial objectives as well]... [So] the less return we demand on our 
asset the less we need to charge, the more incentive there is for people to 
use rail so the higher  the volume will be. Our shareholders are looking 
for a moderate commercial return while achieving the primary objectives 
about the vision (Chief Financial Officer, GBEB, 2008). 
 
 
The empirical findings in this section provide support to only one aspect of H3. 
H3 relates to the moderating effects of BGI on the relationships between capabilities-
strategy match and ERR, on the one hand, and ACCBTY on the other hand. Only in 
the case of a defender/O-I match and its effect of ERR is there a significant positive 
moderating influence of BGI. In all other aspects H3 is rejected.  BGI does not 
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moderate the relationship between matches for other strategic types with ERR. Nor 
does BGI moderate any of the relationships between capabilities-strategy match and 
ACCBTY.  
 
These findings from regression models 16 to 19 infer that non-executive 
directors who are politically-linked and financially-literate (i.e., meaning a higher 
BGI measure) are inclined to have little influence on the GBEs accountability-
emphasis, but give more concern for achieving financial performance, when the board 
deals with matters of capabilities and strategy. It is executive directors, according to 
the interviews with executives, that appear to be more involved in giving the GBE an 
accountability-emphasis even though it could compromise financial performance.  
 
 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter reports the outcomes of three sets of multivariate analysis. These 
multivariate analyses address the hypotheses and research questions posed in prior 
chapters. The findings of the first set of analysis indicate that BGI has a positive and 
significant relationship with financial performance, as measured by ERR, but has no 
significant influence on management’s emphasis on systems and processes for 
discharging managerial and public accountability requirements (ACCBTY). At the 
level of individual features of governance, the percentages of non-executive directors 
(NEDs), politically-related directors (PRDs) and financial-literate directors (FLDs) 
have strong and positive associations with ERR. These findings are supported by prior 
studies. On the ACCBTY side, these governance variables have no significant 
explanatory power. Such a result poses a question as to whether GBE boards view the 
achievement of ‘bottom line’ financial performance as in competition with or 
incompatible to the meeting of accountability expectation and requirements of 
governments and the public. Therefore, this first set of findings only supports part (a) 
of hypothesis 1.  
 
 The outcomes of the second set of analysis indicate that capabilities-strategy 
match (CSM) has no significant influence on ERR but has a strong and positive 
impact on ACCBTY. At the level of particular strategic-types, the results indicate that 
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only the alignment between defender strategic position and outside-in capabilities has 
a positive relationship with both ERR and ACCBTY. These findings reveal that, 
beside the defender strategic position, other alignment combinations of CSM are 
positively related to ACCBTY only, but have no significant affect on achievement of 
ERR. Such a result is rationalised using intuitive reasoning regarding the operating 
environment of GBEs, together with qualitative evidence from interviews with 
executive directors and open-ended questions in the questionnaire. Thus, hypothesis 2 
is only partly supported by the findings. 
 
 Turning to the analysis of the moderating impacts of board governance 
structures on the relationships between capabilities-strategy match and the two types 
of performance-based measures, the results only support part (a) of hypothesis 3. The 
BGI has a positive moderating effect on the CSM and ERR relationship but has no 
impact on the CSM and ACCBTY relationship.  
 
 Overall, the three hypotheses developed in chapter 3 and tested in this chapter, 
are partially supported.  The significant relationships differ for the different dependent 
variable being tested, as summarised below: 
 
• BGI – positive and significant with ERR 
       not significant with ACCBTY; 
• CSM – not significant with ERR 
      positive and significant with ACCBTY; 
• BGI * CSM – positive and significant with ERR 
not significant with ACCBTY 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter provides four sections to conclude the study. The first section 
reiterates the setting and objectives of the study. Section two provides a summary of 
major findings. The implications of the study are discussed in section three. Lastly, 
the limitations of the study are discussed.  
 
8.2 SETTING AND OBJECTIVES REVISITED 
 
 The organisational form and operational philosophy of commercial branches 
of the public sector have been subject to many  reforms over the years (Wettenhall, 
1998) and resulted in the current government-owned but corporatised and 
commercialised GBEs. GBEs are required, in this operating environment, to achieve 
economic efficiency and at the same time fulfil accountability requirements in the 
course of their day-to-day operation (Thynne and Wettenhall, 2001; Thynne, 1998a, 
1998b; Bottomley, 2001; Luke, 2008). This operational arrangement has received 
considerable attention and been subject to much debate. The main focus of public and 
political attention has been on managerial effectiveness and driving performance i.e., 
can financial performance and accountability expectations be achieved simultaneously 
in the course of management of GBEs? This issue is central to normative arguments 
and empirical findings by Thynne (1998a; 1998b), Thynne and Wettenhall (2004), 
Halligan and Horrigan (2005), Bottomley (2001) Seidman (1968) and Luke (2008).  
 
To address this research issue, this study extends two fields of prior empirical 
literature to the context of GBEs. The two fields are the relationship between 
organisational capabilities-strategy match and performance (e.g. Conant et al., 1990; 
Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980 and Smith et al., 1986) and the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and performance (e.g. Feng, Ghosh and Sirman, 
2005; Mothanty, 2003,; Black, 2001). The current study has empirically investigated 
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the way GBEs’ management aligns their organisational capabilities with strategies 
and the way the board is structured. It then relates these two phenomena to financial 
performance and management’s emphasis in developing and implementing systems 
and processes for rendering organisational accountability to government and the 
public. Additionally, this study considers whether board governance has a moderating 
effect on management’s effectiveness in pursuing the primary function of aligning the 
organisation’s capabilities and strategies. 
  
The study modelled these relationships in two stages. First the study 
established the direct relationship between capabilities-strategy match and 
performance, as well as between corporate governance mechanisms and performance. 
In both cases, performance was measured, as the dependent variable, from two 
viewpoints: financial performance and accountability-emphasis. Second, the study 
addressed the moderating effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
relationship between capabilities-strategy match and performance.  
 
8.3 MAJOR FINDINGS 
 
 The empirical analyses were conducted using two datasets. The first dataset 
comprised of a sample of 141 GBEs- 97% of GBE population. This dataset was used 
for empirical analysis of the relationship between GBE’s board governance 
arrangements and their financial performance. The second dataset comprises of 91 
GBEs- 64% of the population. This dataset was used for investigation of the 
relationships between GBE’s board governance and management’s emphasis on 
discharging public and managerial accountabilities. This data was also used to 
determine the impacts of capabilities-strategy match on both financial performance 
and accountability-emphasis.  It was also used to analyse the moderating impacts of 
governance arrangements on relationships between capabilities-strategy match and 
both financial performance and accountability-emphasis. 
 
 The major findings of the study are as follow. First, the study finds that the 
board government index (BGI), as a proxy for quality of board governance 
arrangements, has a positive and significant relationship with financial performance 
(ERR), but not on accountability-emphasis (ACCBTY). At the breakdown analysis 
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level, the study finds the percentages of non-executive directors (NEDs), politically-
related directors (PRDs) and financial-literate directors (FLDs) each have significant 
relationships to ERR. These variables, however, have no significant relationship to 
ACCBTY. The Board size variable has the contrasting affects on both independent 
variables to NEDs, PRDs and FLDs. Board size has a positive impact on ACCBTY 
but not ERR. These results are supported by prior studies and qualitative evidence 
from interviews with GBE’s executives and responses to the open ended questions in 
the questionnaire. These findings infer that directors on the boards of GBEs who are 
non-executive, politically-related and financially-literate will channel their knowledge, 
experience and skills to the organisations’ achievement of financial performance as a 
higher priority more than giving attention to the quality of the organisation’s 
processes for improving accountability. 
 
 Second, the study indicates that capabilities-strategy match (CSM) has a 
significant and positive influence on ACCBTY.  The good fits between all strategic 
positions and their respective sets of capabilities under investigation had positive 
relationships with ACCBTY. This finding suggests that a good fit between 
capabilities and strategy is required in order to assist and empower the management to 
put in place systems and processes for discharging managerial and public 
accountability requirements. This positive findings, however, did not extent to the 
relationship between CSM and ERR. The study found that CSM, at the aggregate 
level, has no relationship with ERR. At the strategic position level, only the good fit 
between defender strategic position and outside-in capabilities has a positive 
relationship with ERR. This result is supported by prior studies that involved 
congruence theory and Resource Base View (RBV) in alignment capabilities to Miles 
and Snow’s strategic-types. The combination of these findings suggests that a GBE is 
unable to increase both of its ERR and ACCBTY simultaneously by improving its 
capabilities-strategy match, unless the type of match pursed consists of a defender 
strategy and outside-in capabilities. Qualitative evidence from the open ended 
questions of the questionnaire corroborates the qualitative evidence that the 
prospector and analyser GBEs pay more attention to processes and systems for 
discharging accountability requirements when their strategies are appropriately 
aligned with capabilities.  
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 Lastly, the study finds BGI has a significant and positive relationship with the 
CSM in explaining the variations of ERR. This result suggests that the presence of a 
greater quality of board governance structures in interaction with a closer alignment 
of capabilities to strategy-type will significantly improve organisational financial 
performance. However, when analysed for individual types of strategic position, only 
the defender-type is positively related to ERR. On the ACCBTY side, BGI has no 
moderating affect on the CSM and ACCBTY relationship. This non-significant 
finding is also observed when individual strategic-types are analysed. These findings 
infer that non-executive directors who are politically-linked and financially-literate 
are inclined to have little influence on GBEs accountability-emphasis but give more 
concern for achieving financial performance, when the board deals with matters of 
capabilities and strategy settings. Evidence from interviews with senor executives of 
GBEs indicates that the executive directors (rather than non-executive directors) are 
more involved in accountability-emphasis.  
 
 The empirical findings support part (a) of Hypothesis 1, to some extent 
support both parts of Hypothesis 2 and only part (a) of Hypothesis 3 of the study.  
 
8.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
 
 The implications of the findings for GBEs to most effectively achieve both 
‘bottom line’ financial performance and accountability-emphasis are:  
 
1. GBEs should adopt and maintain a defender strategy as their default position; 
2. GBEs should ensure they develop strengths in outside-in capabilities; 
 
Given the above strategy-capability setting: 
3. Financial performance will be stronger if GBEs’ boards comprise of a 
substantial proportion of non-executive directors, politically-linked directors 
and financial-literate directors.  
4. Accountability emphasis will be simultaneously stronger because GBE’s 
executive directors and executive management will face more stable 
organisational strategies (i.e., defender-type) and matching capabilities (O-I 
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oriented), thereby making their operating environment more conducive to 
implementing accountability systems and processes in their organisation.  
 
This combination of approaches enables GBEs to achieve both financial performance 
and accountability-emphasis. The defender strategic is deemed to be a suitable default 
position for GBEs and their operating environment. As mentioned in prior chapters, a 
defender is an organisation: 
 
that attempt to locate and maintain a secure position in relative stable 
product or service areas. [The] defenders offer a limited range of products, 
protecting their domain instead of offering lower prices, higher quality, or 
better service than competitors. Defenders are usually not at the forefront of 
new product development in their industries, often ignoring industry 
changes not directly related to their operations (Di Benedetto and Song, 
2003, p. 517). 
 
 
GBEs, for example water, transport and electricity corporations, are operated in 
relative stable product and service area. In addition, some GBEs enjoy a monopoly 
market in their geographical area i.e. port authorities. Furthermore, GBEs offer 
limited product and service lines. Thus, GBEs would have expectations from their 
government-owner to protect their domain, which creates a situation where 
competition is weaker. Hence, management has less pressure to lower prices or 
improve quality. This is conductive to a defender strategy. In terms of capabilities, the 
outside-in capabilities fit well with defender strategic position. This good fit, as 
provided by the empirical analyses, supports GBEs to achieve both financial 
performance and accountability-emphasis.  
 
  The other strategic positions do not support GBEs to achieve their desired 
dual outcomes. The prospector and analyser strategic positions, fitted with their 
respective capabilities, only support GBEs to achieve accountability-emphasis.  
 
 In terms of board governance arrangements, the appointment of non-executive 
directors, politically-linked directors and financial-literate directors would assist 
GBEs to achieve their ‘bottom line’ financial targets. Moreover, this board 
composition will be better qualified and politically motivated to direct internal 
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resources (i.e. outside-in capabilities) and facilitate the setting of an appropriate 
strategy (defender) to achieve financial performance. This is a desired governance 
arrangement for GBEs’ boards when financial performance is paramount, although 
accountability is less emphasised. This study provides qualitative evidence that 
executive directors give attention to systems and processes for discharge of 
accountability requirements. This evidence, however, was not part of multivariate 
analysis of factors determining the variation of both financial performance and 
accountably-emphasis. Whether executive directors facilitate the achievement of 
financial outcomes as well was not directly determined in this study.  
 
 Therefore, a combination of strategy, capabilities and governance arrangement 
that is likely to enable GBEs to achieve their dual objectives of concurrently fulfil 
financial performance and accountability emphasis is to adopt a defender strategic 
type, develop strengths in outside-in capabilities, have their boards comprise of non-
executive directors, politically-linked directors and financial-literate directors and 
allow executive management the freedom and incentives to attend to organisational 
systems and processes that achieve managerial and public accountabilities.  
 
8.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
 The findings and suggested implications of this study should be cautiously 
relied upon in the light of limitations related to data collection, variable measurements, 
support from prior literature, research design and context specific phenomena.  
 
First, the data collected for the measures of accountability-emphasis, 
organisational capabilities and strategic position are based on perceptions of the 
GBEs’ chief financial officer or principal accounting officer in response to the close-
ended questions in a mail questionnaire. Such survey data can have inherent errors 
arising from the respondents’ acquiescence bias, partitioning bias and halo effect. 
While the survey data is likely to contain elements of bias, this study provides 
qualitative textual data to corroborate the results drawn from the questionnaire data.  
  
 Second, the multi-scale items used to measure the accountability-emphasis 
variable and the modified scales used to measure strategic-types and organisational 
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capabilities variables have not been tested for validity and reliability in prior studies. 
Nevertheless, the current study has conducted statistical testings, namely principal-
components factor analysis and Cronbach’s Alpha, to establish their validity and 
reliability for the context of this study.   
 
Third, there is limited conceptual and empirical literature on the interaction 
effects of corporate governance and capabilities-strategy match, or how such 
interaction relates to  organisational performance, either financial or accountability-
related performance. Additionally, there is limited literature on the relationships 
between corporate governance and public sector accountability, particularly the 
accountability-emphasis. These limitations make the current study somewhat 
exploratory.  
 
 Fourth, the explanatory power of the models is quite low in chapter 7. This 
indicates that other important explanatory variables of GBEs’ financial performance 
and accountability-emphasis could be omitted, especially situational factors of a 
temporal or contextual nature. Research using an ethnographic approach might reveal 
factors such as a sudden change of relevant minister, a major event affecting the 
GBEs operations, a media report about the GBE or an imposed change in government 
policy that has impacted in unique ways on financial performance or accountability-
emphasis of particular GBEs in the sample.   
 
Lastly, the study is conducted in the context of Australian GBEs. This means 
the findings can not necessarily be generalised to other types of organisations that 
operate under different regulatory regimes, different market conditions and different 
ownership structures.  
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APPENDIX 1 
ASSUMPTIONS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS 
 
MODEL 6 
Key assumptions Description Discussion Satisfied/ 
Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity 
among independent 
variables (IVs) 
Multicollinearity exists 
when there is strong 
correlation or linear 
relationship among IVs. 
The presence of 
multicollinearity leads 
to an unstable predictor 
equation. In other 
words, the estimated 
value of the regression 
coefficients will be 
unstable from sample to 
sample. 
There are several ways 
to identify 
multicollinearity; SPSS 
provides variance 
inflation factor (VIF) 
indicator of 
multicollinearity. The 
cut-off VIF score is at 
different level, 
according to different 
researchers. According 
to Field (2005), when 
VIF is greater than 2 
then multicollinearity 
exists among the IVs. 
Mayers (1990), on the 
other hand, suggests 
that the point of 
concern should be 10 
and above. 
Table 7.1 
indicates that the 
VIF scores for 
all IVs are 
around 1. Hence 
it is safe to say 
that Model (6) 
meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Homoscedasticity 
exists when the residual 
term variances are 
constant. When this 
assumption is violated 
the conventional t –test 
for regression 
estimators can no 
longer be justified 
(Berry, 1993).  
This assumption can be 
detected by looking at 
scatter plot of the 
standardised residual 
(Y-axis) and 
standardized predicted 
value (X-axis). When 
residual are plotted in 
random and there is a 
dispersed pattern then 
homoscedasticity is 
assumed (Field, 2005). 
Figure 1 
provides the 
residual scatter 
plot for the 
model. It looks 
randomly plotted 
and in disperse 
pattern, hence it 
is safe to say that 
this assumption 
is met. 
Linearity This assumption 
requires that the IVs to 
have a linear 
relationship with the 
DV. If linearity is not 
present then linear 
regression is not the 
right model to analyse 
the data. 
This assumption can be 
detected in the same 
way as 
homoscedasticity. 
This assumption 
is also met. 
Normality This assumption 
required the residuals 
of the model to be 
randomly distributed 
This assumption can be 
detected by looking at 
histogram and normal 
probability plot (P-P). 
Figure 2 
indicates that the 
residuals are 
distributed 
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with mean of zero. A 
significant violation of 
the normality 
assumption leads to 
significant statistics 
becoming unreliable. 
If the histogram has a 
bell shaped curve then 
the residual is normally 
distributed. On the P-P 
plot, if the residuals are 
plotted along the 45 
degree line then it is 
normally distributed 
(Field, 2005).  
roughly 
normally. There 
is a little positive 
skewness. The P-
P plot in Figure 
3 also indicates 
normality and 
positive 
skewness.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (6) meets the assumptions. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- CONTROL 
VARIABLES AND ERR 
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FIGURE 2: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- CONTROL 
VARIABLES AND ERR 
 
 
FIGURE 3: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT-CONTROL VARIABLES AND 
ERR 
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MODEL 8 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.4 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are around 
1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (8) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 4 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From figure 4, this assumption is also met. 
Normality The P-P plot in Figure 5 indicates a roughly normal 
distributed residuals and a little positive skewness.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (8) meets the assumptions. 
 
FIGURE 4: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- BGI AND ERR 
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FIGURE 5: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT-BGI AND ERR 
 
 
 
MODEL 9 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.5 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are around 
1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (9) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 6 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 6, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 7 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. There is a little negative skewness. The P-P plot in 
Figure 8 also indicates normality and negative skewness.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (9) meets the assumptions. 
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FIGURE 6: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- CONTROL 
VARIABLES AND ACCBTY 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- CONTROL 
VARIABLES AND ACCBTY 
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FIGURE 8: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - CONTROL VARIABLES AND 
ACCBTY 
 
 
 
 
 
MODEL 10 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.6 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are around 
1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (10) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 9 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 9, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 10 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. There is a little negative skewness. The P-P plot in 
Figure 11 also indicates normality and negative skewness.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (10) meets the assumptions. 
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FIGURE 9: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- GOVERNANCE 
VARIABLES AND ACCBTY 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- 
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES AND ACCBTY 
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FIGURE 11: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
AND ACCBTY 
 
 
 
MODEL 11 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.7 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are around 
1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (11) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 12 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 12, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 13 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. There is a little negative skewness. The P-P plot in 
Figure 14 also indicates normality and negative skewness.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (11) meets the assumptions. 
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FIGURE 12: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- BGI AND 
ACCBTY 
 
 
FIGURE 13: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- BGI AND 
ACCBTY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 214
FIGURE 14: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - BGI AND ACCTY 
 
 
 
 
MODEL 12 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.8 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are around 
1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (12) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 15 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 15, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 16 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. There is a little positive skewness and a slight 
deficiency in the middle. The P-P plot in Figure 17 also 
indicates roughly normal distributed residuals.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (12) meets the assumptions. 
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FIGURE 15: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- CAPABILITIES-
STRATEGY MATCH AND ERR 
 
 
FIGURE 16: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- 
CAPABILITIES-STRATEGY MATCH AND ERR 
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FIGURE 17: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - CAPABILITIES-STRATEGY 
MATCH AND ERR 
 
 
 
MODEL 13 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.9 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are around 
1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (13) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 18 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity This assumption is also met. 
Normality The P-P plot in Figure 19 indicates roughly normal 
distributed residuals.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (13) meets the assumptions. 
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FIGURE 18: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- STRATEGIC 
POSITION LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CSM IMPACTS ON ERR 
 
 
 
FIGURE 19: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - STRATEGIC POSITION LEVEL 
ANALYSIS OF CSM IMPACTS ON ERR 
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MODEL 14 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.10 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are 
around 1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (14) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 20 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 20, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 21 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. The P-P plot in Figure 22 also indicates normality.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (14) meets the assumptions. 
 
FIGURE 20: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN CSM AND ACCBTY 
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FIGURE 21: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CSM AND ACCBTY 
 
 
FIGURE 22: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
CSM AND ACCBTY 
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MODEL 15 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.11 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are 
around 1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (15) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 23 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 23, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 24 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. The P-P plot in Figure 25 also indicates normality.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (15) meets the assumptions. 
 
FIGURE 23: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- STRATEGIC 
POSITION LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CSM IMPACTS ON ACCBTY 
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FIGURE 24: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- 
STRATEGIC POSITION LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CSM IMPACTS ON ACCBTY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 25: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - STRATEGIC POSITION 
LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CSM IMPACTS ON ACCBTY 
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MODEL 16 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.12 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are 
around 1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (16) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 26 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 26, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 27 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. However, positive skewness is observed. The P-P 
plot in Figure 28 also indicates normality.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (16) meets the assumptions. 
 
FIGURE 26: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- MODERATING 
EFFECTS OF BGI ON CSM & ERR RELATIONSHIPS 
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FIGURE 27: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- 
MODERATING EFFECTS OF BGI ON CSM & ERR RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
FIGURE 28: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - MODERATING EFFECTS OF 
BGI ON CSM & ERR RELATIONSHIPS 
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MODEL 17 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.13 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are 
around 1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (17) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 29 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 29, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 30 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. However, positive skewness is observed. The P-P 
plot in Figure 31 also indicates normality.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (17) meets the assumptions. 
 
 
FIGURE 29: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- STRATEGIC 
POSITION LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BGI IMPACTS ON CSM AND ERR  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 225
FIGURE 30: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- 
STRATEGIC POSITION LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BGI IMPACTS ON CSM AND 
ERR 
 
 
 
FIGURE 31: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - STRATEGIC POSITION 
LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BGI IMPACTS ON CSM AND ERR  
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MODEL 18 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.14 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are 
around 1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (18) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 32 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 32, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 33 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. The P-P plot in Figure 34 also indicates roughly 
normally distributed residuals.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (18) meets the assumptions. 
 
 
FIGURE 32: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- MODERATING 
EFFECTS OF BGI ON CSM & ACCBTY RELATIONSHIPS 
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FIGURE 33: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS - 
MODERATING EFFECTS OF BGI ON CSM & ACCBTY RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
FIGURE 34: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - MODERATING EFFECTS OF 
BGI ON CSM & ACCBTY RELATIONSHIPS 
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MODEL 19 
Key assumptions Satisfied/ Unsatisfied 
No multicollinearity among 
independent variables (IVs) 
Table 7.15 indicates that the VIF scores for all IVs are 
around 1. Hence it is safe to say that Model (19) meets the 
assumption. 
Homoscedasticity  Figure 32 provides the residual scatter plot for the model. It 
looks randomly plotted and in a dispersed pattern, hence it is 
safe to say that this assumption is met. 
Linearity From Figure 32, this assumption is also met. 
Normality Figure 33 indicates that the residuals are distributed roughly 
normal. The P-P plot in Figure 34 also indicates roughly 
normally distributed residuals.  
Conclusion: The regression result of Model (18) meets the assumptions. 
 
 
FIGURE 35: SCATTER PLOT ON LINEARITY ASSUMPTION- STRATEGIC 
POSITION LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BGI IMPACTS ON CSM AND ERR  
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FIGURE 36: HISTOGRAM PLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS- 
STRATEGIC POSITION LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BGI IMPACTS ON CSM AND 
ERR  
 
 
 
FIGURE 37: NORMALITY PROBABILITY PLOT - STRATEGIC POSITION 
LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BGI IMPACTS ON CSM AND ERR  
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APPENDIX 2 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Address: 
 
Date: 
 
Dear 
 
We are seeking your assistance in conducting research to determine factors affecting 
performance of government business enterprises (GBEs). Your response will be 
highly valued as because you have been chosen from a sample of senior executives of 
GBEs throughout Australia. The research is undertaken as part of PhD study.   
 
The study will provide new understanding about the management issue of developing 
and maintaining the right congruence between the organisation’s range of capabilities 
and chosen strategy-type.  
 
The survey will take no more than 20 minutes to complete. The responses will require 
your organisation to be identified in order to line up the questionnaire data with 
published annual report data. Nevertheless, full confidentially for yourself and your 
organisation is assured as the questionnaire will be destroyed after data is recorded for 
statistical analysis.  We will be pleased to provide a report on detailed findings from 
this research study at your request.  Please email to cheaseth.seng@rmit.edu.au to 
receive our research report. 
 
This questionnaire has been approved by RMIT University’s Business Portfolio 
Human Ethic Committee. To discuss any ethical concerns you may have please feel 
free to contact either Seth or Kristina via the details listed below. We would like to 
thank for your contribution to the research in advance. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
    
 
Seth Seng    Prof. Dennis Taylor 
PhD Candidate   Director of Research 
 
 
 
PhD Candidate 
Seth Seng 
Mobile: 0433206261 
Email: 
cheaseth.seng@rmit.edu.au 
Director of Research 
Prof. Dennis Taylor  
 
Tel: (03) 99255765 
Email: 
dennis.taylor@rmit.edu.au 
Business Portfolio Human 
Ethic Committee 
Ms Kristina Tsoulis-Reay 
Tel: (03) 9925 1408 
Email: 
kristina.tsoulisreay@rmit.edu.au  
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Section A: Personal and Industry Details 
 
Please mark (√) in the relevant boxes. 
 
1. Your gender: 
 
Male      Female    
 
2. Years of service: 
 
0 – 5 years     Over 5 years   
   
3. The main function of your position: 
 
 Accounting/Finance    Marketing/Retailing 
  
 Operations Management   Asset Management 
 
 Human Resource    General Management 
 
4. Industry type: 
 
Public trading enterprise   Public financial enterprise    
  
5. Organisation’s name: 
(Confidentiality assured) 
 
 
 
Section B: Accountability-emphasis 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements about how well your 
organisation discharges its managerial and public accountability in the following ways?  
 
 Strongly  
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Highly responsible to 
ensure the 
achievement of 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
outcomes 
1 2 3 4 
  
5 
  
 
6 
 
Sets clear operating 
targets that integrate 
with broader 
strategic goals 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Provide regular 
management reports 
to ‘oversight bodies’ 
on achievements and 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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outcomes 
Monitor the quality 
of service delivery 
through the use of 
relevant non-
financial 
performance 
measures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Abide by quality 
assurance 
procedures, 
particularly those of 
a relevant quality 
assurance accrediting 
body 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strong emphasis on 
providing excellent 
service and 
responsiveness to 
customer enquiries 
and complaints 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Consider customer 
and the public’s 
feedback into the 
provision of 
services/product and 
operation of the 
organization  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Provide considerable 
public information 
about the 
organization’s 
services, projects and 
plans to customers 
and the public. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
Section C: Organisational Capabilities 
 
In relation to possessing the following types of general capabilities, how strong is 
your organisation? 
 
  Very 
Weak
Somewhat 
Weak 
Slightly 
Weak 
Slightly 
Strong 
Somewhat 
Strong 
Very 
Strong 
Financial Management 
capability (investments in 
strategic projects/programs , 
cash management, financing 
decisions) 
1 2 3 4 
  
5 
  
 
6 
 
Cost control capability 
(cost efficiency in 
service/product supply and 
delivery, tight budgeting) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Ability to monitor and 
predict technological 
changes in the industry 
(through research and 
cooperation with experts in 
the filed the organization 
able to determine and 
forecast future technology 
trend affecting them)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Technology development 
(know how) and 
Innovation capability 
(capacity to develop new 
product/services or apply 
appropriate process 
technologies to produce 
new product to satisfy the 
market needs)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Product or Service 
Transformation processes 
(ability to turn resources 
into product or services 
efficiently, meet design 
specifications, developing 
and delivering 
benefits/value promised) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Customer-linking 
capability (creating and 
managing durable customer 
relationships) 
1 2 3 4 
  
5 
  
 
6 
 
Capability to create 
durable relationships with 
suppliers (establishing and 
maintaining strong working 
relationships with suppliers 
and contractors) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Channel-bonding 
capability (creating durable 
relationships across channel 
members such as suppliers, 
wholesalers and retailers) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ability to retain customers 
(achieving high repeat 
business or retention rate of 
customers) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market sensing capability 
(understand the target 
market(s) and competitors’ 
capabilities) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Section D: Strategic type 
 
Each group of statements below relates to an alternative type of strategic position for 
a profit-making organisation. Please indicate which set of statements (type 1, 2, 3 or 4) 
most closely fits your organisation.   
 
Circle one number only that currently characterizes your organization’s strategies. 
 
Strategic 
Type 
Statements about strategic position 
 
 
 
1 
• This type of organisation attempts to locate and maintain a secure 
niche in a relatively stable product or service area. 
• This organisation tends to offer a more limited range of 
products/services than its competitors. 
• This organisation protects its market domain by offering high 
quality, superior services and low prices. 
• This organisation tends to ignore the industry changes that have no 
direct influence on its market domain.   
 
 
 
 
 
2 
• This organisation typically operates within a broad product/ 
services market domain that undergoes periodic redefinition. 
• The organisation values being “first in” in new product/service and 
market areas even if not all of these efforts prove to highly 
profitable. 
• This organisation rapidly responds to area of opportunity, which 
leads to new round of competitive action. 
• This organisation may not maintain market strength in all areas it 
enters. 
 
 
 
 
3 
• This type of organisation attempts to maintain a stable, limited line 
of product/services. 
At the same time following a carefully selected set of the more 
promising new developments in the industry. 
• This organisation is seldom “first in” with new products/ services, 
however by carefully monitoring the actions of major competitors 
in areas compatible with its stable product market base. 
• This organisation can frequently be “second in” with a more cost-
efficient product or service. 
 
 
 
4 
• This type of organisation does not appear to have a consistent 
product or service market orientation. 
• This organisation is not as aggressive in maintaining established 
product/services and markets as some of its competitors 
• This organisation also not willing to take many risks as other 
competitors 
• This organisation responds in the areas where it is forced by 
environmental pressures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 235
 
 
In the previous question, you selected a current strategic-type of your organisation. 
Which description (i.e. Type 1, 2, 3, 4) best fitted your organisation for the past period 
of 1 to 3 years ago?  Tick one 
Past strategic type from 1 to 3 years ago:  Type 1  
 
  Type 2  
 
  Type 3 
 
  Type 4 
 
 
 
 
Section E: Open ended question 
 
From your perspective, in what ways does your board of directors significantly help or 
hinder: (a) the development of the organisation’s strategies and capabilities, and (b) 
the setting and achievement of financial and accountability-related performance? 
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From your perspective, to what extent does your organization give attention to 
aligning its strategies and capabilities? If so, how is this done?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation 
 
Please send in the reply-paid envelope 
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APPENDIX 3 
INTERVIEW SHEET 
 
 
Interview administrator: Seth Seng 
 
Name of Interviewee:          
 
Position in the organisation:         
 
Organisation:           
 
Date of interview:          
 
Time:            
 
Location:          
           
           
           
            
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Interviewer: 
 
 My name is Seth Seng and I am a research student at the RMIT University. I 
would like to thank you for giving your valuable time to assist with the study. I’m 
conducting a study on government business enterprises (GBEs), aiming to identify 
and understand their organisational capabilities and strategy and their effect on 
performance. In addition, my study incorporates GBEs’ unique characteristics, 
namely the governance and accountability constraints into the investigation. The 
study attempts to show that when organisational capabilities are developed and inline 
with a chosen strategy, the organisation would achieve superior performance and that 
the operational constraints would respectively moderate this relationship.  
 
 Today’s interview aims to identify GBEs’ organisational capabilities, strategy, 
accountability and organisational performance. The interview will proceed as follow; 
a brief introduction to each topic and concept is given then questions will follow.  
Interviewee:          
           
           
           
            
 
 
2. Organisational capabilities 
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Interviewer:  
   Organisational capabilities are skills, abilities, knowledge, know-how and 
organisational processes that the organisation possess. Organisational capabilities can 
be viewed as inside-out capabilities and outside-in capabilities.  
  
 Inside-out capabilities are capabilities that allow the organisation to keep costs 
down and/or differentiate its offering from competitive offerings.   
 
Question 1: 
 
Can you please indicate how strong are the following inside-out capabilities in your 
organisation on a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 is very weak, 6 is very strong? A non-
applicability rating is given when the organisation does not have any particular 
capability.   
 
Interviewee: 
 
  
 Very 
Weak
Somewhat 
Weak 
Slightly 
Weak 
Slightly 
Strong 
Somewhat 
Strong 
Very 
Strong 
Financial Management 
capability (investments in 
strategic projects/programs , 
cash management, financing 
decisions) 
1 2 3 4 
  
5 
  
 
6 
 
Cost control capability 
(cost efficiency in 
service/product supply and 
delivery, tight budgeting) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ability to monitor and 
predict technological 
changes in the industry 
(through research and 
cooperation with experts in 
the filed the organization 
able to determine and 
forecast future technology 
trend affecting them)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Technology development 
(know how) and 
Innovation capability 
(capacity to develop new 
product/services or apply 
appropriate process 
technologies to produce 
new product to satisfy the 
market needs)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Product or Service 
Transformation processes 
(ability to turn resources 
into product or services 
efficiently, meet design 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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specifications, developing 
and delivering 
benefits/value promised) 
 
Interviewer: 
 
 Thanks you for that, it is very helpful in identifying (the organisation’s name) 
capabilities. Now let have a look at the outside-in capabilities. 
 
 Outside-in capabilities are capabilities that bring key information into the 
organisation and allow it to be more responsive to changes in customer needs.    
 
Question 2: 
 
Can you please indicate how strong are the following inside-out capabilities in your 
organisation on a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 is very weak, 6 is very strong? A non-
applicability rating is given when the organisation does not have any particular 
capability.   
 
Interviewee: 
 
Customer-linking 
capability (creating and 
managing durable customer 
relationships) 
1 2 3 4 
  
5 
  
 
6 
 
Capability to create 
durable relationships with 
suppliers (establishing and 
maintaining strong working 
relationships with suppliers 
and contractors) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Channel-bonding 
capability (creating durable 
relationships with channel 
members such as suppliers, 
wholesalers and retailers) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ability to retain customers 
(achieving high repeat 
business or retention rate of 
customers) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market sensing capability 
(understand the target 
market(s) and competitors’ 
capabilities) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Interviewer: 
 
 Since the capabilities that we have looked at are taken from private sector 
organisations which concern mainly with commercial objective and operate in 
different environment from (organisation’s name) i.e. no accountability constraints 
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and community service obligations (CSOs), let turn away from them and look at 
capabilities that are specific to the (organisation’s name).  
 
Question 3: 
 
Given (organisation’s name) operates in the business of (pre-prepare and specific to 
the organisation), what sort of capabilities that (organisation’s name) has developed to 
carry out and be successful in the business? 
 
Interviewee:          
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
  
Question 4: 
 
How do you rate the organisation’s strength on scale of 1 to 6 (same as above) on 
these capabilities? 
 
Interviewee:          
           
           
           
           
           
            
 
 
3. Strategy 
 
Interviewer: 
 
 As a business enterprise, having a clear strategy is important. In addition, for 
(organisation’s name), a government owned enterprise it is even more important as 
strategy is needed to clarify the commercial and government directed objectives i.e. 
CSOs. In other words, the establish strategy needs to be capable of directing 
organisational resources and capabilities to achieve both commercial and government 
directed objectives. 
 
Question 1 
Do you have any comments on this statement? 
 
Interviewee:          
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Question 2: 
 
In your opinion, which one the following competitive strategy types closely fit 
(organisation’s name)?   
 
Strategic 
Type 
Statements about strategic position 
 
 
 
1 
• This type of organisation attempts to locate and maintain a secure 
niche in a relatively stable product or service area. 
• This organisation tends to offer a more limited range of 
products/services than its competitors. 
• This organisation protects its market domain by offering high 
quality, superior services and low prices. 
• This organisation tends to ignore the industry changes that have no 
direct influence on its market domain.   
 
 
 
 
 
2 
• This organisation typically operates within a broad product/ 
services market domain that undergoes periodic redefinition. 
• The organisation values being “first in” in new product/service and 
market areas even if not all of these efforts prove to highly 
profitable. 
• This organisation rapidly responds to area of opportunity, which 
leads to new round of competitive action. 
• This organisation may not maintain market strength in all areas it 
enters. 
 
 
 
 
3 
• This type of organisation attempts to maintain a stable, limited line 
of product/services. 
At the same time following a carefully selected set of the more 
promising new developments in the industry. 
• This organisation is seldom “first in” with new products/ services, 
however by carefully monitoring the actions of major competitors 
in areas compatible with its stable product market base. 
• This organisation can frequently be “second in” with a more cost-
efficient product or service. 
 
 
 
4 
• This type of organisation does not appear to have a consistent 
product or service market orientation. 
• This organisation is not as aggressive in maintaining established 
product/services and markets as some of its competitors 
• This organisation also not willing to take many risks as other 
competitors 
• This organisation responds in the areas where it is forced by 
environmental pressures. 
   
Interviewer 
Question 3:  
 
How well does the strategy type chosen in Question 1 characterise your organisation’s 
strategic orientation? How did you arrive at this conclusion?  
 
Interviewee:          
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Interviewer: 
Question 4 
 
Does the management team consider organisational capabilities in developing strategy 
or vice versa? How?  
 
Interviewee:          
           
           
           
           
            
 
Interviewer: 
Question 5 
 
To your understanding, is (organisation’s name) current financial and accountability 
performance affected by its alignment between capabilities and strategies? How? 
 
Interviewee:          
           
           
           
           
            
 
 
4. Accountability 
 
Interviewer: 
 
A brief explanation of the concept of accountability will be given. 
 
Question 1: 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements about your organisation’s 
dimensions of accountability a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 is strongly disagree and 6 is 
strongly agree? A non-applicability rating will be given if the organisation does not 
face any particular accountability orientation.  
 
Interviewee: 
 
 
 
 
 Strongly  Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
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Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
Highly responsible to 
ensure the 
achievement of 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
outcomes 
1 2 3 4 
  
5 
  
 
6 
 
Sets clear operating 
targets that integrate 
with broader 
strategic goals 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Provide regular 
management reports 
to ‘oversight bodies’ 
on achievements and 
outcomes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Monitor the quality 
of service delivery 
through the use of 
relevant non-
financial 
performance 
measures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Abide by quality 
assurance 
procedures, 
particularly those of 
a relevant quality 
assurance accrediting 
body 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strong emphasis on 
providing excellent 
service and 
responsiveness to 
customer enquiries 
and complaints 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Consider customer 
and the public’s 
feedback into the 
provision of 
services/product and 
operation of the 
organization  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Provide considerable 
public information 
about the 
organization’s 
services, projects and 
plans to customers 
and the public. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
Interviewer: 
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A review of your organisation’s annual report shows that the board of directors is 
responsible to the minister for (the minister that the GBE’s board of directors answer 
to). 
The annual report also shows that your organisation takes community and 
environmental obligations (examples will be given) as part of day-to-day management 
functions, even if not directed by the government. 
 
Question 2: 
 
Is there any accountability requirement(s) as the consequence of this operational 
structure and operations? 
 
Interviewee:          
           
           
           
            
 
Interviewer: 
 
Question 3:  
 
Do the management and board have managerial and public accountability imposed 
upon them? What are the current practices of discharging these accountability 
requirements? 
 
Interviewee:          
           
           
           
           
            
 
 
5. Board governance behaviours 
 
Question 1 
Interviewer: 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the conduct of the 
board of directors?   
 Strongly  
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The Chair takes 
ultimate 
responsibility for all 
aspects of the board’s 
performance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
The Chair seeks to 
foster good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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relationships 
amongst the board 
members, the 
executive team and 
relevant government 
officials and the 
minister 
The board works 
together as a single 
corporate unit 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Board meetings are 
well managed and 
organised 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Discussions at board 
meetings are focused 
and constructive.  
1 2 3 4 
  
5 
  
 
6 
 
Discussions take into 
account the wider 
implications for the 
organisations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Board powers are 
delegated 
appropriately. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Relevant government 
agencies/ 
department(s) 
provide support and 
strategic oversight to 
the board as 
required. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
The executive 
management team 
place very high 
importance on 
assisting the board in 
understanding the 
organization and 
implementing the 
board’s decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Board members are 
well informed about 
all aspects of the 
organisation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Board decisions and 
aims are clearly 
communicated to all 
senior staff. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Question 2 
Interviewer: 
 
To your understanding, do board governance behaviours have impact on financial and 
accountability-related performance? How? 
 
Interviewee:          
           
           
           
           
            
 
 
6. Closing Remark 
Interviewer:  
Thanks for your time, I am deeply appreciated your contribution to this study. If you 
have any queries about the study or would like a copy of the finding to send to you 
please contact me on; 
Mobile: 4033206261 or 
Email: cheaseth.seng@rmit.edu.au 
 
